networks and the war on terror

1. Networks and the War on Terror Michael Stohl Cynthia Stohl University of California Santa Barbara Department of Communication ANU TERRORISM WORKSHOP 1 April 2005

3. THE IDEA OF TERROR NETWORKS IS NOT NEW CLAIRE STERLING (1981) argued that there existed an international network of terrorists within whose center one found a Palestinian connection and a Russian patron, with, quite often, a Cuban cutout providing the shield for direct Russian participation argued that the Soviet Union had placed a loaded gun of the world table and benefited each time someone picked it up and used it. ALEXANDER HAIG AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION went further and suggested that the Russians were behind it all. The administration was unable to convince its own intelligence agencies (or those of its allies) to support its view of the Soviet role and was not able to provide public evidence for the existence of such an actual network

4. BUT�Ironically Bob Woodward reports that Sterling had been leaked material as part of a CIA propaganda scheme.(see Woodward, Bob, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987, Headline Press, 1987, pp. 125-127). Thus, while there is no doubt that there was Soviet support for the aims of many of the groups that were under suspicion, and that many members of those groups had passed through either the Soviet Union or one of its client states, there was also no clear network chart that distinguished the types of clear links, membership and type of network.

5. People have been talking about terror networks long before September 11, 2001 Despite the discrediting of some of the claims Despite the new developments in network analysis and network theories We still are relying on some outdated, outmoded ways of thinking about and analyzing networks.

6. Terrorism and NetworksPurpose of our talk Explore the relationship between what we as scholars know about networks and terrorism and our responses to terrorism What can a network approach contribute to our understanding of terrorism, identifying the possible connections among various terrorist groups and the implications for how they communicate, operate and cooperate what our responses are/should be?

7. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS Political terrorism needs to be seen as a process of political communication and not simply a destructive or �simple� act of violence. To understand terrorist networks, we must take into account that networks are much more than "communication structures" or "information flow charts." Networks are a tapestry of agents, communicative relationships, histories, and a complex interwoven symbolic fabric-- all embedded in the larger global system.

8. What should an analysis of �networks of terror� do? Should explain how various terrorist groups, and other organizations and states are connected Describe how they are organized and how they operate as a network. Explicate what we mean by membership in the network and how the various members are linked. How the members are linked alters our understanding of what it means to be connected and how important those connections are. Not all connections are equal An analysis of �networks of terror� should explain how various terrorist groups, and other organizations and states are connected, how they are organized and how they operate as a network. We need to know what we mean by membership in the network and how the various members are linked. How the members are linked alters our understanding of what it means to be connected and how important those connections are. Not all connections are equalAn analysis of �networks of terror� should explain how various terrorist groups, and other organizations and states are connected, how they are organized and how they operate as a network. We need to know what we mean by membership in the network and how the various members are linked. How the members are linked alters our understanding of what it means to be connected and how important those connections are. Not all connections are equal

9. What should an analysis of �networks of terror� do? Distinguish between the ability �to network,� (i.e., the structural capacity to activate the ubiquitous six degrees of separation) from the ability to mobilize, control, and coordinate members for specific planned acts. Connections do not equal coordination, temporary exchange relationships do not equal control and identification of an agreed enemy does not equal the emergence of an organization

10. To study terrorist networks we need to know What is a/the network? Who is in the network? What are its boundaries? What relations are encompassed in the network? How are nodes connected? What are the relevant structural properties? What types of ties exist? How are networks embedded within society? What network processes are associated with structure?

11. 1. What is a network? Networks consist of interconnected nodes linked by patterned flows of information, influence, coordination, support, functionality, affect, and message interpretation. Nodes: Who/what comprises the networks Attributes: Qualities of the nodes Links: connections between nodes Relations: What comprises the network links Roles: Positions within network Network Concepts and Measures: Strength of tie Centrality of link/network Reciprocity of link Density

12. What is a network: Organizational Structures matter Is the organization composed of thousands of members, hundreds of cells and located in 60 or more countries or is it a much smaller organization which coalesces with other existing organizations when it needs to move people, money or material around the world. Is Al Qaeda a loose confederation of organizations? If so, then we find linkages based upon resource dependency and exchange a hierarchical organization with a cell structure? If so, then we have a bureaucratic chain of command a horizontal modern �networked organization?� If so, the absence of an overarching bureaucracy necessitates that group cohesion is maintained through shared norms and values.

