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Neo-Liberal Institutionalism

Neo-Liberal Institutionalism. The Prisoners’ Dilemma. Player 1. Player 2. Neo-Liberal Institutionalism. Accepts the basic assumptions of realism States: main actors States: unitary, rational actors Goals: states follow their interests

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Neo-Liberal Institutionalism

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  1. Neo-Liberal Institutionalism

  2. The Prisoners’ Dilemma Player 1 Player 2

  3. Neo-Liberal Institutionalism • Accepts the basic assumptions of realism • States: main actors • States: unitary, rational actors • Goals: states follow their interests • -but have multiple interests in addition to security and power • -power not always fungible • System: anarchical, no central authority

  4. Central Question What Facilitates Cooperation in an Anarchical System?

  5. Iteration • Robert Axelrod The Evolution of Cooperation (1984) • If you play the PD repeatedly the winning/dominant strategy is TIT FOR TAT, not DEFECT • Implications: • Cooperation can get started even in a world of unconditional defection; • Iteration, long term horizons important; • Strategy of reciprocity can thrive where many other strategies of cooperation fail • Once established cooperation based on reciprocity can protect itself from invasion of other strategies

  6. Conditions for Cooperation • Hegemonic Interest (Realism and Institutionalism) • Repeated interaction • Repeated PD: dominant strategy is “Tit-for-Tat”; NOT “Defect” • No immediate threat to state survival • Smaller number of actors • Type of cooperation dilemma

  7. PD: problems of cheating, credible commitment Battle of the Sexes: coordination problems Cooperation dilemmas

  8. International Regimes • “…implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” Stephen Krasner (1983) International Regimes, p.2. Example: GATT/WTO

  9. Institutions Facilitate Cooperation • Institutionalize iteration • Provide information • Credible commitments • Issue linkage • Reduce transaction costs • make agreements and monitoring less costly to administer • Resolve distribution conflicts

  10. Growth in the Number of International RegimesEnvironmental Treaties 1968-1998

  11. Realist Critique • Institutions reflect the distribution of power and interests and therefore are irrelevant • Neo-liberal have ignored the problem of relative gains that would inhibit or shape cooperation • Little empirical evidence that institutions matter

  12. Impact of Ozone Regime

  13. Impact of Whaling Regime?

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