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Citizens, Suspects, Stakeholders? Policy Narratives on Muslims under New Labour

Citizens, Suspects, Stakeholders? Policy Narratives on Muslims under New Labour. Dr Therese O’Toole Dr Daniel Nilsson DeHanas University of Bristol. Introduction.

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Citizens, Suspects, Stakeholders? Policy Narratives on Muslims under New Labour

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  1. Citizens, Suspects, Stakeholders?Policy Narratives on Muslims under New Labour Dr Therese O’Toole Dr Daniel Nilsson DeHanas University of Bristol

  2. Introduction • In the present context of the ‘hyper-visibility’ of Muslims within the public domain, three theses have emerged on government perspectives on Muslims as: • Suspects • Citizens • Stakeholders • Question: which of these theses best describes New Labour’s policy positions?

  3. The research • We address this through analysis of policies under New Labour from 1997-2010 • = 1st of 5 data gathering stages within the project Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance • Our approach addresses both the role of institutional power and the agency of Muslim actors within participative governance • Policy analysis will be followed by study of participatory processes at national and local levels

  4. Thesis 1: Suspects • McGhee (2008): counter-terrorism legislation since 2001 has contributed to the casting of Muslims as ‘suspect communities’ • Govt has deployed a good/bad, moderate/extremist distinction creating a limited repertoire of subject positions for Muslims • In creating provisions to deport those whose presence is not conducive to public safety, Muslims have been made ‘conditional citizens’ (McGhee 2008: 37) • Integration, cohesion and civil renewal policies have all been problematically linked to securitisation agenda

  5. Thesis 2: Citizens • Meer & Modood(2009) responding to (Joppke’s) assertions that multiculturalism is in retreat argue that, despite anxieties about multiculturalism arising from (overbearing) Muslim claims, recognition in principle and practice has not been in wholesale retreat • Evidence is in equalities legislation & discourses on community cohesion and national identity • Process of ‘civic rebalancing’, in which citizenship is conceptualised as comprising shared civic identity, as well as permitting cultural and religious diversity

  6. Thesis 3: Stakeholders • Engagement with Muslims has been a strong feature of New Labour’s approach to partnering with the Third Sector in provision of public goods and services • In this arena Muslims, as faith groups, have been included within co-governance networks as partners and stakeholders • Faith groups seen as agents of urban regeneration (Furbey et al 2005), active citizenship and community cohesion, providers of local services (Dinham & Lowndes 2008) and representatives giving access to ‘hard-to-reach’ groups • Muslim inclusion has also been facilitated by CofE, which has invested in ecumenical and multi-faith alliances (McLaughlin 2010: 127)

  7. New Labour’s perspective on Muslims • Rather than one unifying (suspect, citizen, stakeholder) perspective that characterises New Labour’s stance, we propose that governance is a ‘contested terrain’, of different policy fields, in which a range of, not necessarily complementary, logics may be at work • These change over time • Also arise from ongoing struggles within policy fields for ‘symbolic power’ over the place of religion, Muslims, minorities, or the recognition of difference, in public life • Policy logics can sometimes overlap, but they emanate from fields with different rules and configurations of political, social and cultural capitals

  8. Conceptualising policy logics • We see policy logics as arising from fields that have the characteristics of Bourdieu’s ‘political field’, described as: ‘an arena of conflict over the definition and implementation of public policies that are struggled over by political professionals (Swartz 2003: 151) • Struggles in the field are for ‘symbolic power’ over the: ‘legitimate way to characterise how the social world is organised or should be organised’ (Swartz 2003: 147) • Fields generate their own structures and logics, in which actors develop their positions in reference to other actors in the field • We identify 3 key policy fields where narratives on Muslims have been formulated under New Labour

  9. Policy field 1: Faith sector governance • Covers a range of governance partnerships and forums including Local Strategic Partnerships, urban regeneration partnerships, social service planning and delivery, consultations, and health, police and neighbourhood forums. • Particular emphasis on working with and through faith groups & interfaith forums to maximise representation • Characterised by ‘co-governance’ to achieve a ‘mixed economy of welfare provision; • Driven by a logic of partnering, shared values & inter-faithism

  10. Policy field 2: Equalities and diversity • Covers field of equalities legislation, e.g. the new Single Equality Act (2010) which brings together, and equalises anti-discrimination laws. • Also covers diversity and policy responses in relation to multiculturalism, community cohesion and integration. • Tends to be focused on cultural rather than material equalities • Informed by practices of recognition and anxieties about difference and cohesion

