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TDG UPDATE COHMED 2010, San Antonio

TDG UPDATE COHMED 2010, San Antonio. By Nathalie Belliveau A/ Director Compliance and Response Branch Transport Dangerous Goods Directorate. Purpose of the presentation. Update of the amendments to the TDG Act Reports on accidental releases Most commonly cited non-compliances in 2009

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TDG UPDATE COHMED 2010, San Antonio

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  1. TDG UPDATE COHMED 2010, San Antonio By Nathalie Belliveau A/ Director Compliance and Response Branch Transport Dangerous Goods Directorate

  2. Purpose of the presentation • Update of the amendments to the TDG Act • Reports on accidental releases • Most commonly cited non-compliances in 2009 • Random sampling report • 2010 winter Olympics in Vancouver BC

  3. A newly amended TDG Act, Royal Assent June 16th 2009 • Safety • Strengthen Emergency Response Assistance Plan Program; • Enable inspectors to inspect any place for which a means of containment is being manufactured, repaired or tested; • Reconfirm that the Act is applicable uniformly throughout Canada, including local works and undertakings (movements of dangerous goods within a province not using a federal carrier/shipper); • Change the concept of importer to clarify who is the person in Canada that needs to meet the obligations of the act; • Enable a shipping record to be used in court as evidence of the presence of a dangerous good in a means of containment; and • Some wording changes – permits to certificates and inclusion of new temporary certificate.

  4. New Security Requirements in the Act • Security Response • Enabling the use of Emergency Response Assistance Plans to respond to a terrorist release of dangerous goods. • Security Prevention • Require security plans and security training; • Enable the use Security Measures and Interim Orders (as Public Safety Act and 10 other existing Parliament Acts); and • Enable regulations to be made to require that dangerous goods are tracked during transport, or reported if lost or stolen. 

  5. CBRNE • In 2002, the TDG directorate put in place a Chemical Biological Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) Response Program that would be part of the federal government initiative on counter-terrorism. • The mandate of the TDG CBRNE Response Program is to ensure product response services following a CBRNE incident. Such response would occur once all terrorist-related hazards have been eliminated. • The CBRNE Response Program is based on the existing industrial Emergency Response (ER) network and infrastructure established under the Emergency Response Assistance Plan (ERAP) requirements pursuant to the TDG Act and Regulations. An amended TDG Act to include security is required to fully implement the program.

  6. Amended Act - continued • Personal Liability (Amended Section) • 20.The following persons are not personally liable, either civilly or criminally, in respect of any act or omission done in good faith and without negligence: • (a)any person who responds to an actual or anticipated release using an emergency response assistance plan that applies to the release, acts in accordance with the plan and informs the Canadian Transport Emergency Centre of the Department of Transport of their response to the release; • (b)any person who is directed or required under paragraph 7.1(a), section 17, sub­section 18(2) or paragraph 19(1)(a) or (b) to do or refrain from doing anything and acts in accordance with the direction or requirement; and • (c)any person who acts in accordance with an authorization given under paragraph 7.1(b).

  7. How would it work? • There are two potential security scenarios which could trigger activation of the Emergency Response Assistance Plan following a security (terrorist) incident • a security (terrorist) incident involving a known shipper/producer/manufacturer/offerer of dangerous goods, • Industry would use their existing Emergency Response Assistance Plan to assist first responders following a security (terrorist) incident during the transportation of dangerous goods for their own product. • 2) a security (terrorist) incident involving an unknown shipper/producer/manufacturer/offerer of dangerous goods (unknown meaning an orphaned shipment transported by a terrorist or suicide bomber to a specific location, or found at a site by first responders where the dangerous goods is in an unmarked or improper means of containment, or in a vehicle or truck not owned, leased or rented by a known shipper/manufacturer/producer/offerer. • unknown or orphaned - the Minister (or delegate) would ask a company with an approved ERAP if they would be willing to respond on the government’s behalf. Should an approved company accept to respond, the government would agree to pay the costs associated with that response and provide the responders with indemnity protection. • The company would only be asked to respond after the site has been cleared by the appropriate agencies (i.e., police, RCMP or DND). The choice of plan holder would be based on the appropriateness of the plan and the timeliness of the response.

  8. What Costs could Industry recover • Industry would be eligible to recover capital and operational cost associated with a response (what it includes to be spelled out in regulations). • But would for example include: salaries, meals, hotels, suit replacement, fuel and travel expenses as well as costs associated with damage to equipment such as non sparking tools, vehicles, pumps or hoses due to a requested response. • The government would also be responsible for any damage to third parties caused by necessary response actions by responders to enable access to a site during the requested response. This would include for example replacement cost for fencing cut or removed to have access to a site; or damage to the grass caused by the responder’s vehicles. • Ineligible expenses - the purchase of new equipment to be able to conduct a response or the loss of production due to the acceptance of the government’s response request.

