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Revival of Professional Unions?

Revival of Professional Unions?. International Workshop European Trade Unionism in Transition ? WZB Berlin, September 9th/10th2008. Rudi Schmidt, Universität Jena. A. Initial Question. 1. Two tendencies could be observed in German industrial relations over the last ten years:

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Revival of Professional Unions?

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  1. Revival of Professional Unions? International Workshop European Trade Unionism in Transition ? WZB Berlin, September 9th/10th2008 Rudi Schmidt, Universität Jena

  2. A. Initial Question • 1. Two tendencies could be observed in German industrial relations over the last ten years: • - Merging of sectoral unions towards multi-sectoral unions (Ver.di, IG BC) • - Emergence of autonomous small professional and „specialist“ unions (air controller, physicians, pilots, train drivers) • 2. In doing so these small unions take advantage of the high homogeneity and sanctioning capability of their members • – an affinity towards Anglo-American business unions is not to be ignored • 3. Reason for this development is not only the vacuum produced by the multi-sectoral unions –

  3. 4. ….a reason is also the increasing heterogeneity of the working and living conditions of the employees, intensified by profit-oriented restructuring and shareholder value strategies within the enterprises 5. Thus my thesis is: If the large unions are not able to find sophisticated answers to this heterogeneity, the small sectoral unions may position themselves successfully in Germany 6. By the example of the strike of the German train drivers (GDL) 2007/08 the organizing and policy competency will be examined on the following charts At first I will illustrate the actors and the course of the conflict, then comment on its outcomes and finally draw a short conclusion.

  4. B. The Actors • General characteristics of the Deutsche Bahn company • The following characterisics of the Bahn employees should be considered: • Shaped by the historical background: a state owned enterprise providing livelong employment and company benefits. Thus there is a traditionally high awareness of status (civil servants, job security). • 2. …up to now the three railway unions have remained sectoral unions, competing against each other • 3. After World War II and especially after 1989/90 (merger of the West German Deutsche Bahn and the East German Deutsche Reichsbahn) there was a massive reduction of employment, the workforce was reduced by more than 50 % • 4. The unions – mainly Transnet und GDBA, connected in one tariff community – were trying to secure employment – especially of the elder personnel (their members) – by concessions regarding wages and working conditions, while simultaneously arranging a social compensation plan. (collective labour agreement on job security). • 5. In general they were pursuing an industry- resp. company affiliated strategy, bringing them closer to the cooperation with the management, whereas the GDL (the third union), didn‘t consider such collaboration.

  5. Deutsche Bahn AG 1. Since 1994 the DB has the egal form of a corporation, 100% state-owned, initial public offering scheduled for 2008. 2. 240.000 employees working for the whole group, for the main company 180.000, 135.000 of them payed in accordance with the salary scale of the unions and about 45.000 as civil servants 3. 2003 in the black for the first time, since then increase of profit, reduction of debts and massive employment reduction. 4. Technological Modernisation (change-over from electromechanic to electronic signal and switch control, semiautomatic train control of the ICEs etc.) 5. The change of the employment and wage policy is determined by the transformation of the compensation system from the civil service pay to a performance and skill-related pay

  6. The Train Drivers (1/1) • 19.600 of the 240.000 employees of the group, • a small, but very homogeneous group, high sanctioning capability. • There is a traditionally high awareness of status (civil servants or relatively secure jobs in the past); self-image of the train drivers as the „Captains of the Railway“! • Although the semi-skilled occupation „train driver“ is a job-dead-end (a good secondary school degree and a training of 6-8 months), without any chance of career advancement (up to now only two wage groups containing four seniority groups). • Factually train drivers have been degraded to be only responsible for measuring and steering. • In this context a war against loss of significance and relativisation can be observed from the semantic dispute between DB AG and GDL on ‚locomotive driver‘ vs. ‚train driver‘ (‚Triebfahrzeugführer‘)

  7. The Train Drivers (1/2) • Crucial for the payment of the train drivers are neither qualification nor performance, but strain mainly caused by the exposure to unfavourable working times (shift work, night duty, long distances to the assigned train and then back home, transfer time between the trains, overnight stays away from home and long absence from the family). • Neither experience nor responsibility are – although they were emphasised repeatedly during the dispute against Deutsche Bahn – not that relevant, because real sovereignty over the rails is carried by train dispatchers in the control centres. • Before the strike 13-14.000 of the 19.600 train drivers at DB AG were unionised by the GDL, about 5.000 by Transnet and GDBA. • 8.000 of the train drivers are civil servants and so are not allowed to strike.

  8. The Unions • The union Transnet (former GdED) is the biggest of the three Bahn-unions with about 230.000 members in 2007 (without any retirees • 140.000). Most of Transnet‘s members are working in the area of the railway system (incl. railway control centres), repair shops and crew (e.g. the majority of the conductors and service personnel) • The transportation unionGDBA has about 45.000 members. It focusses on the administration, the former strongholds of the civil servants; but there are also 2.500 engine drivers among its members. • Gewerkschaft Deutscher Lokomotivführer GDL, had 34.000 members before the strike, (without any retirees 22.000), there were about 1.500 new entrants through the strike. The GDL was founded in 1867 and thus is the oldest (still existing) union in Germany. It was not until the privatisation of the DB that it pursued an independent tariff policy. Its strongholds are in East Germany, where 80% of the train drivers are unionised by the GDL (especially in the regional transportation – DB Regio). • Transnet belongs to the DGB. As former exclusive civil servants unions GDBA and GDL are both unionised in the DBB (German Civil Servants Union). Transnet and GDBA join one tariff community.

