Dr. Martin Sherman

1. Asia III The Middle East Conflict : Separating Fact from Fantasy Dr. Martin Sherman Singapore, Septembetr 2006

2. "Do whatever you want, you and your family in your home, worship whatever you want, but there has not been, or will be a church [in the kingdom].” Prince Sultan of Saudi Arabia The Christian population declined 29 percent in the West Bank and 20 percent in the Gaza Strip from 1997 to 2002. By contrast, in the period 1995–2003, Israel’s Arab Christian population grew 14.1 percent (CAMERA, December 24, 2004).

3. Bethlehem Christians under Palestinian Authority ►The Christian population was reduced from a 60% majority in 1990 to a 20% minority in 2001 (23,000) ► 1,640 Christians fled Bethlehem between Oct. 2000 and Nov. 2001 ► More Beit Jala Christians reside in Belize (Central America) than are left in Beit Jalah itself. ► Before 1995, Bethlehem had a majority-Christian municipal council. After the PA take- over, Arafat replaced the municipal council with a predominately Muslim council. 51.2% of Christians in Beit Sahour are considering emigration ► 45% of Palestinian Christians in Bethlehem expressed growing fears of tensions between Christians and Muslims ► Mosques in Bethlehem: 1970 - 5 mosques; 2004 - 72 mosques

4. ? The Authenticity of the Palestinian Claims ? The Legitimacy of Palestinian Narrative ? The Relevance of a Palestinian State ? The Feasibility of Alternative Solutions

5. ? The Authenticity of the Palestinian Claims

6. There are no differences between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. We are all part of one nation. It is only for political reasons that we carefully underline our Palestinian identity, because it is in the interest of the Arabs to encourage a separate Palestinian identity. Yes, the existence of a separate Palestinian identity serves only tactical purposes. The founding of a Palestinian state is a new tool in the continuing battle against Israel. Zuheir Muhsin, formerly the head of the PLO's Military Department and member of its Executive Council Dutch daily Trouw March 31, 1977 … Jordanians and Palestinians are considered by the PLO as one people. Farouk Kadoumi, head of the PLO Political Department, Newsweek, on 14th March 1977. The appearance of the Palestinian national personality comes as an answer to Israel’s claim that Palestine is Jewish. King Hussein, Amman, Nov. 1987

7. The Palestinian National Charter Article 1. Palestine, the homeland of the Palestinian Arab people, is an inseparable part of the greater Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are a part of the Arab Nation. Article 12: The Palestinian people believe in Arab unity. In order to contribute their share toward the attainment of that belief, however, they must, at the present stage of their struggle, safeguard their Palestinian identity and develop their consciousness of that identity, and oppose any plan that may dissolve or impair it.

8. ? The Legitimacy of Palestinian Narrative

9. Two Opposing Hypotheses to Account for the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Conventional Wisdom: The Fuel of the Conflict is the Absence of Palestinian Self Determination The True Palestinian Aspiration is to Establisha State for Themselves Alternative Wisdom: The Fuel of the Conflict is the Existence of Jewish Self Determination The True Palestinian Aspiration is to Dismantle a State for Jews

10. Rejection of every territorial proposal, which would have allowed them to create a state of their own - from the 1947 partition plan to Barak's offer at Camp David in 2000 Rejection of a "two state solution", as evidenced in their rhetoric and symbolism in which they portray the whole the Land of Israel, from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River, as part of Arab Palestine. Palestinians refrained from demands to exert their national sovereignty in the pre-1967 "West Bank" and Gaza - as evidenced by the text of their original National Charter. Accept rule by a Hashemite Bedouin despot, who represents the minority in the land. Rejection not only of the far-reaching generosity of the Barak proposal, but also the violent manner in which they rejected it. Although the proposals did include a proviso insisting on "end of conflict“, they were unprecedented in the concessions offered towards making a Palestinian state a feasible prospect. Palestinian response is explic-able only if "end of conflict" is an unacceptable concept for them. Stubborn insistence on the "right of return“, which implies placing hundreds of thousands of Palestinians ( and possibly even more), now living in Arab countries, under Israeli jurisdiction, a position hardly consistent with an alleged desire to be free of oppressive Israeli control... or with an equitable two-state solution.

