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Securing Science Gateways

Securing Science Gateways. July 2011 Victor Hazlewood National Institute for Computational Sciences University of Tennessee victor@utk.edu Matthew Woitaszek Computational and Information Systems Laboratory National Center for Atmospheric Research mattheww@ucar.edu.

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Securing Science Gateways

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  1. Securing Science Gateways July 2011 Victor HazlewoodNational Institute for Computational SciencesUniversity of Tennesseevictor@utk.edu Matthew WoitaszekComputational and Information Systems Laboratory National Center for Atmospheric Researchmattheww@ucar.edu

  2. Securing Science Gateways Overview Work initiated by Science Gateway Group of TeraGrid, led by Nancy Wilkins-Diehr Goal to investigate securing science gateways that balance security, developer ease-of-use, end user ease-of-use and improves security posture Present survey of TeraGrid science gateway implementations and security models Selected commsh integration with Globus GRAM Performed pilot study for securing science gateways with GridAMP science gateway on Kraken at NICS Recommendations for science gateway security beyond TeraGrid (XSEDE) Paper at http://www.nics.tennessee.edu/~victor/SecuringGateways-TG11.pdf

  3. Investigate Securing Science Gateways Gateways have evolved from a web portal requesting service on behalf of a user to using a “community account” shared by a number of portal end users Gateway developers want to employ a reasonably easy-to-use method to authenticate in order to gain access to compute resources Resource providers want gateways to use a secure and auditable method for submitting work and jobs for the gateway end users Additionally, TeraGrid has security and accounting requirements for Science Gateways How to strike the correct balance between development, use and security?

  4. TeraGrid Science Gateways Survey • Over twenty-five TeraGrid science gateways are registered and integrated with the TeraGrid. See https://www.teragrid.org/web/science-gateways/gateway_list • Implementation details of twenty science gateways are reported in the survey table • AuthN • Nineteen reported using community account • One reported using only end user account • Middleware used • Thirteen reported using GRAM2 • Two reported using GRAM4 • Two reported using GSISSH • Two reported using both GRAM2 and GRAM4 • One did not report the grid middleware service used

  5. TeraGrid Science Gateways Survey

  6. The Risks with Community Accounts Compromise of the science gateway server Compromise of the science gateway’s community account short-lived GSI credential Compromise of the science gateway’s community account long-lived GSI credential Unauthorized use of the science gateway community account Unauthorized command and/or application execution on a resource Unauthorized replacement of gateway executables

  7. Risk Mitigation Techniques The gateway community user should only be able to execute authorized commands and software. 1. Separate the user and developer accounts • Personal accounts used for development • Gateway software installed in shared software area via group permissions • ‘sudo’ available if required for testing

  8. Risk Mitigation Techniques 2. Use the NCSA “commsh” restricted shell for community accounts • When set as a shell, filters all commands according to rules (like sudo or using regular expressions) • Integrates easily with GRAM4 and GRAM5, also works for accounts using gsissh and qsub 3. Disambiguate and audit community account users using SAML assertions • Currently informational; may be mandatory

  9. Mitigation with commsh a New Tool for Securing GRAM • NCSA commsh tool • When set as a shell, filters all commands according to rules (like sudo or using regular expressions) • Integrates easily with GRAM4 and GRAM5, also works for accounts using gsissh and qsub • Decided to investigate use of commsh • Found willing accomplice to pilot the use of commsh with GRAM for AMP at NCAR using Kraken at NICS

  10. Pilot Requirements Use of Kraken as the computational resource Installation and configuration of Science Gateway Kit on Kraken with GRAM4 (eventually upgraded to GRAM5) Report gateway end user attributes (gramAudit) Use commsh to restrict community user access Use a managed gateway directoryscripts, executables and static datasets go here Use GSI authentication AMP must get productive work done

  11. AMP portal – http://amp.ucar.edu/

  12. Kraken Compute Resource at NICS 1.17 PetaFlop Cray XT5 9408 nodes with 112,896 compute cores Two 2.6 GHz AMD processors with 12 cores per node 147 TBs memory

  13. AMP Architecture Web Interface GridAMP Daemon Remote Resource GRAM4 GRAM5 SQL DB SQL SQL • Users interact with a web server • Community certificate on the daemon server • All communication through database • SQL recordset role controls • All input files parsed, stored in database using native types, and regenerated by template before transmission to remote resource

  14. GridAMP Simulation Processing Simulation Web Auth. Record Community Certificate + SAML assertion Simulation Certificate Every simulation uses a unique X.509 certificate with a SAML assertion Simulation-specific certificates cached and regenerated automatically

  15. GridAMP Simulation Processing Simulation Web Auth. Record Community Certificate + SAML assertion Simulation Certificate SAML GRAM Audit Log & TGCDB GRAM4 GRAM5 Remote Resource + commsh Processing Command Fork or Queue developer makes sure these match • Developer must register commands with commsh • GRAM4/5 on resource: • Checks command with commsh • Extracts SAML for audit log

  16. Pilot Study Experiences • Gateway Developer • Must understand commsh (and work with RP) • Must understand and implement SAML assertions(may require gateway user interface modification!) • Must understand use of gateway managed directory • Gateway User • No end user visible changes • System Administrator • GRAM4 and GRAM5 have steep learning curve to configure and test (provided feedback to Globus dev) • Commsh and gramAudit configuration needs better installation and example documentation • Found a commsh bug [GRAM-206]

  17. Recommendations Continue mandatory TeraGrid security and accounting requirements Use of community accounts should be limited to GRAM and GSISSH implementations Restrict commands that may be executed on a host by a community account with commsh or an equivalent Require use of a “managed gateway directory” for community accounts scripts, executables and static data

  18. Recommendations Do not allow use of the community account for gateway development. Use a gateway developer account Limit community account user certificates to be only from short-lived certificate authorities Audit user DNs periodically to make sure multiple end users do not use the same DNs When user or community accounts are compromised revoke all related user certs Improve the commsh configuration documentation

  19. Recommendations Fix the commsh bug [GRAM-206]Note: this has been reported as fixed.

  20. Questions or Comments?

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