13. IS THIS A TERRORIST NETWORK? OR is Al Qaeda an example of Lewis Beam�s �leaderless resistance� which is comprised of �Organs of information distribution, such as newspapers, leaflets, computers, etc. which are widely available to all, keep each person informed of events allowing for a planned response that will take many variations. NO one need issue an order to anyone.�

14. 2. Who is in the network? What are its boundaries? Depending upon how we define link, the membership and configuration of networks change and our understanding of organizing processes is somewhat altered

15. Network Specification: A long recognized problem �In view of the potential consequences of an incorrect specification of system boundaries in network analysis , it is somewhat surprising that the published literature reporting studies of social networks shows little concern for the problem of specifying the inclusion rules in defining the membership of actors in particular networks and in identifying the types of social relationships to be analyzed (Laumann, Marsden and Prensky, 1983:19).� The tendency to make everything connected to everything else is extremely problematic for both theoretical and practical reasons. Paradoxically, this tendency is derived from a process oriented approach of communication in which membership, boundaries, and connectedness are open-ended and not delimited apriori. The basic requisites of organization-- coordination, control, membership integration and institutional interdependence-- represent communication processes that may be conceptualized as descriptors of virtually all links within the organization�s milieu. The tendency to make everything connected to everything else is extremely problematic for both theoretical and practical reasons. Paradoxically, this tendency is derived from a process oriented approach of communication in which membership, boundaries, and connectedness are open-ended and not delimited apriori. The basic requisites of organization-- coordination, control, membership integration and institutional interdependence-- represent communication processes that may be conceptualized as descriptors of virtually all links within the organization�s milieu.

16. Al Qaeda It is neither a single group or a coalition of groups: it comprised a core base or bases in Afghanistan, satellite terrorist cells worldwide, a conglomerate of Islamist political parties, and other largely independent terrorist groups that it draws on for offensive actions and other responsibilities. Leaders of all the above are co-opted as and when necessary to serve as an integral part of Al Qaeda�s high command, which is run via a vertical leadership structure that provides strategic direction and tactical support to its horizontal network of compartmentalized cells and associate organizations (Gunaratna, 2002, 54).

17. Al-Qaeda Specification Early stages: U.S. government made the network as large as it could Loose identification rules and unspecified linkage rules enabled law enforcement agencies throughout the world (both because they were interested in �combating terrorism� and because by doing so they could obtain U.S. financial assistance and gratitude) to count anyone they sought and/or arrested as �members� of al-Qaeda.

18. By 2002, pressure for success brought incentives to limit scale and scope of al-Qaeda At the same time, reporters also noted that some of the same officials were indicating that the threat of terror itself had not diminished because a new organization or a new organizational form was emerging. �Officials emphasized that it was no longer possible simply to label all post- Sept. 11 plots as al-Qaeda inspired, because the new terror alliance has largely replaced the old bin Laden network� (Johnston, Van Natta and Miller, 2002, p.10). Assuming that the administration was not simply engaging in Orwellian doublespeak when it both announced the elimination of much of the al-Qaeda central command structure and support infrastructure and also indicated that it would no longer count all terror attacks as linked to al-Qaeda, the obvious question is whether the new organization was indeed new or if the administration did not understand the nature of the network that it was confronting at the two points in time.

19. Perhaps most disturbingly, Johnson, Van Natta, and Miller reported on June 19, 2002, �classified investigations of the al-Qaeda threat now under way at the F.B.I. and C.I.A, have concluded that the war in Afghanistan failed to diminish the threat to the United States. Some analysts suggest that the war might have complicated counterterrorism efforts by dispersing potential attackers across the globe.� After the Iraq war, analysts worried not only about dispersal but also the movement of terrorists to post war Iraq

20. Implications of mis-specifying the Network If we believe that each of the groups is a constituent unit of Al-Qaeda, action against them may make operational sense. If they are not part of Al-Qaeda at best the actions divert valuable resources from the efforts against Al-Qaeda. Further, such actions may inadvertently provide �ammunition� to those groups, by uniting them. One of the �security� arguments against a war with Iraq, we may recall, was that such a war would likely trigger attacks from like minded groups who are not coordinated nor controlled by Al-Qaeda, but would use the opportunity to mobilize populations against the United States for their own organizational purposes (an outcome which appears in some parts of the world to have occurred).