11. Rejection of every territorial proposal, which would have allowed them to create a state of their own - from the 1947 partition plan to Barak's offer at Camp David in 2000

12. Israel & the Arab World Israel & the Moslem World

17. Rejection of a "two state solution", as evidenced in their rhetoric and symbolism in which they portray the whole the Land of Israel, from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River, as part of Arab Palestine.

18. Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - GC Palestinian Symbolism

19. Palestinian Islamic Jihad Hamas Palestinian Symbolism

20. Some Principles of the Hamas Charter ► Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it. ► The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf consecrated for future Moslem generations until Judgment Day. It, or any part of it, should not be squandered: it, or any part of it, should not be given up. ► There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad. Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are all a waste of time and vain endeavors. Palestinian Rhetoric

21. Fateh: The Movement's Essential Principles http://www.fateh.net/e_public/constitution.htm Article (6) UN projects, accords and resolutions, or those of any individual which undermine the Palestinian people's right in their homeland are illegal and rejected Article (7) The Zionist Movement is racial, colonial and aggressive in ideology, goals, organization and method. Article (8) The Israeli existence in Palestine is a Zionist invasion with a colonial expansive base, and it is a natural ally to colonialism and international imperialism Palestinian Rhetoric (cont) Goals Article (12)Complete liberation of Palestine, and eradication of Zionist economic, political, military and cultural existence. Article (13)Establishing an independent democratic state with complete sovereignty on all Palestinian lands, and Jerusalem is its capital city, and protecting the citizens' legal and equal rights without any racial or religious discrimination.   Methods Article (19)Armed struggle is a strategy and not a tactic, and the Palestinian Arab People's armed revolution is a decisive factor in the liberation fight and in uprooting the Zionist existence, and this struggle will not cease unless the Zionist state is demolished and Palestine is completely liberated

22. The Nature of Zionism and the Existence of Israel Fateh Article (7)The Zionist Movement is racial, colonial and aggressive in ideology, goals, organization and method. Article (8)The Israeli existence in Palestine is a Zionist invasion with a colonial expansive base, and it is a natural ally to colonialism and international imperialism Hamas The Zionist invasion is a mischievous one. It does not hesitate to take any road, or to pursue all despicable and repulsive means to fulfill its desires.

23. Attitudes to Peace and Efforts of International Mediation Fateh Article (6) UN projects, accords and resolutions, or those of any individual which undermine the Palestinian people's right in their homeland are illegal and rejected Article (22) Opposing any political solution offered as an alternative to demolishing the Zionist occupation in Palestine, as well as any project intended to liquidate the Palestinian case or impose any international mandate on its people. Hamas [Peace] initiatives, the so-called peaceful solutions, and the international conferences to resolve the Palestinian problem, are all contrary to the beliefs of the Islamic Resistance Movement….The initiatives, proposals and International Conferences are but a waste of time, an exercise in futility…Those conferences are no more than a means to appoint the nonbelievers as arbitrators in the lands of Islam. Since when did the Unbelievers do justice to the Believers?

24. The Rejection of Any Non-Violent Resolution of the Conflict Fateh - Methods - Article (19)Armed struggle is a strategy and not a tactic, and the Palestinian Arab People's armed revolution is a decisive factor in the liberation fight and in uprooting the Zionist existence, and this struggle will not cease unless the Zionist state is demolished and Palestine is completely liberated Hamas Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it…There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad

25. The Totality of the Repudiation of Israel Fateh - Goals - Article (12) Complete liberation of Palestine, and eradication of Zionist economic, political, military and cultural existence Hamas The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf consecrated for future Moslem generations until Judgment Day. It, or any part of it, should not be squandered: it, or any part of it, should not be given up… Israel, by virtue of its being Jewish and of having a Jewish population, defies Islam and the Muslims.

26. Palestinians refrained from demands to exert their national sovereignty in the pre-1967 "West Bank" and Gaza - as evidenced by the text of their original National Charter. Accept rule by a Hashemite Bedouin despot, who represents the minority in the land.

27. THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL CHARTER Adopted in 1964 by the 1st Palestinian Conference Article 16: The liberation of Palestine…is a defensive act necessitated by the demands of self-defense as stated in the Charter of the United Nations. For that, the people of Palestine… look forward to…restoring the legitimate situation to Palestine, establishing peace and security in its territory, and enabling its people to exercise national sovereignty... Article 24: This Organization does not exercise any territorial sovereignty over the West Bank in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, on the Gaza Strip or in the Himmah Area…

28. Rejection not only of the far-reaching generosity of the Barak proposal, but also the violent manner in which they rejected it. Although the proposals did include a proviso insisting on "end of conflict“, they were unprecedented in the concessions offered towards making a Palestinian state a feasible prospect. Palestinian response is explicable only if "end of conflict" is an unacceptable concept for them.

29. Stubborn insistence on the "right of return“, which implies placing hundreds of thousands of Palestinians ( and possibly even more), now living in Arab countries, under Israeli jurisdiction, a position hardly consistent with an alleged desire to be free of oppressive Israeli control... or with an equitable two-state solution.

30. ? The Relevance of a Palestinian State

31. The wave which bore the kind of claims for national self determination invoked by the Palestinians began in the forties with the end of WW-II, the breakup of empire and the casting off of colonial rule in far flung imperial territories with little generic affinity to the ruling European power in terms of its social, cultural or historical roots. It peaked in the late 50s and early 60s andpetered out in the late 70s with virtually no political entities being granted independence from non-indigenous control after the mid-80s. The only significant subsequent additions of states to the international system, which had by that time to a large degree stabilized, were those that emerged from the dissolution of the Communist bloc in Eastern and Central Europe, the Balkans and Central Asia. But this was a state-forming process entirely different in it political origins, in its political rationale and in its duration. It began in the 1990s and ended in the 1990s. It involved the disintegration of existing sovereign countries (or at least ostensibly sovereign countries) rather than disenfranchised people extricating themselves from alien control which emanated from distant centers of power in foreign capitals.

32. The Palestinians have enjoyed: Almost Universal International Endorsement of Their Claims Highly Supportive International Media Coverage Decades of Super Power Patronage Highly Accommodative Israeli Regimes which not only Acknowledged but Identified with their Claims

33. Over Half a Century of Proven Palestinian Political Incompetence and Administrative Failure -- Despite Highly Favorable Conditions Imply: As a National Entity --the Palestinians have “Failed the Test of History” As a Political Goal – a Palestinian State has become an Historical Anachronism and as such Should be Removed for the International Agenda

34. The de-legitimization of the Palestinian narrative and the dismissal of Palestinian demands for statehood will not obviate the practical plight of hundreds of thousand essentially disenfranchised Palestinian families resident in Samaria, Judea and Gaza. This is a predicament that still must be addressed and – dissipated. The major thrust of the effort should be directed along two major channels: Generous monetary compensation to effect the relocation and rehabilitation of the Palestinian residents of Samaria, Judea and Gaza elsewhere. "Atomization" of the issue by making the offer of compensation and relocation directly to the heads of families and not through any Palestinian organizational structure.

35. ? The Feasibility of Alternative Solutions

36. The feasibility of such a proposal should be analyzed on three separate levels: The acceptability of the proposal of relocation finance to the prospective recipients. The acceptability of the proposal to the prospective host countries that would become future domiciles for the relocated Palestinians. The affordability of the economic cost of the proposal relative to other available options.

37. The Feasibility of Two State Solutions based on :- ► Significant Israeli Withdrawal ► Establishment of a Self Ruling Palestinian Entity in the Evacuated Territories Another Issue of Feasibility that Should Be Addressed: Feasibility of Long Term Israeli Survivabilty within the Context of a Palestinian State

38. Feasibility of Long Term Israeli Survivabilty within the Context of a Palestinian State

40. Water Line Ben Gurion Airport Tel Aviv Area 1976 Green Line Jordan Valley

41. ● Major Air Fields - Civilian and Military ● Major Sea Ports and Naval Bases ●Principal Power Stations ●Sweet Water System ●Crucial Communications and Transport Systems ● Vital Centers of Military Command & Control, and Centers of Civilian Government ●80% of the Population and 80%of the Economic Activity

