'Address space layout randomization' diaporamas de présentation

Cellular Networks and Mobile Computing COMS 6998-11, Fall 2012

Cellular Networks and Mobile Computing COMS 6998-11, Fall 2012. Instructor: Li Erran Li ( lel2139@columbia.edu ) http://www.cs.columbia.edu/ ~lierranli/coms6998-11Fall2012/ Lecture 10: Mobile Malware. Syllabus. Mobile App Development (lecture 2,3)

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Practical Malware Analysis

Practical Malware Analysis. Ch 9: OllyDbg. History. OllyDbg was developed more than a decade ago First used to crack software and to develop exploits The OllyDbg 1.1 source code was purchased by Immunity and rebranded as Immunity Debugger The two products are very similar. Loading Malware.

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Program Security Part 2

Program Security Part 2. Trying to Prevent Attacks Due to Insecure Code. Assessing the Impact of Memory Corruption. Let's try to access the risk these memory corruption vulnerabilities represent. A number of factors affect how exploitable a vulnerability is.

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Hands-On Ethical Hacking and Network Defense

Chapter 6 Enumeration. Hands-On Ethical Hacking and Network Defense. Objectives. Describe the enumeration step of security testing Enumerate Microsoft OS targets Enumerate NetWare OS targets Enumerate *NIX OS targets. Introduction to Enumeration. Enumeration extracts information about:

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Advanced Network Security

Advanced Network Security. Fall 2014 Instructor: Kun Sun. Outline. Introduction of Moving Target Defense How to defeat Buffer Overflow attacks? Address Space Layout Randomization How to defeat port scanning attacks? IP/port randomization. What is Moving Target Defense (MTD)?.

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Introduction to exploitation

Introduction to exploitation. James McFadyen. About Me. Information Security Engineer and Director of Customer Support at HAWK Network Defense, Inc . Student at UTD Active in local security community 2600 UTDCSG DC214

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0x1A Great Papers in Computer Security

CS 380S. 0x1A Great Papers in Computer Security. Vitaly Shmatikov. http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/courses/cs380s/. Problem: Lack of Diversity. Stack smashing and return-to-libc exploits need to know the (virtual) address to hijack control Address of attack code in the buffer

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Chapter 10

Chapter 10. Hacking Code. Last modified 4-24-09. Common Exploit Techniques. Buffer Overflows and Design Flaws History Buffer over-runs in the mid-1990s Then C library vulnerabilities Then string vulnerabilities, off-by one buffer overruns, and database vulnerabilities

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Using Memory Management to Detect and Extract Illegitimate Code for Malware Analysis

Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC) 2012. Using Memory Management to Detect and Extract Illegitimate Code for Malware Analysis. Carsten Willems 1 , Thorsten Holz 1 , Felix Freiling 2 1 Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany 2 University of Erlangen, Germany. ???

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Practical Reversing VI - Exploit Development [advanced]

Reverse Engineering & Malware Analysis Training. Amit Malik. Practical Reversing VI - Exploit Development [advanced]. www.SecurityXploded.com. Disclaimer.

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Intro to Exploitation Stack Overflows

Intro to Exploitation Stack Overflows. James McFadyen UTD Computer Security Group 10/20/2011. Intro to Exploitation. Only an intro to stack overflow Basic theory and application One of many types of exploitation. Outline. What is a buffer overflow? Tools Vulnerable C Functions

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Using EMET to defend against targeted attacks

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THE XP MIGRATION IS HERE

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The Superdiversifier: Peephole Individualization for Software Protection

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Instrumentation with Relocatable Program Code

Instrumentation with Relocatable Program Code. Tugrul Ince Department of Computer Science University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742. Code Patching. void BZ2_blockSort ( EState * s ) {. UInt32* ptr = s-> ptr ; UChar * block = s->block; UInt32* ftab = s-> ftab ;

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3-Protecting Systems

3-Protecting Systems. Dr. John P. Abraham Professor UTPA. Hardening Operating System. 3 pronged approach: operating system updates, Protect against buffer overflows, configuring operating system protections. Operating System updates. Security Patch: Covers discovered Vulnerabilities

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