21. 3. What relations constitute the network?

22. What relations constitute the Al Qaeda Network? In early 2001 the FBI reported: Although Al-Qaeda functions independently of other terrorist organizations, it also functions through some of the terrorist organizations that operate under its umbrella or with its support, including: the Al-Jihad, the Al-Gamma Al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group - led by Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and later by Ahmed Refai Taha, a/k/a "Abu Yasser al Masri,"), Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and a number of jihad groups in other countries, including the Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia, Croatia, Albania, Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, the Philippines, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, the Kashmiri region of India, and the Chechen region of Russia. Al-Qaeda also maintained cells and personnel in a number of countries to facilitate its activities, including in Kenya, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States. By banding together, Al-Qaeda proposed to work together against the perceived common enemies in the West - particularly the United States which Al-Qaeda regards as an "infidel" state which provides essential support for other "infidel" governments (Caruso, 2001).�

23. Global Terror Network? 1. The Global Terror Network Non-coordinated, ephemeral links of convenience 2. Network(s) of Terrorists and Terrorist Organizations Coordinated, tangible but transitory links 3. The Networked Terror Organization Controlled constellation of organizations across sectors, locations, and time.

24. �It is important to avoid equating the bin Laden network solely with bin Laden. He represents a key node in the Arab Afghan terror network, but there should be no illusion about the likely effect on the network of actions taken to neutralize him. The networks conducts many operations without his involvement, leadership, or financing � and will continue to be able to do so should he be killed or captured. (Arquilla, Ronfeldt and Zanini p.63)

26. In reality, terrorist networks obey the rigid laws that determine their typology, structure and therefore their ability to function. They exploit all the advantages of self organized networks, including flexibility and tolerance to internal failures. Unfamiliarity with this new order and a lack of language for formularizing our experience are perhaps our most deadly enemies (Buchanan, 2002,p. 223). Structural properties matter

27. The New Science of Networks Underlying dynamic of interconnectedness, of shared deep structural properties that strongly influence who we are, how we think, how we make sense of the world, how we interpret messages and how we organize Albert-Laszlo Barabasi Duncan Watts

28. It�s a Small World �small world architecture� (first identified by Milgram, 1965 and then popularized in John Guare�s play, Six Degrees of Separation Watts found the small world architecture in a Malaysian firefly community Barabasi found same structure on www Highly clustered segments with connector

29. Relatively minor changes in the connectivity of a network can have dramatic changes on the global structure of a network. With their relatively small degree of separation between any two nodes, small world networks facilitate the efficient transmission of information or other resources without having to overload the network with too many redundant links. More complex networks tend to fluctuate less and are more stable than simple networks. Networks which exhibit the small world architecture can have a significant fraction of nodes removed randomly without breaking apart. In a random network if the number of links removed reaches a critical point, the system abruptly breaks into isolated tiny unconnected islands. Even when 80% of nodes are randomly removed in scale free networks, the remaining 20% still hang together. This robustness, resilience to errors against failures, is a property not shared by random networks.

30. The source of topological robustness is the existence of the hubs, the few highly connected nodes that keep the scale free network together. Failures disproportionately affect small nodes. The accidental removal of a single hub will not be fatal since the continuous hierarchy of several large hubs will maintain the network�s integrity. Random networks, despite their redundancy, fall apart quite quickly in the face of an uncoordinated attack, whereas the small world architecture makes a network resilient against random failure or unsophisticated attack. The very feature that �makes a small world network safe from random failure could be its Achilles heel in the face of an intelligent assault� (Buchanan, 2002, p. 132). Under coordinated attack, the random network has the advantage; a small world network is extremely vulnerable. �Disable a few of the hubs and a scale free network will fall to pieces� (Barabasi, 2002, p. 118).

