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Banking Regulation after the Crisis

Banking Regulation after the Crisis. Prof. Dr. Volbert Alexander Goethe University Frankfurt (Germany) Bank of Greece , Athens April 2011 . Banking Regulation after the Crisis. Ethics in Finance. Banking regulation after the crisis became a dominant problem in the

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Banking Regulation after the Crisis

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  1. Banking Regulation after theCrisis Prof. Dr. Volbert Alexander Goethe University Frankfurt (Germany) Bank of Greece, Athens April 2011

  2. Banking Regulation after theCrisis Ethics in Finance Banking regulation after the crisis became a dominant problem in the present discussions. Many proposals are launched with the central focus on the question: How can future crises be avoided by prudent macro- and microeconomic regulations ? Presentation is concentrated on the following issues: (1) The Situation of the Banking Sector after the Crisis (2) Implemented and Planned Regulations According to Basel III (3) Neglected Problems (4) Summary and Conclusions The analysis is concentrated on the discussion in Europe, specific regulatory issues in US or Asia etc. are neglected.

  3. (1) The Situation of the Banking System after theCrisis Ethics in Finance

  4. Banking Regulation after theCrisis Ethics in Finance

  5. Banking Regulation after theCrisis Ethics in Finance

  6. Banking Regulation after theCrisis Ethics in Finance

  7. Banking Regulation after theCrisis Ethics in Finance

  8. Banking Regulation after theCrisis Ethics in Finance

  9. Banking Regulation after theCrisis Ethics in Finance

  10. Banking Regulation after theCrisis Ethics in Finance

  11. Banking Regulation after theCrisis Ethics in Finance

  12. Banking Regulation after theCrisis Ethics in Finance

  13. Banking Regulation after theCrisis Ethics in Finance

  14. Banking Regulation after theCrisis Ethics in Finance (2) Implemented and Planned Regulations according to Basel III concentration on the following strategic magnitudes of banking business ( - ) capital ( - ) liquidity ( - ) leverage

  15. Banking Regulation after theCrisis Ethics in Finance

  16. Banking Regulation after theCrisis Ethics in Finance

  17. Banking Regulation after theCrisis Ethics in Finance

  18. Banking Regulation after theCrisis Ethics in Finance

  19. Banking Regulation after theCrisis Ethics in Finance

  20. Banking Regulation after theCrisis Ethics in Finance (3) Neglected Problems To sum up: - Basel III relies on quantitative measures to enhance the balance sheets of banks with a strong concentration on the capital base. - Structural (systemically relevant banks) and qualitative (nature of transactions) aspects of the present discussion are not included. exception: In Germany uncovered short selling, in general, is forbidden.

  21. Banking Regulation after theCrisis Ethics in Finance General problem for regulations: Regulations in single countries or regions are not effective, because banks immediately transfer businesses to unregulated regions. Global regulations are not achievable or are possible only after very long periods of negotiations. Reluctance to introduce effective regulations on order to avoid losses in the financial business. The following aspects are neglected in the Basel III concept but will be of significant importance for a future macro- and micro- prudential regulation framework:

  22. Banking Regulation after theCrisis Ethics in Finance (-) capital market oriented instruments ( contingent capital = liabilities which are converted into common capital in situations of shortages in required capital ratios) (-) structure of regulatory bodies ( Central Banks only or Central Banks and an independent institution(Germany)) (-) reducing the „systemic“ importance of large banks - universal banking or separate banking systems - interbank indebtedness (-) prohibition of special transactions (gambling)

  23. Banking Regulation after theCrisis Ethics in Finance Proposal for limiting banking transactions along the following criterion: Do transactions of banks contribute to economic welfare ? in detail: Do transactions of banks create, encourage or facilitate real and monetary transactions improving the welfare of the society ? problem: pure gambling: Capital gains of the winner are equal to the capital loss of the looser, the overall net value remains unchanged.

  24. Banking Regulation after theCrisis Ethics in Finance Example: Bank A issues a DJ- certificate to the public with the following (extremely simplified )characteristics: - the papers earns an interest rate of 0% if the DJ does not change more than +/- 2% - if the DJ goes up more than +2% the interest rate follows exactly - if the DJ looses more than 2 % the paper looses correspondingly Consequences: In all situations gains are matched by losses. In addition, both parties are confronted with additional risk. An overall increase in the net welfare of the society is not observable.

  25. Banking Regulation after theCrisis Ethics in Finance (4) Summary and Conclusions (-) The regulations of Basel III are a quantitave approach to make bank`s balance sheets more crisis proof. They will not be able to avoid future crises in a global system of banks using all financial instruments existing today. (-) Qualitative and structural regulations are necessary reducing the systemic relevance of large banks and limiting or prohibiting specific financial transactions.

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