'Stackelberg game' diaporamas de présentation

Keep the Adversary Guessing: Agent Security by Policy Randomization

Keep the Adversary Guessing: Agent Security by Policy Randomization. Praveen Paruchuri University of Southern California paruchur@usc.edu. Motivation: The Prediction Game. Police vehicle Patrols 4 regions Can you predict the patrol pattern ? Pattern 1 Pattern 2

344 views • 34 slides

Signaling and Reputation in Repeated Games

Signaling and Reputation in Repeated Games. Charles Roddie Nuffield College, Oxford. What is reputation?. Link between what an agent has done in past and what he is expected to do in future Two approaches: Exact Do x repeatedly to establish reputation for x

451 views • 27 slides

ISP vs. ISP+CDN: Can ISPs in Duopoly Profit by Introducing CDN Services?

W-PIN 2012, London, UK . ISP vs. ISP+CDN: Can ISPs in Duopoly Profit by Introducing CDN Services?. Dongmyung Lee Seoul National University June 11, 2012. Joint work with J. Mo and J. Park. Introduction Model The Game Numerical Results Conclusion. Contents.

291 views • 14 slides

ECO290E: Game Theory

ECO290E: Game Theory. Lecture 9 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. Game Tree. An extensive-form game is defined by a tree that consists of nodes connected by branches . Each branch is an arrow , pointing from one node (a predecessor ) to another (a successor ).

210 views • 8 slides

69 views • 6 slides