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Planning a Public Key Infrastructure

Planning a Public Key Infrastructure . Planning a Certification Authority Hierarchy Managing Certification Authorities Using Certificates for Authentication. Planning a Certification Authority Hierarchy. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Deployment Steps Reviewing PKI components

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Planning a Public Key Infrastructure

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  1. Planning a Public Key Infrastructure • Planning a Certification Authority Hierarchy • Managing Certification Authorities • Using Certificates for Authentication

  2. Planning a Certification Authority Hierarchy • Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Deployment Steps • Reviewing PKI components • Determining whether to use a private or public Certification Authority (CA) • Determining the CA structure • Planning the scope of a CA • Planning offline CAs • Designing the Certification Authority hierarchy • Planning disaster recovery of CAs

  3. PKI Deployment Steps • Determine whether a public CA or a private CA meets the business needs. • Design a CA hierarchy that allows clients to recognize and verify all issued certificates. • Determine whether to deploy an Enterprise or Standalone scope for private CAs. • Plan security for the root CA. • Develop a disaster recovery plan for the potential failure of a CA.

  4. Reviewing PKI Components

  5. Public Key-Enabled Applications and Services

  6. Choosing a Public CA

  7. Choosing a Private CA

  8. Making the Decision:Implementing Public and Private CAs • Use a public CA when • An application requires verification from a trusted third party • The resources necessary to deploy an internal PKI are not available • Time is limited • A project requires certificate interoperability between organizations • An application requires liability protection

  9. Making the Decision: Implementing Public and Private CAs (Cont.) • Use a private CA when • The organization needs to maintain management control of all client-associated certificates • The certificates will be used only for internal projects, applications, and services • The costs associated with issuing certificates must be minimized • An organization has the expertise to manage and maintain Certificate Services

  10. Applying the Decision: Implementing Public and Private CAs for Blue Yonder Airlines • Public CAs • The online booking Web server must have a public CA-issued certificate. • Ensures customer confidence in the security of sensitive data. • Configure the Web server to require 128-bit encryption. • Private CAs • Make it possible to issue smart cards to customers while maintaining the ability to revoke certificates quickly • Provide internal employees with smart card logon and Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) authentication for remote access

  11. A Rooted CA Hierarchy

  12. A Cross-Certification CA Hierarchy

  13. Making the Decision: Designing Certificate Hierarchies • Provide maximum security for the root CA. • Limit trusted CAs to an organization’s CAs. • Provide interoperability between organizations. • Limit which CAs will be trusted from a partner organization.

  14. Applying the Decision: Designing Certificate Hierarchies for Blue Yonder Airlines • Blue Yonder Airlines requires only a rooted CA hierarchy for the internal network and for Web site customers. • This allows for increased security by removing the root CA from the network. • Blue Yonder Airlines will acquire a certificate for their Web server from a public CA such as Entrust. • There is no business reason to create cross-certification between the company’s CA hierarchy and the Entrust CA hierarchy. • The Entrust certificate will be trusted. • The root certificate from Entrust CA will be included in the Trusted Root Certification Authorities container by default.

  15. Planning the Scope of a CA

  16. Enterprise CA Considerations • Certificate templates • Integration with Microsoft Windows 2000 security • Storage of data in Active Directory • Applications and services that require an Enterprise CA • Reduction in management for certificate issuance

  17. Deploying a Standalone CA • Standalone CAs can be members of a domain or standalone servers in a workgroup. • All data is stored in a local database. • Standalone CAs do not use certificate templates.

  18. Considerations for Deploying a Standalone CA • If an offline root CA is established • If integration of Windows 2000 Certificate Services with an Exchange 5.5 Key Management Server (KMS) is desirable • If the CA is required to run in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)

  19. Making the Decision: Implementing Enterprise CAs • Deploy Certificate Services for an internal deployment where the users will be providing their network credentials for authentication. • Deploy Windows 2000 services that require certificate templates provided only by Enterprise CAs. • Leverage the standard Windows 2000 security model to determine who can acquire specific certificate templates.

  20. Making the Decision: Implementing Standalone CAs • Deploy offline CAs that must operate without communicating with the rest of the network. • Configure the Exchange 5.5 KMS to use x.509 v3 certificates rather than the default x.509 v1 certificates. • Place the CA in a location where it cannot connect to Active Directory.

  21. Applying the Decision: Deploying Enterprise CAs or Standalone CAs at Blue Yonder Airlines • Blue Yonder Airlines requires the issuance of smart cards for both customers and internal user accounts. • Requires deployment of an Enterprise CA. • Only an Enterprise CA supports certificates for smart cards • Each CA hierarchy should have an offline root CA to increase the security of the CA hierarchy. • Requires configuration of a Standalone scope for the CA.

  22. Offline CA Considerations • Storage location of the offline CA • Use of a strong Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP) • Publication of the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) • Publication of the Authority Information Access (AIA) • Definition of certificate renewal period

  23. Configuring an Offline Root CA • The primary configuration is performed in the Capolicy.inf file. • Place the Capolicy.inf file in the Systemroot folder before installing Windows 2000 Certificate Services.

  24. Capolicy.inf Configuration File

  25. Capolicy.inf File for Nonroot CAs • Only use a Capolicy.inf configuration file for a nonroot CA to define a Certificate Practice Statement (CPS) for an issuing CA. • The Capolicy.inf text file is the only way to enter information into a CPS for Windows 2000 Certificate Services. • A nonroot CA processes only the [CAPolicy] and [PolicyName] sections of the Capolicy.inf configuration file. • All other sections are ignored.