  9. QUARTERLY REPORT • PURPOSE • Supplementon-demand information requests for accident data from TDG Staff. • Revive information reporting function (Regional Monthly Reports distribution 10 years ago) • Make full use of DGAIS to inform Directorate management and staff. • Present accident data to larger audience. • Evaluate Accident Levels Regionally on Quarterly basis • Foresee possible future trends and be aware of what is going on.

  10. CANADA : QUARTERLY REPORT ORIGINAL FIRST PAGE APPENDIX E

  11. CANADA : QUARTERLY REPORT ORIGINAL SECOND PAGE APPENDIX F

  12. REPORTABLE ACCIDENTS In 1989 ( 20 Years Ago ) a) Pacific, Atlantic and Quebec Regions registered comparable accident levels. b) Prairie & Northern and Ontario Regions registered comparable accident levels. In 2008 ( 20 Years Later) a) Ontario Region recorded registered accident levels to the Pacific, Atlantic and Quebec Regions. b) Prairie & Northern registered significantly higher accident levels.

  13. Most commonly cited violations

  14. mean upper limit lower limit Random inspection program • What, Why, Where the non-compliance is by part: Documentation, Training...  • RANDOM INSPECTION PROGRAM - 2008 SUMMARY • Monitoring compliance or lack thereof with the Transportation of Dangerous Goods (TDG) Regulations is an important aspect of the TDG program. Starting in 2005, TDG inspectors visited a number of randomly generated sites, an exercise that has been repeated every year since. From February 1 2008 to January 31 2009, TDG inspectors addressed 492 randomly generated sites, 405 of which were inspected. The results show an overall non-compliance rate of 36%, the lowest value reached since 2005. It is however not statistically significant.

  15. Random inspection program (cont) • Overall Non-Compliance Rate Estimates over the years • The objective of this exercise is to provide each year a reliable non-compliance rate. One that provides a picture in time of how the regulated population is doing. One that TDG will use as a benchmark of the program's performance: the lower the non-compliance, the safer the Canadian public should be. Monitoring this rate over time should allow us to evaluate improvements or deterioration of the situation whether due to changes in the regulations, an increase/decrease in enforcement or awareness of the TDG program, or changes in the industry. • A 36% non-compliance population estimate means that in general we can expect 36% of sites to be non-compliant with one or many parts of the TDG Regulations. One also observes that the parts that are most often contravened are in decreasing order of importance (frequency): Part 3 – Documentation, Part 6 – Training, and Parts 4 and 5 on Safety Marks and Means of Containments. This is essentially what we observe from one year to another. 2008 Non-Compliance Rate – Overall and by Part of the Regulations

  16. Non-Compliance _ + Seriousness Random Inspection Program (cont) • Is the non-compliance serious? Apparently yes!

  17. TDG Work for the Olympics • Safety and Security Threat Risk Assessments completed • Stakeholders engaged – Chemical, Nuclear/radioactive, explosives, ports, CN, CP, BNSF, truckers, associations, provinces, first responders both through the Ministers Advisory Council and locally within British Columbia. • Dangerous Goods Sites mapped and visits conducted by Transportation of Dangerous Goods inspectors and Remedial Measures Specialists. • Dangerous goods products entering the ports reviewed. • Dangerous goods products being transported by rail reviewed. • Road survey conducted (routes and bridges). • Plume modeling conducted on dangerous goods transported.

  18. Proposed Safety and Security Enhancements • Loss and Stolen Dangerous Goods Reporting • Controlled access for the movement and storage of Dangerous Goods in and around venues • Establishment of “controlled access areas” in downtown Vancouver, around other venues and along the Sea-to-Sky corridor • Time of day restrictions on “placarded movements” (i.e. volumes that require a placard) • Movements limited to between midnight and 06:00 am • No ERAP-able movements in downtown core • For example, high volume movements of explosive or flammable gasses that require an Emergency Response Action Plan • Close / move dangerous goods moved by barge • Minimal impact on industry as a new barge facility is being built outside of restricted area • No dangerous goods stored in yards within proximity of venues • Will allow for business critical movement of dangerous goods • Either through exceptions or reducing the volume of goods moved below Placard and / or ERAP thresholds • Targeted inspections at facilities / locations ranking high in the threat risk assessment and as requested by the RCMP both before and during the Olympics. http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/tdg/olympics-controlledaccesszones-322.htm

  19. Questions?

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