  11. Policy field 3: Security • Covers migration and border control policies as well as surveillance and counter-terrorism. • British counter-terrorism CONTEST strategy has 4 strands – Pursue, Prevent, Protect, and Prepare – ranging from ‘soft’ community engagement to disaster preparedness and the legal prosecution of alleged terrorists. • Characterised by surveillance and engagement (‘hearts and minds’) logics

  12. Methodology: Policy Documents • Creating a master list of Policy Documents • Hundreds of documents from 1997 to now • Focus on official docs: Acts/Bills, White Papers, Speeches, plus a few that are ‘quasi-official’ • Unofficial docs and key events included for context • 10 key documents for today’s presentation • Docs that were seminal or representative • At least three per policy field

  13. Ten Key Policy Documents 1. Inner Cities Religious Council Review 1998 PF1 2. Community Cohesion Review (Cantle) 2001 PF2 3. Faith & Community (LGA, ICRC) 2002 PF1 4. Strength in Diversity (Home Office) 2004 PF2 5. Working Together (Home Office) 2004 PF1 6. Terrorism and Community Relat. (HOC) 2005 PF3 7. Prevent: Winning Hearts & Minds (CLG) 2007 PF3 8. Our Shared Future (COIC) 2007 PF2 9. Face to Face & Side by Side (CLG) 2008 PF1 10. Prevent: Sixth Report (HOC) 2010 PF3

  14. Methodology: Periods, Policy Language and Policy Logics 1. Defining the main periods relevant to Muslim-Government relations • 1997-2001: Early Blair years to Cantle Report • 2001-2005: Cantle Report to 7/7 • 2005-2010: 7/7 to the Coalition • 2010-Present: The Coalition 2. Tracing policy language on Muslims/religion 3. Identifying the policy logics underlying these

  15. Methodology: Policy Language • In-depth coding of a small selection of key documents for every mention of Islam, Muslims, faith, religion (or cognates) • Religion as: • Religion, Resources, Representation (Dinham & Lowndes 2008 – henceforth D&L) • Truth, Danger, Utility, Identity, Worthy of Respect (Modood 2010 – henceforth M)

  16. Methodology: Policy Language • Religion as: (synthesis of the two lists) • Resource (D&L), Utility (M) • Representation (D&L) • Identity (M) • Truth (M), Religion (D&L) • Values, Worthy of Respect (M) • Danger (M)

  17. Methodology: Policy Language • Religion as: • Resource • Representation • Identity • Truth • Values • Danger

  18. Methodology: Policy Logics • PF1: Faith Sector Governance • Interfaithism • Stakeholder-Representation • Instrumentalism …. • PF2: Equality and Diversity • Multiculturalism • Community Cohesion • Civic Integration …. • PF3: Securitisation • Pragmatic Partnerships • ‘Muscular Liberalism’ ….

  19. PF1: ICRC Review – 1998 • Inner Cities Religious Council founded 1991 • Chaired by a Govt Minister, with 5 Faith Reps • Designed to influence inner city regen. policy “The Review team found that the [ICRC] has had a considerable impact through the subtle permeation of the culture of Government…. [yet there is an] absence within Whitehall of any other mechanism for consulting faith communities.” • ICRC Review sets precedent in interfaith logic • 1997-2001, ‘new religious discourse’ (J. Taylor) is only emerging sparingly in policy documents

  20. PF1: Faith & Community – 2002 • Quasi-official local advisory document on faith partnership (ICRC, LGA, Interfaith Network) • Yokes together interfaith and comm. cohesion PF1:Working Together – 2004 • Interfaith agenda matures, enters Home Office

  21. PF1: Face to Face, Side by Side 2008 • In-depth treatment of the positive potential of religion in governance (N = 1111!) • Diverse, positive, and sophisticated portrayal of Muslims and other faith actors: • Muslims seen as stakeholders; also as active citizens, knowledgeable interfaith participants, bearers of ‘shared values,’ and even as worshipers • ‘Danger’ narratives: Stereotyped/feared, causing tension, and barriers to women accounted for majority of these. Religious extremism only mentioned once.

  22. Policy Language on Muslims/Relig. N = 1111

  23. PF2: Comm. Cohesion (Cantle) – 2001 • Home Office appointed Review Team on the summer 2001 disturbances in Northern towns • Had a novel ‘community cohesion’ logic • The Report makes surprisingly little reference to religion, as compared to race/ethnicity “We collected the evidence and the Muslim dimension, in connection with the riots, hadn’t emerged” – Ted Cantle interview, 26 Jan 2011 • Equality & Diversity Policy Field remained quite separate from Faith Sector Policy Field

  24. Policy Language on Muslims/Relig. N = 71

  25. PF2:Strength in Diversity – 2004 • Aim: “to develop a Government wide Community Cohesion and Race Equality Strategy” • Forerunner to Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society (2007) • Multi-vocal: CoCo, ‘inclusive’ active citizenship, race & faith equality, counter-extremism