31. Significant Policy Implications �The jihad is resilient to random arrests of its members but fragile in terms of the targeted attacks on its hubs It is important to avoid equating the bin Laden network solely with bin Laden (Arquilla, Ronfeldt, & Zanini, 1999)� Computational analyses demonstrate that the removal of the leader/central agent does not have anticipated consequences (Carley, Lee, Krackhardt, 2002).

32. 5. What types of ties are there? Not all links are equal. They can vary along several dimensions including orientation, reciprocity, strength, symmetry and multiplexity (C. Stohl, 1996:39)

33. In the case of the Lebanese Shi�a fundamentalist group, Hizballah, �not only are all members from the same Shi�a Islamic confessional community, but the subgroups within Hizballah are often linked through close blood ties as well�.Kinship is also a prominent factor in the composition of Amal, a faction of Hizballah led by Husayn al Musawi. Many of the members are from the Musawi clan (Lodge, 1990, p. 22). MULTIPLEX STRONG LINKS In these terrorist organizations then, we would expect the communicative structuring mirrors the scale free, small world networks uncovered by Milgram, Watts, and Barabasi et al. They are �small worlds� with short degrees of separation and composed of strong ties with powerful hubs. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies have consistently indicated, and the historical record demonstrates, that these types of networks are very difficult to identify, even more difficult to penetrate, and almost impossible for intelligence operatives to join, but once identified each cell can more easily be monitored and destroyed (�rolled up� is the term used) than other types of communication structures.

34. Alternatively, other terrorist networks are not built upon relational homophily (family, friends, identity) but upon homophily of a particular value and �like-mindedness.� UNIPLEX WEAK LINKS These ideological or doctrinal movements (e.g., the German Red Army Faction [RAF], the various forms of militia organization in the United States-- such as the 112th Georgia Militia and Christian identity organizations, such as the 1980s Covenant, Sword and Arm of the Lord or the Aryan Nations) are much easier to penetrate and join than the precious networks. Growth and preferential attachment are oriented outwardly.

35. Significant Policy Implication As Ross and Gurr (1989) discuss there are four general kinds of conditions which can contribute to the decline of political terrorism: preemption, deterrence, burnout, and backlash. �Preemption and deterrence are counterterrorist policies and actions which can reduce or eliminate the terrorists� coercive capabilities. Burnout and backlash are general conditions which reduce the political capabilities of groups using terrorism� (p. 408).

36. Thus, employing network theory, it is not surprising that the terrorist movements which have shown decline (and in many cases simply disappearance) over the past thirty years have been the ideologically based movements such as the Red Army Faction, Action Direct and Red Brigades of Germany, France and Italy respectively, while those which have shown the greatest resilience have been the ethno nationalist movements such as the ETA (Basque Fatherland and Liberty), the Sri Lankan based LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), the IRA, and the numerous Palestinian groups.

37. Research Questions Are Al Qaeda and the other �new� terrorist organizations examples of organizations whose ties are based on relational or value homophily? Are their recruitment patterns based on relational or value homophily? What are the implications of homphily/heterophily?

38. 6. How is a network embedded in the larger system? To comprehensively assess the threats, and thus the corresponding risks, we must know the history, culture, mores, organization, decision-making processes, leadership and other forces that characterize and motivate enemy and terrorist networks (Haimes, 2002, p. 35).

39. Hamas, Hezbollah, the IRA and the Basque ETA, for example, can only be understood if they are located as but one organizational part of a larger social movement which is represented by political parties, charitable organizations, neighborhood clinics, schools and other social service organizations. These organizations are further embedded within an ethno nationalist community which, at a minimum, acquiesces to the organization�s existence because the community supports the organization�s goals (even when the community decries the organization�s methods) and at certain, relatively infrequent historical, moments also support the means as well.