  26. Configuring the CDPs • Configure Certification Distribution Points (CDPs) for the CRL and Authority Information Access (AIA) associated with the CA. • Configure CDPs in the properties of the Certification Authority. • Define the X.509 extensions for the CA's policy module. • The URLs defined for the CRL and AIA distribution points are included in the properties of any newly issued certificate by the CA.

  27. Making the Decision: Securing Offline Root CAs • Allow the CA to be removed from the network for long periods of time. • Provide the strongest form of encryption at the offline root CA. • Make the CRL and AIA available to network users. • Define a CPS. • Provide the most security for your CA hierarchy.

  28. Applying the Decision: Securing Offline Root CAs for Blue Yonder Airlines • A Standalone CA must be used for the offline root CA. • A second layer of subordinate CAs can also be removed. • A Capolicy.inf configuration file must be configured to issue a CPS that defines usage policy for all customers with airline smart cards. • Attributes for the CA must be set before removing the CA from the network. • CRL publication interval • CRL and AIA distribution points • The default lifetime for issued certificates

  29. Certification Authority Hierarchy: Structure Based on Usage

  30. Certification Authority Hierarchy:Structure Based on Administration

  31. Certification Authority Hierarchy: Structure Based on Location

  32. Required CA Levels • Create a CA hierarchy that is three to four levels deep. • Hierarchies with fewer than three levels are more vulnerable. • With two levels, if the root level is compromised, all certificates are also compromised. • Hierarchies with more than four levels introduce unnecessary complexity.

  33. Making the Decision:Choosing CA Hierarchy Structures • Usage structure • Administrative structure • Location structure

  34. Applying the Decision: Implementing CA Hierarchy Structures for Blue Yonder Airlines

  35. Preventing CA Failure • Implement hardware solutions for fault tolerance. • Back up the Certificate Services data regularly. • Back up an offline CA server with disk imaging software.

  36. Making the Decision: Disaster Recovery Plan for CAs • Prevent loss of data in the Certificate Services database. • Ensure that a rebuilt CA is still valid for all issued certificates. • Allow a CA to be recovered. • Ensure recoverability.

  37. Applying the Decision: Disaster Recovery Plan for CAs at Blue Yonder Airlines • Include a backup and restore strategy for all CAs. • Schedule regular backups that include the system state backups. • Export the existing private and public keys associated with the CA’s certificate to files and include those files in the regular backup set. • Create an image of the root CA for the hierarchy on a CD.

  38. Managing Certification Authorities • Planning certificate issuance • Planning certificate revocation • Planning certificate renewal

  39. Planning Certificate Issuance • Certificates must be issued to the necessary users, computers, and network devices. • Issuing certificates involves either • Configuring permissions to establish which security principals have Enroll permissions for specific templates • Appointing a certificate administrator who will review each certificate request and issue or deny the request

  40. Designing Automatic Issuance • Define which certificate templates will be requested by computer accounts within the site, domain, or OU where the Group Policy object is defined. • Assign the correct permissions to the required computers to acquire the certificate templates. • Configure at least one Enterprise CA in the forest to issue the required certificate templates.

  41. Designing Manual Issuance • All user certificates and some computer certificates must be requested manually from a CA. • User certificates cannot automatically be assigned. • Set permissions for each certificate template. • Designate a CA to issue the required certificate templates.

  42. Making the Decision: Planning Certificate Issuance • Restrict access to specific templates. • Restrict which CA issues a specific certificate template. • Automate the deployment of computer certificates. • Issue certificates to users. • Require a certificate administrator to approve or reject each certificate request.

  43. Applying the Decision: Planning Certificate Issuance for Blue Yonder Airlines • Computer certificates • Require IPSec-specific certificates or multipurpose Computer certificates for IPSec authentication • Configure the Default Domain Policy to issue both IPSec and Computer certificates • User certificates • Cannot automatically issue certificates to internal users • Jenny Sax will make all certificate requests for external customers

  44. Planning Certificate Revocation • Reasons for revoking a certificate before its expiration date • Verifying a revoked certificate • When frequent certificate revocations occur • The CRL's availability

  45. Making the Decision: Planning CRL Availability for CAs • Create a central location for offline CA CRLs. • Determine the optimal publication schedule for the CRL associated with a CA. • Ensure availability of the CRL. • Ensure that CRL's are available to external clients if they receive certificates from the internal network. • Ensure that all CRL's in the CA chain are available.

  46. Applying the Decision: Planning CRL Availability for CAs at Blue Yonder Airlines

  47. Planning Certificate Renewal • Registry values define the lifetime for all issued certificates • Renewing User certificates or Computer certificates • Renewing the CA certificate using the Certification Authority console • Setting the lifetime for CA and SubCA certificates

  48. Making the Decision: Designing a Renewal Policy for Certificates • Define certificate lifetimes based on renewal requirements. • Define a process that users and computers will use to renew their certificates. • Ensure that the CA certificate's remaining lifetime is never shorter than the lifetime for issued certificates. • Plan for renewal dates far in the future.

  49. Applying the Decision: Designing a Renewal Policy for Certificates at Blue Yonder Airlines • Install the root CA with the longest lifetime. • Renew the root CA's certificate before the SubCAs expire. • The Smartcards CA requires the shortest validity period. • Develop a plan for renewing the internal network certificates.

  50. Using Certificates for Authentication • Planning smart card logon • Planning certificate-based Web authentication

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