42. What these two senators [Byrd and Dole] assume is that somehow or other, some Arab state has a right to claim that anything beyond the Green Line is Arab territory under 242 and 338. This is exactly contrary to its provisions and its purpose…. [T]here is an important document which has now been released. It is useful in interpreting Resolution 242 because it reveals part of what the U.S. government had in mind in pushing the resolution through. It is a map of the area, showing the places of particular security concern to Israel. The map was prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who made a study of Israeli security …to advise the President on what the security concerns of Israel were.* The study advised …that the security of Israel required Israel to receive parts of the territory of the West Bank as essential to its defense. In fact, all the studies of the Israeli security problem reached the same conclusion – from the security point of view, Israel must hold the high points in the West Bank and areas along the Jordan River. I do not know if the Joint Chiefs of Staff would draw a different map today, but I doubt is very much. * See Appendix D. Editor Eugene V. Rostow, “The Peace-Making Process and UN Resolutions 242 and 338” in Israel’s Legitimacy in Law and History, New York: Center for Near East Policy Research, 1993

44. Head of Military Intelligence: The Arabs Demand 60 Percent of Israel’s Water

45. Territorial Concessions = Multi Dimensional Threat !! (a) Length – Extent of Frontiers (b) Width – No “Strategic Depth” (c) Height – Topographical Inferiority (d) Depth – Hydrological Dependency

46. The acceptability of the proposal of relocation finance to the prospective recipients.

47. The Palestinian GNP was 38% lower in 2002 than in 1999, according to a World Bank report on the impact of the first 27 months of the intifada. The World Bank reports that unemployment amounted to 37% of the labor force at the end of 2002. The stricter standards utilized by the International Labor Organization (ILO), which only include people actively seeking work in the labor force, show 27% unemployment at the end of 2002. Per capita income fell by over 46%, compared with 1999, and the poverty rate, defined as less than $2.10 a day in income, was almost 60% of the population, compared with 21% on the eve of the intifada. The Palestinian population grew by 13% between 1999 and 2002. http://www.globes.co.il/DocsEn/did=704221.htm

48. Country/Grouping GNP per capita Years of GNP per capita per $100,000 Years of GNP per capita per $150,000 World Average 5830 17 26 Palestinian Administ’d Territories* 1600 64 94 Central America 1980 51 78 South America 3340 30 45 North Africa 1790 56 84 OPEC 1770 57 86 Jordan 1630 61 92 Egypt 1340 75 112 Morocco 1150 87 130 Tunisia 2110 47 71 Indonesia 600 167 250 India 448 223 334 Pakistan 443 225 338 Kenya 351 285 427 Nigeria 790 127 190 Source: US Department of State – WMEAT 1999-2000. *USAID - 2000

49. Continue life under the Rigors of Israeli Control Life under and even more repressive and regressive Palestinian Regime Accept the Relocation Grant and build a new life of himself and his family Accept the Relocation Grant and build a new life of himself and his family Relocation and Rehabilitation as Individual Rational Choice The individual Palestinian would have the following choices:

50. Palestinian Survey 42% state that they have considered emigrating permanently to some other country In answer to the question "What would induce you to emigrate permanently, only 15% stated that nothing would induce them. Over 70% specified one or more material factors that would induce to emigrate permanently them such as substantial financial compensation; guarantee of a good job abroad; a good level of housing Suvey was conducted by face to face interviews on 15-21 Nov, 2004 during various hours of the , by means of a structured questionnaire in Arabic, among a random sample of 528 interviewees, representative of the adult population in Judea and Samaria(17yrs of age and above). Statistical margin of error 4.5%. The sampling and the interviews were conducted by pollsters of THE PALESTINIAN CENTER FOR PUBLIC OPINION. The questionnaire design , the data input, the statistical processing, the formulation of final report were done by Maagar Mohot Ltd. The survey was conducted by Maagar Mohot Interdisciplinary Research and Consulting Institute Ltd, under the supervision of Prof, Yitzhak Katz, Prof. Baruch Mevorach – Scientific Director, and Amir Horkin, Research Manager ,in collaboration with THE PALESTINIAN CENTER FOR PUBLIC OPINION under the management of Dr.Nabil Kokli