  9. C The Trade Dispute – The Prehistory • 1. The main problem was the massive loss of members caused by the reduction of employment since 1990. Concerning a rate of unionisation of 80%, a stabilisation respectively a raise of memberships can only be achieved at the expense of the rates of the other unions. • This is exactly what the GDL intended to do when it pursued an sectoral collective agreement for the whole crew personnel in 2003 (incl. conductors and service personnel), although it had only unionised the majority of the train drivers so far. • 3. The GDL‘s claim failed in former bargaining rounds. The postulation - essential for the union - of a separate collective labour agreement (a sectoral agreement) for the crew (incl. conductors and service personnel) was ‚packed‘ into massive wage increase and better conditions regarding working times.

  10. Reasons for the Permanence and Severity of the Conflict • (The bargaining conflict lasted more than 10 months.) The GDL fought against the employer and its rival unions (Transnet und GDBA) • Interest of differentiation (GDL) vs. call for integration – traditionally one collective bargaining unity within DB AG • ‚Cannibalisation‘ of the neighbouring unions by the GDL‘s expansion on the crew (sectoral collective agreement) • The GDL‘s refusal to adopt the company-wide, comparable compensation system (a conflict of privilege regarding Transnet/GDBA)

  11. Characteristices of the Conflict • The railway strikes were very effective, because they were a strong weapon economically and socially. • A surprising tolerance of the clients of the Bahn towards obstructions caused by the strike; a perception of the personnel as ‚representatives‘: „at least one group is fighting the permanent decline of real wages in Germany“ (‚Stellvertreterkrieg‘) • GDL called for political intervention (owner: state) – Transnet/GDBA and DB AG were against that, according to the tariff autonomy the GDL otherwise is claiming for to legitimize the separate collective agreement for the driving crew. The minister of transport did so; Tiefensee intervened several times (to prevent further strikes) and forced DB AG to give in, despite the weakness of GDL in the late phase. • The GDL‘s success by the acknowlegdement of its special status since March 1st 2008. From this time on it is having sole responsibility for the train drivers‘ bargaining.

  12. D. The Outcome • What was achieved by the GDL? After all their major aim, the separate collective agreement for train drivers, but limited to train drivers on the track (‚Streckenlokführer‘). • Since September 1st 2008 an increase of wages by 11%, (according to the duration of the treaty 1.7.07 – 28.2.09 only 7%). • Improvement of the working time conditions

  13. What was achieved by the other unions? • The same. • The Bahn had to agree to the equal treatment because of the strike threat by Transnet/GDBA. (‚counterbidding‘!)

  14. Transnat/GDBA and all of the Bahn employees benefited from the strike policy of the GDL. After all with an increase of wages of 7% in this barbaining round they accomplished the highest agreement of all sectors of the German economy.. • For the Bahn this doesn‘t just mean an increase of costs. At the same time competition in regional transportation is growing. By now the DB‘s share of regional transportation is 80%, regarding recent biddings it only gets 50%. And the initial public offering is scheduled for fall 2008. • In the future the Bahn wants to avoid conflicts with the GDL by outsourcing. The 1.000 newly trained train drivers will supposably be employed in a new company, where the collective agreement for the train drivers is not effective.

  15. E. Conclusions • The offensive reinvention of a profession-related civil servants organisation - as a sectoral union able to handle conflicts effectively - leads to the question, if this development could be symptomatic for the unions in Germany or if this is only characteristic for the railway sector • As pilots, air controllers and physicians the train drivers constitute a homogeneous, sufficiently distinct professional category, possessing a high sanctioning capability • All of the four professional unions in Germany has been fighting for separate treaties were emerging out of an existing large solidarity agreement, because they felt that their interests were not considered sufficiently. This development over the last ten years indicates a proceeding societal and economic differentiation, which can be also observed with collective bargaining policy.

  16. This raises the question, if the large sectoral unions are able to find an elaborate answer to this differantiation process and so to take out the wind of the sails of existing or emerging small unions. So far they have been showing difficulties in doing so. • The special interest policy of the transformed GDL is clientelistic, very market-oriented and competitive. Habitus and practice seem very American; the appearance is un-ideological, actions show a radical lust for strike. To traditional characteristics of German unions as „Class-solidarity“ the GDL doesn‘t pay any attention. • Is there a new trend indicated by the successful strikes by the GDL? Hardly that; the trade dispute of the Deutsche Bahn is an unique incident. Because of the tripartite constellation with an efficient labour-cartel in a (at present) monopolistic company it can barely be imitated somewhere else. • But it could encourage other groups of specialists to demand more differentiation in favour of their interests with bad consequences for those groups in the German DGB-Unions fit out with little bargaining power

  17. If anything the unions of physicians, air controller or pilots can be seen as symptomatic examples; but strictly speaking they also contain some special characteristics. • Each of the four unions recruit their members from state-related infrastructural sectors of the national economy (similar to the situation in France and Italy); but that the industrial sector is also susceptible to such organisations should be challenged at the moment. • However, if the tariff rivalry at Deutsche Bahn should expand beyond this particular case, the companies will have to respond to a new environment, which will be determined by permanent battles provoked by the sectoral unions! • A renaissance of the sectoral unions would put extreme pressure on the German production model to change towards instability and a short-term orientation; a transformation already induced by shareholder value strategies of the actorsof the financial market

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