Small is beautiful pitiful : Community Micro-hydroelectricity and the Politics of Rural Electrification in Thailand

1. Small is beautifulpitiful: Community Micro-hydroelectricity and the Politics of Rural Electrification in Thailand Chris Sangarasri Greacen ERG – UC Berkeley Ph.D. colloquium presentation – 4 Dec, 2002 Thanks to… Ph.D. Dissertation Committee: Dan Kammen, Dick Norgaard, Jeff Romm Switzer Network Mentors: Jim Williams and Margaret Torn EPA-STAR Fellowship, Switzer Environmental Fellowship

2. Source: Jon Agee, So Many Dynamos! And other Palindromes by Jon Agee. FEW

3. Microhydro technology Research question International context and current status Field-work results Theoretical perspectives History & political economy of microhydro Conclusions Post script: Net metering Outline

4. Village renewable energy is a flakey technology destined to fall on its face! The grid kills “small is beautiful” every time! Renewable Energy True Believer Conventional Energy Man

5. Cold war Metering arrangements power factor Bureaucratic competition Common property Objective PhD student Methods: interviews, surveys, archival research, datalogging

6. Thailand micro-hydro site locations

7. Micro-hydroelectricity Source: Inversin, A. R. (1986). Micro-Hydropower Sourcebook.

8. Micro-hydro: reservoir and powerhouse

9. Turbine & generator

10. Local manufacture

11. Average cost: micro-hydro vs. grid for 25 years of electricity to a remote household Source: Microhydro data from construction costs of existing microhydro projects from Panya Consultants Co. (1993). Kroonggaan Padtana Fai Faa Palang Naam Radap Muu Baan (Village Scale Microhydro Development Projects). Bangkok, Thailand, Department of Energy Development and Promotion Grid costs from Price Waterhouse CoopersPrice Waterhouse Coopers (2000). Review of Electric Power Tariffs National Energy Policy Office of Thailand -- Final Report -- Annexes H-R. Bangkok, Thailand.

12. Number of villages servedmicro-hydro vs. the grid (as claimed) Source: PEA Annual Report 2000; DEDP “mini and microhydopower”

13. Thailand topography and micro-hydro site locations

14. Research question: Why is village micro-hydro losing to the centralized grid as the technology of choice for rural electrification in Thailand?

15. Grid extension failing to keep pace population growth Privatization – less money available for rural electrification International Context

16. International Context • Global climate change • Energy for rural development

17. Thai context • Increasing dissatisfaction with conventional power generation • Pak Mun dam kills fishing communities • Mae Moh spews SO2 • Bo Nok and Hin Krud coal power plant siting

18. Thai context • Dissatisfaction with lack of transparency, public participation • Renewable energy, cooperatives seen as alternatives

19. How well do micro-hydro installations work in the field in Thailand? Of 59 systems installed, less than half still in operation

20. Performance problems • In the systems that still work: • Low voltages (brownouts) especially in the evening (20 of 24 installations) • Power outages (16 of 24 installations) • Most common equipment failures • Generator / AVR (14 installations) • Governor (5 installations) • Shaft (5 installations) • Turbine (1 installations)

21. Village field methods • Equipment inspection • Interviews • Powerhouse operator • Village headman • Villagers • Survey appliance use • Datalogger • Current • Voltage • 15 minute intervals • 3 months per site

22. Voltage at Mae Kam Pong village microhydro from 25 June to 23 September 2001

23. Technical causes of low voltage problems • Generators produce only 50% to 70% of rated power • Low power factor

24. Mae Kam Pong Microhydro Unit #2 Voltage andCurrent (15 minute intervals) 6 Sept to 8 Sept 2001

25. Current vs. Voltage Mae Kam Pong 7 June – 23 Sept, 2001

26. Applying Common Property Theory to Village Power Systems Definition of a common pool resource (Oakerson 1992; Ostrom 1994): • System has limited yields • difficult to exclude individual users from using too much Common property theories never previously applied to village power

27. Low evening time voltage:symptom of a common property problem • Rules governing user behavior should match with the technical characteristics of the system • kWh Meters are a mismatch for microhdyro • Should be concerned with kW, not kWh • Low voltages… kWh meter is a culprit

28. Circuit breakers: a technical fix for a common property problem X kWh meter OK Mini-circuitbreaker Mini-circuit breaker can encourage peak load reduction

29. Hourly load curve, by year from 1985 to 2000. Graph based on an appliance usage survey of 35 families in Mae Kam Pong village, April and June 2001.

