LEVERAGING UICC WITH OPEN MOBILE API FOR SECURE APPLICATIONS AND SERVICES

1. LEVERAGING UICC WITH OPEN MOBILE API FOR SECURE APPLICATIONS AND SERVICES Ran Zhou

2. Motivation • Smartphones become the handheld computer and the personal assistant • Growing market has attracted hackers to make the potential for serious security threats on smartphones a reality • UICC serves as the security anchor in mobile networks • GSM Association: the UICC is the strategically best alternative as a secure element for mobile devices [Sma09] • Interface is required to fill the gap between UICC applets and mobile applications

3. Solution Idea • SIMAlliance Open Mobile API: the communication channel • Dual ApplicationArchitecture: the basic architecture • An example: Smart OpenID

4. Agenda • Motivation and Solution Idea • Basic Technologies • State of the Art • Smart OpenID • Implementation • Summary and Future Work

5. Universal Integrated Circuit Card:UICC • The bearer of the subscriber’s identity in cellular networks • Secure element secure storage, cryptographic functions • Secure channel transmission between the UICC and the server with authenticity, integrity, confidentiality • Wireless PKI mobile network operator owns root certificate: becomes a certificate authority

6. Open Mobile API Open Mobile API is established by SIMalliance as an open API between secure element and the mobile applications • Crypto • Authentication • Secure Storage • PKCS#15 • … Open Mobile API

7. Open Mobile API

8. Agenda • Motivation and Solution Idea • Basic Technologies • State of the Art • Smart OpenID • Implementation • Summary and Future Work

9. State of the Art • Financial applications online-banking, contactless payment, tickets apps • Enterprise applications secure Email, ERP, Software as a Service • Content protection applications digital rights management, secure document • Authentication applications generic bootstrapping architecture, public key infrastructure

10. State of the Art • Malware virus, Trojan horse, Spyware • Eavesdropping traffic (password) on the network • Man-in-the-middle attacker manipulates the transmitted data • Replay attacks a valid data is maliciously repeated or delayed • Phishing acquires data by masquerading as a trustworthy entity

11. State of the Art • Private information is the main aim of the attacker, e.g., password, credit card number etc. • Anti-Malware, secure storage, digital certificate, transport layer security, authentication etc. • Some countermeasures are unusual on smartphone • Existed protocols are vulnerable to different attacks

12. Agenda • Motivation and Solution Idea • Basic Technologies • State of the Art • Smart OpenID • Implementation • Summary and Future Work

13. OpenID Relying Parties Relying Party Association session: a shared symmetric key + association handle Submit OpenID Authentication response: signed with the shared key User authentication Device OpenID Provider User

14. Threats to OpenID • Malware virus, Trojan horse, Spyware • Eavesdropping password on the network • Man-in-the-middle attacker captures the transmitted password, authentication assertion, optionally alters it • Replay attacks a valid authentication assertion is maliciously repeated • Phishing acquire password by masquerading as an OP

15. Smart OpenID: Concept • Authentication factor • something the user knows: password • something the user has: smart card • something the user is: finger print • Using UICC as credential • shares a long-term secret (LTS) with the server • derives a key from the LTS and an one-time password • PIN verification to activate the function

16. Submit OpenID Association Handle Association Smart OpenID Relying Parties Relying Party Association handle + derived key (symmetric) Signed assertion (with same derivated key) Local authentication (with PIN) Local OP Provider = Mobile Application + UICC Applet User Network OpenID Provider Trust (long-term secret)

17. Smart OpenID Long-term secret: 64 bytes Association handle: less than 255 bytes Key derivation functions: PBKDF2 • use HMAC-SHA-1/HMAC-SHA-256 (hash-based message authentication code) as underlying algorithm • configurable iteration count and derived key length

18. Security Analysis

19. Security Analysis : Phishing Derived Key S = PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-1(LTS, AH, 64, 64)

20. Agenda • Motivation and Solution Idea • Basic Technologies • State of the Art • Smart OpenID • Implementation • Summary and Future Work

21. Implementation • Platform Android 2.3.5 Java Card UICC 2.2.1 • Algorithms key derivation function: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-1 signature: HMAC-SHA-1

22. Demo

23. Performance Iteration: 64 rounds AH: 240 bytes Derived key length: 64 bytes

24. Performance Derived key length: 64 bytes

25. Agenda • Motivation and Solution Idea • Basic Technologies • State of the Art • Smart OpenID • Implementation • Summary and Future Work

26. Summary • UICC as secure element on smartphones • Dual Application Architecture with Open Mobile API • Improve existed protocols with the UICC • Other usages: • Digital certificate • Wireless PKI • NFC payment • …

27. Future Work • Smart OpenID with HMAC-SHA-256 • Implementation of other applications

28. 28 Thank you! Questions?

29. Bibliographie [Sma09] SmartTrust. The role of SIM OTA and the mobile operator in the NFC environment, 4 2009.

30. Smartphone • Mobile phone voice communication and messaging • Feature phone digital camera, gaming, music and video streaming • Smartphone modern operating system, high speed connectivity, third-party applications ...

31. Access Control Module

32. Security Analysis : Phishing

33. Security Analysis : Phishing