1 / 29

Fiscal Consolidation and Public Investment:  Friends, Foes, or Neutral Partners? A Look at Bulgaria and Romania

International Seminar for Experts “The coming enlargement of the the EU” Cicero Foundation October 12-13, 2006 . Fiscal Consolidation and Public Investment:  Friends, Foes, or Neutral Partners? A Look at Bulgaria and Romania . Armin Riess European Investment Bank. Outline.

Jimmy
Télécharger la présentation

Fiscal Consolidation and Public Investment:  Friends, Foes, or Neutral Partners? A Look at Bulgaria and Romania

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. International Seminar for Experts “The coming enlargement of the the EU” Cicero Foundation October 12-13, 2006 Fiscal Consolidation and Public Investment:  Friends, Foes, or Neutral Partners? A Look at Bulgaria and Romania Armin Riess European Investment Bank

  2. Outline 1. Motivation – EIB interest 2. General observations (EU 27) • Public debt sustainability (the long run) • Macroeconomic constraints to fiscal policy (the short run) 3. Fiscal consolidation and public investment • Bulgaria • Romania 4. Conclusion

  3. Outline 1. Motivation – EIB interest 2. General observations (EU 27) • Public debt sustainability (the long run) • Macroeconomic constraints to fiscal policy (the short run) 3. Fiscal consolidation and public investment • Bulgaria • Romania 4. Conclusion

  4. Outline 1. Motivation – EIB interest 2. General observations (EU 27) • Public debt sustainability (the long run) • Macroeconomic constraints to fiscal policy (the short run) 3. Fiscal consolidation and public investment • Bulgaria • Romania 4. Conclusion

  5. Public debt in EU-27 (% of GDP), 2006 Maastricht 60% criterion Source: European Commission, Economic Forecast, Spring 2006

  6. Fiscal balance in EU-27 (% of GDP), 2006 Maastricht 3% criterion Source: European Commission, Economic Forecast, Spring 2006

  7. Debt dynamics Change in debt/GDP ratio = fiscal deficit/GDP ratio – nominal GDP growth • debt/GDP ratio

  8. Debt dynamics Change in debt/GDP ratio = fiscal deficit/GDP ratio – nominal GDP growth • debt/GDP ratio Key message: debt accumulation the slower, the • smaller the deficit • higher economic growth

  9. Real GDP growth (in %), 2000-05 Source: European Commission, Economic Forecast, Spring 2006

  10. Fiscal deficit that makes debt/GDP converge to 60% (Maastricht criteria)

  11. Fiscal deficit that makes debt/GDP converge to 60% (Maastricht criteria)

  12. Fiscal deficit that makes debt/GDP converge to 60% (Maastricht criteria)

  13. Fiscal deficit that makes debt/GDP converge to 60% (Maastricht criteria)

  14. Bulgaria: fiscal balance and public debt (in % of GDP) Public debt (right scale) Fiscal balance (left scale) Source: National Statistical Institute (NSI) of Bulgaria; *Projected

  15. Romania: fiscal balance and public debt (in % of GDP) Pubic debt (right scale) Fiscal balance (left scale) Source: IMF; *based on policy measures (1.8% of GDP) relative to initial budget

  16. Outline 1. Motivation – EIB interest 2. General observations (EU 27) • Public debt sustainability (the long run) • Macroeconomic constraints to fiscal policy (the short run) 3. Fiscal consolidation and public investment • Bulgaria • Romania 4. Conclusion

  17. Outline 1. Motivation – EIB interest 2. General observations (EU 27) • Public debt sustainability (the long run) • Macroeconomic constraints to fiscal policy (the short run) 3. Fiscal consolidation and public investment • Bulgaria • Romania 4. Conclusion

  18. Macroeconomic constraints Concerns about • Inflation  internal imbalances • External current account  external imbalances

  19. Macroeconomic constraints Concerns about • Inflation  internal imbalances • External current account  external imbalances

  20. External current account (in % of GDP) Current account balance = Trade balance + … Current account balance = Savings – Investment

  21. External current account (in % of GDP) Current account balance = Trade balance + … Current account balance = Savings – Investment Investment Saving Current account balance Current account balance =

  22. External current account (in % of GDP) Current account balance = Trade balance + … Current account balance = Savings – Investment Investment Saving Current account balance (Savings – Investment) of private sector + fiscal balance Current account balance =

  23. Outline 1. Motivation – EIB interest 2. General observations (EU 27) • Public debt sustainability (the long run) • Macroeconomic constraints to fiscal policy (the short run) 3. Fiscal consolidation and public investment • Bulgaria • Romania 4. Conclusion

  24. Outline 1. Motivation – EIB interest 2. General observations (EU 27) • Public debt sustainability (the long run) • Macroeconomic constraints to fiscal policy (the short run) 3. Fiscal consolidation and public investment • Bulgaria • Romania 4. Conclusion

  25. Bulgaria: contributions to change in fiscal balance (in % of GDP), 2001-05 Change in fiscal balance 3.8 % Decline in public investment 0.2 % Decline in interest payments on public debt 2.1 % Increase in revenue 3.1 % Change in fiscal balance Increase in current expenditure (excl. interest payments) – 1.6 % Source: Bulgarian National Bank

  26. Romania: contributions to change in fiscal balance (in % of GDP), 2001-05 Change in fiscal balance 3.3 % Decline in public investment 0.3 % Decline in interest payments on public debt 3.7 % Change in fiscal balance Decline in current expenditure (excl. interest payments) 1.5 % Decline in revenue 2.2 % Source: IMF

  27. Public investment (% of GDP) Eurozone countries 2005 Source: AMECO (European Commission)

  28. Conclusion • Fiscal policy in BU & RO: macroeconomic stability rather than debt sustainability • Fiscal consolidation has not come at expense of public investment  “neutral partners” • Public investment in BU & RO low compared to NMS-8, but increase possible without deteriorating fiscal balance

  29. International Seminar for Experts “The coming enlargement of the the EU” Cicero Foundation October 12-13, 2006 Fiscal consolidation and public investment: friends, foes, or neutral partners? A look at Bulgaria and Romania Armin Riess (a.riess@eib.org) European Investment Bank

More Related