30. Contribution to evening maximum peak demand by appliance, for the years 1985 – 2001.

31. Technical and managerial problems are (in many cases) resolvable • Technical • Better equipment (especially AVRs) • Power factor correction capacitors • Managerial • Mini-circuit breakers • Peak load reduction program

32. Community micro-hydro and integrated rural development • Managed by community cooperative, elected by customers • Local operator & tariff collector • Micro-hydro fund used for village micro-credit • Low marginal cost of additional household hookups facilitates connecting poorer households

33. Headmen and village microhydro operators from 10 out of 12 village viewed the projects as having positive impacts: Promoting sense of community responsibility Money staying within village and providing revolving fund Promoting conservation of forests and watershed All villages with functioning microhydro wish to keep their projects running. Communities like microhydro

34. Summary from the village level:“it still doesn’t add up” + - Local integrated development benefits Cost effective rural electricity Resolvable technical and managerial challenges ? = + Rarely implemented Existing installations replaced by grid

35. Social Barriers Social Barriers literature (Karekezi 1994; Martinot and McDoom 2000) • Decision makers lack sufficient information for rational economic choices • Limited institutional capacities • Solution is “better guidance” & “Best Practices” • Shortcomings of Social Barriers • Does little to explain structural or historical bases • Assumes uptake is by autonomous individuals – not state • Focuses on diffusion & uptake – does not address long-term use

36. Political economy of technology choice • Need for analysis that is sensitive to: • Historical and structural factors • How trajectory of relevant policies, programs, and institutions shapes social and technical arrangements • Variety of social scales – village to international • Technology adoption mediated by the exercise of power (Thomas, 1994) • choice of technologies and social arrangements consist of the application of rules that are consistent with particular organizational objectives

37. Political economy of technology choice • Understanding the “organizational objectives” that shape and limit technology choice requires sensitivity to the functioning of the state and state bureaucracies (Riggs 1966; Scott 1989). • Must consider ways in which options were framed (cannot consider technology adoption as simply strategic choice) (Ferguson 1994) • Role of technological inertia (Winner 1986) • product of the historical coupling of technology & structure, combined with popular non-participation

38. Research into history of Thai rural electrification • Archival research • Historical analysis

39. Key questions in a history of micro-hydroelectricity in Thailand • How and why were key decisions on rural electrification technology choice made? • How have organizational structures and key events shaped and constrained the opportunities for community managed village-scale micro-hydroelectricity?

40. Key points of contention • centralized vs. decentralized • cooperatives vs. state owned company

41. Key historical forces • Cold war • Bureaucratic competition

42. Power Sector Agencies in Thailand(as of August 2002) (formerly NEA)

43. 1950s – diverse electrification strategies • By 1960 only 2% of villages electrified • Diversity in ownership: Municipal, private & cooperative • 1958 National Energy Authority (NEA) created • “responsible for the planning … development and utilization of all energy resources in the country” • Regulated Thaialnd’s independent utilties • Cold war comes to Thailand. $1.08 billion in economic and military aid from 1951 to 1967

44. 1960s – formative period • 1960 PEA established with mandate to electrify rural areas • “water flows, lights shine, good road” • “Lighting serves a particular counter subversion need by reducing the psychological isolation of villagers, facilitating police surveillance, and inhibiting clandestine infiltration”-- US Operations Mission 1965, justifying electrification program • USAID rural electrification prefeasibility study adopted as rural electrification master plan for Thailand

45. 1966: USAID plan dismisses decentralized micro-hydroelectricity “The view has been advanced by some that the construction and operation of hydroelectric plants... is necessary in order to demonstrate the interest of the Government in the welfare of the people, particularly in the so-called "sensitive areas" where the very low income status of the population makes them susceptible to the propaganda of Asian Communism. Others believe that … the funds available can be put to better use by building transmission and rural distribution facilities to bring power from large, centrally located generation stations which are …less exposed to damage or destruction by subversive or enemy action. The team endorses the later option.” USAID (1966). Thailand Electric Power Supply, US Agency for International Development, United States Operations Mission.

46. Threat of the Chinese Model • Starting in 1953 China emphasized "self-construction, self-management and self-consumption" of village-scale and grid-connected small-scale hydroelectricity • 18,944 village micro-hydro by 2001. Current small and micro-hydro capacity in China exceeds 26 GW (Jiandong, 2003).

47. 1960s – coop or state-owned rural electrification? • Much rural electrification in the U.S. was accomplished using farmer-run non-profit cooperatives. • The National Rural Electrification Cooperatives Association (NRECA) is federation of these coops • With funding from USAID, NRECA sent team to study setting up rural electrification cooperatives • PEA wants no part of it. • “...it would be desirable to examine the matter objectively without the emotional handicap of a [cooperatives] missionary.” – Mr. Belford Seabrook, US advisor to PEA • NEA responds enthusiastically.

48. 1960s – coop or state-owned rural electrification? • PEA raised objections about electricity coop idea: • “interfered with PEA work” • “would confuse villagers” • “credit cooperatives had been tried and had failed” • “money should go to PEA instead” • 8,141 villagers signed up to form a rural electrification coop in Udorn Thani • PEA General Manager to Washington DC. • Coop idea squashed by 1967

49. PEA expands… • 99% electrified • Still over 29,000 employees • “50% of the employees could be laid-off with no loss of output.” -- PEA engineer • Able to expand to non-economic areas due to national uniform tariff, access to concessional financing, and $15 million per month from MEA

50. …while NEA declines • By 1970s lost power to enforce compliance with the plans it created • Tossed from ministry to ministry • Name changes  Department of Energy Development and Promotion (DEDP)