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Why Are There Wars?

3. Why Are There Wars?. Why Is There So Much Peace in the World?. Most countries are at peace most of the time American deaths from 9/11: 2,986 Terrorism: A few dozen per year Iraq War: 4,977 Murder, average year: 15,000 Car accidents, average year: 42,000

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Why Are There Wars?

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  1. 3 Why Are There Wars?

  2. Why Is There So Much Peace in the World? • Most countries are at peace most of the time • American deaths from • 9/11: 2,986 • Terrorism: A few dozen per year • Iraq War: 4,977 • Murder, average year: 15,000 • Car accidents, average year: 42,000 • Lightning, average year: 90

  3. The Percentage of States Involved in War per Year, 1820–2010

  4. War Is Puzzling • War is costly • Blood and treasure • States would rather get what they want without going to war • “In war, the aggressor is always peace-loving; he would prefer to take over our country unopposed.” —Karl von Clausewitz

  5. Why Are There Wars? • What states fight over • War as outcome of a failed bargain • War from incomplete information • War from commitment problems • War from indivisibility • How to make war less likely

  6. Why Are There Wars? • What states fight over • War as outcome of a failed bargain • War from incomplete information • War from commitment problems • War from indivisibility • How to make war less likely

  7. What States Fight Over • Territory Territorial Claims in the Kashmir Region

  8. What States Fight Over • National policy • Regime type • Ethnic or religious divisions

  9. What States Fight Over Territorial Disputes and the Risk of Interstate Conflict, 1950-1990

  10. Why Are There Wars? • What states fight over • War as outcome of a failed bargain • War from incomplete information • War from commitment problems • War from indivisibility • How to make war less likely

  11. War as Outcome of a Failed Bargain Alternative explanations for war • Anarchy • Misperception • Domestic politics

  12. War as Outcome of a Failed Bargain • Bargaining • Coercive bargaining (aka “crisis bargaining” or “coercive diplomacy”) • “Do what I ask or else!”

  13. War as Outcome of a Failed Bargain The Costs of War and the Bargaining Range

  14. War as Outcome of a Failed Bargain: A Model of War CASTLE A CASTLE B

  15. A Model of War Fertile farmland Castle A Castle B

  16. A Model of War Fertile farmland • The object of contention (the green line) can be anything that states are in conflict over. Castle A Castle B

  17. A Model of War Current Border A B Probable new border if A and B fight

  18. A Model of War Costs of fighting to A Costs of fighting to B A B Probable new border if A and B fight

  19. A Model of War Net value of fighting to A Net value of fighting to B current border A B

  20. A Model of War Current Border A B Range of possible border settlements that both A and B prefer to fighting

  21. A Model of War B's proposal for a new border Current Border A B

  22. A Model of War A B • For any A and B, if • War is costly • The object of contention is divisible • Then there is always at least one negotiated settlement that A and B will both prefer to war.

  23. Bargaining and the Status Quo

  24. Deterrence

  25. Why Are There Wars? • What states fight over • War as outcome of failed bargain • War from incomplete information • War from commitment problems • War from indivisibility • How to make war less likely

  26. War from Incomplete Information • Leads to two bargaining mistakes: • Yielding too little • Demanding too much

  27. War from Incomplete Information • Incentives to misrepresent • May seek to appear weaker or stronger • May want to keep adversary guessing

  28. Bluffing A B A thinks that the probable new border if A and B fight is here

  29. Bluffing B says, “No--the probable new border if we fight is here.” A B A thinks that the probable new border if A and B fight is here

  30. Bluffing B has a secret weapon, putting the actual probable new border if they fight here A B A thinks that the probable new border if A and B fight is here

  31. War from Incomplete Information • Communicating resolve • Brinkmanship • Tying hands • Paying for power

  32. War from Incomplete Information • Communicating resolve • Brinkmanship • Tying hands • Paying for power

  33. Brinkmanship: The Cuban Missile Crisis

  34. War from Incomplete Information • Communicating resolve • Brinkmanship • Tying hands • Paying for power

  35. War from Incomplete Information • Communicating resolve • Brinkmanship • Tying hands • Paying for power

  36. Why Are There Wars? • What states fight over • War as outcome of failed bargain • War from incomplete information • War from commitment problems • War from indivisibility • How to make war less likely

  37. War from Commitment Problems • What if you find a settlement in the bargaining range? • Can you trust your adversary to honor a deal?

  38. War from Commitment Problems • Bargaining over the future • Preventive war • Preemptive war (war in response to first-strike advantages)

  39. War from Commitment Problems • Preventive war • Power shift: Even if states agree to a deal in the bargaining range now, the rising power may be tempted to use its power to revise the deal later.

  40. Bargaining and Shifting Power

  41. Bargaining and First-Strike Advantages Note: The upper line depicts the expected outcome of a war started by A. The lower line depicts the expected outcome of a war started by B.

  42. War from Commitment Problems

  43. Why Are There Wars? • What states fight over • War as outcome of failed bargain • War from incomplete information • War from commitment problems • War from indivisibility • How to make war less likely

  44. War from Indivisibility

  45. Why Are There Wars? • What states fight over • War as outcome of failed bargain • War from incomplete information • War from commitment problems • War from indivisibility • How to make war less likely

  46. How to make war less likely • Raise costs • Increase transparency • Outside enforcement • Divide indivisible goods

  47. Dividing Apparently Indivisible Goods

  48. Additional art from the text follows this slide

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