The Strategy of Coercion in Humanitarian Intervention: Can the EU Do It?

1. The Strategy of Coercion in Humanitarian Intervention: Can the EU Do It? By Christina Zygakis Founder & Director, The New IR Scholar project

2. What is the strategy of coercion? • Practically, a combination of military mobilization (military coercion) and diplomacy (coercive diplomacy) vs. Consideration of these terms as synonymous in Strategic Studies scholarship

3. What is the strategy of coercion? • Definition: “Coercion is the use of threats to influence the behavior of another (usually a target state but occasionally a non-state actor) by making it choose to comply rather than directly forcing it to comply (i.e. by brute force)” (Bratton, 2005)

4. What is the strategy of coercion? • Diplomacy-Military force Developments in the one shape developments in the other “We need to think about force and diplomacy not strictly dichotomously and not even necessarily sequentially: force “and” diplomacy, not just force “or” diplomacy” (Stanley Foundation, 2006)

5. What is the strategy of coercion? • Purpose: to force the opponent to avoid, cease or undo an unwanted action (e.g. ethnic cleansing)

6. What is the strategy of coercion? • Means of coercion 3 schools • Use of diplomacy separately from the use of force • Almost exclusive use of force (mainly air power) • Application of both diplomacy and force

7. What is the strategy of coercion? • Positive analogy between each actor’s power and possibilities of violence escalation • Dependence on deliberate decision making • Cost of non-compliance Very important factor

8. Factors for Success and Failure

9. Factors for success and failure • Compliance of the opponent and avoidance of full materialization of threats/full escalation of violence by the coercer Success • Materialization of threats/full escalation of force (no matter who is victorious) Failure

10. Factors for success and failure Table 1. Measuring success of coercion. Source: Jacobsen, Peter V., “Coercive Diplomacy: Frequently Used Seldom Successful”, KunglKrigsvetenskapsakademiensHandlingarOchTidskrift, April 2007

11. Factors for success and failure Table 2. Western use of coercive diplomacy to stop/undo acts of agression, 1990/2005. Source: Jacobsen, Peter V., “Coercive Diplomacy: Frequently Used Seldom Successful”, KunglKrigsvetenskapsakademiensHandlingarOchTidskrift, April 2007

12. Factors for success and failure Table 2. Western use of coercive diplomacy to stop/undo acts of agression, 1990/2005. Source: Jacobsen, Peter V., “Coercive Diplomacy: Frequently Used Seldom Successful”, KunglKrigsvetenskapsakademiensHandlingarOchTidskrift, April 2007

13. Factors for success and failure Table 2. Western use of coercive diplomacy to stop/undo acts of agression, 1990/2005. Source: Jacobsen, Peter V., “Coercive Diplomacy: Frequently Used Seldom Successful”, KunglKrigsvetenskapsakademiensHandlingarOchTidskrift, April 2007

14. Factors for success and failure Table 2. Western use of coercive diplomacy to stop/undo acts of agression, 1990/2005. Source: Jacobsen, Peter V., “Coercive Diplomacy: Frequently Used Seldom Successful”, KunglKrigsvetenskapsakademiensHandlingarOchTidskrift, April 2007

15. Factors for success and failure Table 2. Western use of coercive diplomacy to stop/undo acts of agression, 1990/2005. Source: Jacobsen, Peter V., “Coercive Diplomacy: Frequently Used Seldom Successful”, KunglKrigsvetenskapsakademiensHandlingarOchTidskrift, April 2007

16. Factors for success • Constant maintenance of a communication channel with the target actor through diplomacy • Credibility • Persuasiveness • Offering “rewards”/“motives” for giving in • Assuring that compliance will not bring new demands

17. Factors for success • Right timing • Good intelligence system • Enough resources and capabilities • Deadlines for compliance • Stressing the overwhelming costs of non-compliance • Exact identification of the target actor • Exact identification of objectives of each coercion initiative

18. Factors for success • Support from public opinion • Support by multiple actors and from major international institutions (UN) • Coherence and solidarity when it comes to multiple coercers • Consider each case as unique

19. Factors for failure • Inability to give in due to domestic factors • Psychological reasons (e.g. humiliation for giving in) • Coercee’s perception that maintaining the undesirable conduct is more beneficial than abandoning it • The cost of failure is paid by the coercer

20. The EU Tools and Prospects for Coercion

21. The EU tools and prospects for coercion • Since 1992, the EU has obtained a variety of military and diplomatic decision-making bodies appropriate for a coercion strategy: • External Action Service leaded by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy • Military Committee • Military Staff • Crisis Management and Planning Directorate • EU Political and Security Committee

22. The EU tools and prospects for coercion • Tools appropriate for military coercion • Petersberg Tasks • EU Battle Groups

23. The EU tools and prospects for coercion • Map of EU operations as of September 2012 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations?amp;lang=en

24. Can the EU conduct a coercion strategy? • No!

25. Obstacles for the use of coercion • Nature different from that of a traditional nation state • Complex response system with plenty of overlaps and inter-institutional competition • Lack of political will • Indecisiveness of the High Representative • Clash of interests among the Member States • Individual actions by the Member States, outside the EU instruments • Too strong resource dependence from NATO • Funding issues

26. Obstacles for the use of coercion

27. Obstacles for the use of coercion • Lack of credibility and persuasiveness • “Tied hands”

28. How could we make the EU effective in coercion? • Leave riskless paperwork and fancy chairs, get to bloody work! • Invest money in strong and fast-deployable military capabilities • Establish a decisive diplomacy with people both being and feeling committed to the establishment of the EU as a serious global political actor • Invest in the practice of force, instead of “dust cleaning”

29. How could we make the EU effective in coercion? • Find a way to detach the CSDP from NATO equipment pool • Focus on the EU’s interests rather than national interests during decision-making procedures • Less focus on enlargement • Real, realistic and exact strategic doctrine

30. The End Thank you!