40. 7. What network processes are associated with structure? Transitivity of trust A cohesive network develops when a group of individuals or organizations form reliable, productive communication and decision channels and a more or less permeable boundary to define members (Fountain,2001)

41. What a communication network perspective tell us about the surprising operational agreement between the PLO and the Red Brigade during the 1970�s 1. Organizational behavior and decisions occur within existing communication structures and ongoing social relations. (Granovetter�s 1985 theory of embeddedness) 2. Most network linkages derive from exchange and dependency relations. Furthermore, proximity is the best predictor of network relations. (Monge & Contractor, 2003) In this case, Morretti (member of Red Brigade) and Abu Iyyad (member of the PLO) were brought together by the French group Action Directe (Direct Action) who, on behalf of themselves and the Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction in Germany), were interested in establishing a militant anti-Israeli front amongst the Western European left wing terrorist groups. The leaders of these groups were not only known to each other but as early as 1969 members of the Red Army Faction had been training in Palestinian camps in Jordan. Thus the mutual interests and possibility of benefits from coordinated action were made concrete by the communicative linkages that were in existence prior to the agreement.

42. Conclusion Move beyond the network metaphor to network analysis to improve our understanding of terrorist organizing 1. Boundary specification 2. Attributes of nodes 3. Qualities of links 4. Relational connections 5. Structural properties Recognize that network analysis does not identify the causes, the context or the socio-political solutions that are possible

43. Are we winning or losing?How can we tell? Are we defeating the enemy What have been the impacts on the network of terror Is the enemy stronger or weaker Does it have greater or lesser scope of action Is it Bigger or smaller Is it Causing more damage Is it Creating more fear Is it Gaining more or less support

44. Effective Counterterrorism policyWhat a network understanding provides The formulation of a response must begin with an understanding that the two primary purposes of a counterterrorism policy within the United States and in each of its of its counterterrorism network partners are to make the nation(s) more secure to make the public(s) believe that they are more secure

45. Global Counterterrorism Policy: Winning the Communication Battle within the global network Purpose Countering fear Communicating trust, security and resolve Audiences: U.S. public Global public Supporters Acquiescers Antagonists

46. Counterterrorism Fighting terrorism is not as simple as winning military battles or destroying a network structure How you fight, with whom you fight, and against whom you fight are equally important because in the long run it is necessary to not only eliminate �the bad guys� but also much of their support network. Even more importantly it is necessary to eliminate the willingness of the vast majority of people to acquiesce to terrorists� presence within their midst. The context is being produced and reproduced by the actions of both terrorists and counterterrorism actors. Case in point: The French �victory� in the Algerian War

47. Lesson of the Battle of Algiers As the flier inviting guests to the Pentagon screening declared: ''How to win a battle against terrorism and lose the war of ideas. Children shoot soldiers at point-blank range. Women plant bombs in cafes. Soon the entire Arab population builds to a mad fervor. Sound familiar? The French have a plan. It succeeds tactically, but fails strategically. To understand why, come to a rare showing of this film.'� NYTimes September 7, 2003

48. War as CounterterrorismInitial Errors: Alternative interpretations of messages are likely when the audience is comprised of multiple cultures and weak and heterogenous links While trying to assure the Muslim World that the United States recognized the difference between the Al Qaeda terrorists and the followers of Islam, President Bush in announcing that the United States would respond with force indicated: "This crusade, this war on terrorism, is going to take a while.� This initial naming of the military response in Afghanistan as Operation Infinite Justice (which gave way to Operation Enduring Freedom when it was made clear to the White House that the term gave offense to Muslim sensibilities),

49. Ambiguous definition of the Enemy and non-specification of the Scope of action Mr. Bush (and his administration) did not clearly define the enemy, the scope of operations, the theater of war, or provide the metrics by which the military and public could judge whether or not it had won or even was winning. Was Afghanistan the first of many wars? Will the Iraq War be followed by the Iran War? Why Not?