  26. PF2 Our Shared Future – 2007 • Home Office established COIC to: “advise on how, consistent with their own religion and culture, there is better integration of those parts of the community inadequately integrated” • Redefines ‘integrated and cohesive community’ • Argues for a policy logic shift from CoCo and Multiculturalism to ‘whole communities’: “step back from the trend of a society defined strongly in terms of competing separate group identities, and [move to] shared futures and mutual interdependence.” (e.g., charters of belonging)

  27. PF3 HOC on Terrorism - April 2005 • Applied CoCo to Terrorism (Denham chair) • Focuses on demogr/econ/identity influences • Considers abuses of terrorism powers (e.g., by police), media, Islamophobia, and potential for coordination and interfaith dialogue “We reject any suggestion that Muslims are in some way more likely to turn to extremism than followers of other religions.” “No one should be forced to choose between being British and being Muslim… [we need a debate] on British identity” • Recommends involving Muslims in reviews (though they comprised just 6 of 39 witnesses)

  28. PF3: PVE: Hearts & Minds – 2007 • An effort to reform the thought-life and loyalties of Muslims - “win hearts and minds” • “fundamentally rebalance our engagement” • Tensions in policy logic can be seen in PVE Guidance: “always been a tiny minority who oppose tolerance and diversity” but “key measure of success will be demonstrable changes in attitudes among Muslims” • Governmentality mixed w/ faith participation; community cohesion mixed w/ counter-terror

  29. PF3: HOC Rev. of Prevent – 2007 • Review of the Prevent strategy, chaired by Starkey • Greater consultative input requested from Muslims (about 13/31 witnesses) • Advises policy field differentiation: • Recognises need to separate CoCo (CLG office) from counter-terrorism (Home Office) • Requests separation of Channel from the CONTEST strategy to eliminate confusion on spying

  30. How does a Bourdieusian view of Policy Fields contribute? • A more dynamic model of interrelationships between (and tensions within) theses such as suspects, stakeholders, and citizens • Policy logics can become influential for different reasons: • Community Cohesion has been highly valued as political capital, perhaps due to broader political and public questioning of Multiculturalism • Yet the political capital of CoCo poses problems – yoked unhelpfully into Security, undermining both

  31. How does a Bourdieusian view of Policy Fields contribute? • In contrast, the policy logics of Multiculturalism and Interfaithism are influential largely by habitus • ‘Civic rebalancing’ of MC shows habitus influence • Interfaithism entered PF3 by habitus and intent Interviewer: What should change in the Government's Prevent approach?Ahmed: .... The Church of England has.... infrastructure.  They have it top down.  How could that big church help the small [Muslim] community?  That's what we're looking at, for number one.

  32. How does a Bourdieusian view of Policy Fields contribute? • How are Muslims portrayed? This differs across fields, which sometimes influence each other • Faith Sector Governance is positive and sophisticated • Quiet contestation of Equality & Diversity field • ‘Suspects’ may be re-emerging in Security field….

  33. Policy narratives on Muslims under the Coalition • Under the Coalition, there is a dominant logic (from field of counter-terrorism) that is hostile to recognition • Strengthened by Cameron’s Munich speech which described multiculturalism as failed, called for ‘muscular liberalism’ and a tougher stance in excluding Muslim groups described as holding extremist positions. “So first, instead of ignoring this extremist ideology, we – as governments and as societies – have got to confront it, in all its forms.  And second, instead of encouraging people to live apart, we need a clear sense of shared national identity that is open to everyone.” (Cameron 5.2.2011)

  34. The logic of ‘muscular liberalism’ • Not dissimilar to Labour’s stance on multiculturalism in calling for respect for diversity alongside shared values/national identity (i.e. critique seems based on a misrepresentation of Labour’s multiculturalism) • Shunning of extremists is based on a contentious ‘escalator thesis’ (as propounded by Quilliam/Policy Exchange) • Makes subscription to a particular set of values an eligibility criterion for engagement/inclusion within governance. In so doing, it potentially limits public debate and participation. • Problematic question of who defines who is extremist?

  35. Competing logics under the coalition? • But, this policy direction will sit alongside a Coalition policy emphasis on interfaithism, which emerges from a field where the dominant logic rests on recognition • Interfaith networks seem unlikely to eschew recognition and difference because this significantly undermines the ways in which this field works • These logics may operate alongside each other, or faith sector will find its practices undermined, and its capacities to operate diminished. • As in other areas, the logic of ‘muscular liberalism’ may undermine the logic of the Big Society...

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