50. President Bush: Specifying the Network "This group and its leader � a person named Osama bin Laden � are linked to many other organizations in different countries, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. There are thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries�(President Bush)� Does this mean that every time there is a terrorist event somewhere in any of the sixty countries that Al Qaeda or Bin Laden are responsible if you argue that all the terrorism that occurs in the world is connected to Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda (or in earlier periods to any of the other devils), each terror attack become an unnecessary victory that you have handed to Bin Laden. To connect the successful culmination of the war against terror to the absence of terrorism will be self defeating and further will increase the damage to the United States and its allies that any act of future terrorism will bring thus granting to Al Qaeda unnecessary �victories.�

51. Utilizing a War Metaphor the war metaphor against �the terrorist network� has undermined the ability of the United States to manage the problem of terrorism Raises the expectations Justifies excesses Escalates fear Requires resolution rather than management of the problem

52. The War Metaphor and War Treating the the Afghan theater as the first step and the Iraq War as the second major campaign in the �war on terror� allowed the United States to demonstrate once again that it was able to bring to bear overwhelming force, high tech airpower and a capacity to destroy that is second to none. However, the power to destroy is not equivalent to countering the threat or the fear of the threat of future terrorism nor changing the context in which terrorist networks emerge and develop. How will we know when we have won the war on terror? How do we know when the terrorist network is destroyed? How long do we have to go after the last attack to declare victory.

53. What could the Administration have done differently in the early stages? Separated the War against the Taliban for their part in September 11 and Counterterrorism efforts Defeating the Taliban was not equivalent to destroying the decentralized terrorist network with multiple hubs�structural properties matter! Distinguished among the terrorists (Mr. Bush�s �evil doers�) who were targeting the United States in the name of an Islamic revivalism from those who target other states and other issues. Clarify network boundaries Distinguished among the terrorists and those with whom they have been in contact, who have supported them, those that have acquiesced to their presence. Recognize the embedded nature of network links and the existence of uniplex and multiplex links.

54. The long term implications: Is the Bush approach working? How can we tell?

55. Are we winning or losing?How can we tell? Are we defeating the enemy What have been the impacts on the network of terror Is the enemy stronger or weaker Does it have greater or lesser scope of action Is it Bigger or smaller Is it Causing more damage Is it Creating more fear Is it Gaining more or less support

56. Unpacking the discourseHow big is the network and is it getting smaller? �Senior officials suggest that although sworn members of Al Qaeda were estimated to number no more than 200 to 300 men, officials say that at its peak this broader Qaeda network operated about a dozen Afghan camps that trained as many as 5000 militants, who in turn created cells in as many as 60 countries. Johnson, Van Natta and Miller (June 2002 New York Times) �Two senior FBI officials�Everyone tries to tie everything into 9/11 and al-Qaida," said one of the two officials interviewed Friday on condition of anonymity. "There was a recent report suggesting that al-Qaida is about 5,000 strong. It is nowhere near 5,000 strong�While thousands of Islamic extremists and future terrorists have passed through Mr. bin Laden�s training camps, it does not mean they are actual al Qaeda operatives, the officials said. (Carr Cox News service, July 2002, A10)�

57. Unpacking the discourse: Is the network fractured and diffused or a new distributed network? The war in Afghanistan has successfully dispersed, killed or captured al-Qaeda leaders, leaving the terror network fractured and diffused� (Carr Cox News service, July 2002, A10)� Later in the summer of 2002 it was reported that: �Classified investigations of the Qaeda threat � under way at the F.B.I. and C.I.A have concluded that the war in Afghanistan failed to diminish the threat to the United States Instead, the war might have complicated counterterrorism efforts by dispersing potential attackers across a wider geographic area (and)� Officials emphasized that it was no longer possible simply to label all post- Sept. 1 plots as Al Qaeda inspired, because the new terror alliance has largely replaced the old bin Laden network (Johnston, Van Natta and Miller, 2002).�

58. Network Paradoxes By the network logic being applied to Al Qaeda and its offspring, the US can never prevail. Whatever is done to thwart the enemy just seems to make it stronger. Wolff (2002) noted: Although we've killed countless members of the enemy group, including much of its leadership, disrupted its infrastructure, captured reams of intelligence on its activities, it's suddenly stronger than ever before. Likewise, we ascribe substantial organizational talents to what we also describe as uniquely disorganized. This new group has become, the Times story implies, a threat not least of all because it is less a group than the former group, which itself was notable for its loose-knitness (although, in comparison with the new group, the former group was apparently a model of central governance).

59. Uncle Osama Go ahead. Saddam will quickly fall, but that won�t make the world safer or more secure. Your bombs will send me a new generation of recruits and fuel their hatred and desire for revenge. So go ahead. Squander your wealth on war and occupation -- America will be weaker for it. Divide your people, divide the world, isolate yourselves! Perfect! I thrive on chaos. I need an enemy. You give me both.

60. Tom Ridge July 8, 2004 "Credible reporting now indicates that al-Qaeda is moving forward with its plans to carry out a large-scale attack in the United States in an effort to disrupt our democratic process," he said. "Based on the attack in Madrid and recent interdictions in England, Jordan and Italy, we know that they have the capability to succeed and hold the mistaken belief that their attacks will have an impact on America's resolve,"

61. George Bush at Oak RidgeJuly 13, 2004 We will confront them overseas so we do not have to confront them here at home." Today, because America has acted, and because America has led, the forces of terror and tyranny have suffered defeat after defeat, and America and the world are safer.

63. CounterterrorismMeasuring Success

64. Metrics Revised State Department version of Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 June 04 � There were 208 acts of international terrorism in 2003, a slight increase from the most recently published figure of 198* attacks in 2002, and a 42 percent drop from the level in 2001 of 355 attacks. A total of 625 persons were killed in the attacks of 2003, fewer than the 725 killed during 2002. A total of 3646 persons were wounded in the attacks that occurred in 2003, a sharp increase from 2013 persons wounded the year before. This increase reflects the numerous indiscriminate attacks during 2003 on �soft targets,� such as places of worship, hotels, and commercial districts, intended to produce mass casualties. Thirty-five U.S. citizens died in international terrorist attacks in 2003: �

65. Metrics Do we count U.S. casualties ? In U.S., globally? Do we count casualties in general? Or only our �friends�? Do we count number of attacks Against Americans, against allies, against anyone? In U.S., globally Do we count attacks prevented? Do we count arrests, deaths, amnesty�s, or those who have foresworn terrorism in the future?

68. Damage: The Alienation and Hostility of Friends September 12 Today We Are All Americans

69. Today U.S. most feared political actor on the planet Hostility of European public towards U.S. Coalition members withdrawing from Iraq because they are becoming targets of terror and their publics are furious

70. Alignment with repressive regimes to fight terror The new counter terror coalition members Pakistan Ukraine Kazakstan Russia

72. War While the �war� in Afghanistan successfully eliminated the Taliban government and destroyed the relatively comfortable safe haven that Afghanistan provided for Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, and while the War in Iraq overthrew Saddam Hussein we did not find Bin Laden and further terrorist attacks attributed to Al Qaeda followed both inside Afghanistan and Iraq and without, most notably in Bali, Istanbul, and Tunisia and in March 2004 in Madrid.

73. Bush�s War on Terrorism (1) the implications of the ways in which the terms terror and network have been used strategically and inconsistently (2) the need to develop a better understanding of the dynamics of terrorism and networks if we are to create an effective response 3) issues related to the importance of our own roles and reactions in networks of terror (4) the administration's failure to employ and at times disparage credible tools of network analysis in terms of intelligence, law enforcement, and financial influence while concentrating on the destructive instruments of the military weapon and finally, (5) the ways in which describing the U.S. response as war and adopting a "war fighting strategy" were significant mistakes that undermine the effort to confront networks of terror and terrorism.

74. The Afghan Alumni As Shay and Schweitzer (2000) have described, today, the �Afghan Alumni� operate in four capacities: 1. As leaders of the radical Islamic organizations in their countries of origin (Egypt, the Maghrib countries, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, etc.) 2. As founders of new terrorist organizations, such as Osama bin Laden�s �Al- Qa�idah� [�The Vanguard�]. 3. As the architects of �independent� terrorist cells which, while lacking a specific organizational affiliation, cooperate with other institutionalized terrorist organizations. 4. As participants in the struggles of Islamic populations in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Tajikistan, and Kashmir. Note- provides links for connections but the connection to the local creates dissonance between local needs and backlash from actions undertaken elsewhere which might harm the local political bargaining