Information Engagement in Counterinsurgency

1. Information Engagementin Counterinsurgency 1

2. Agenda IE Goals IE Fundamentals in COIN IE Vacuum Success vs. Failure IE Task Categories IE in the AO 2

3. Perceptions are Everything 3 COIN is political conflict for power, and control of the population is the primary means to gain that power. History is replete with examples of counterinsurgents winning the tactical battles while losing the strategic campaign for the support of the host and home nations . We have learned that operations will be assessed through the lens of information effects. Information engagement is not a staff section�s responsibility or an operations order annex, but a commander�s program through which all efforts, lethal and non-lethal, must be viewed. Counterinsurgents must constantly ask, �What are the various audiences, and how will this action be perceived by each one? Then, ask what can we do to shape that perception to our advantage?� A successful counterinsurgent is proactive in shaping the information message of his actions. When reacting to events in the current media environment, speed and accuracy are key. To increase tempo, media engagement authority must be decentralized as much as possible out of theater and corps headquarters down to battalions and companies . Creating credible perceptions of increasing success and momentum are critical to re-establishing legitimacy and restoring the population�s confidence and trust in the host government. Reference Combined Arms Center Commander LTG William Caldwell IV�s 2008 article �Changing the Organizational Culture� located at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/01/changing-the-organizational-cu-1/. LTG Caldwell states bluntly, �Responding to this challenge requires changes in our approach to warfare. The one thing we can change now does not require resources � just a change in attitudes and the organizational culture in our Army.� Identified in the March-April 2008 Military Review article �Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point� http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MarApr08/Smith_AnbarEngMarApr08.pdf by the author and COL(P) Sean MacFarland. Borrowed from a concept outlined by COL (ret) Rick Everett. COIN is political conflict for power, and control of the population is the primary means to gain that power. History is replete with examples of counterinsurgents winning the tactical battles while losing the strategic campaign for the support of the host and home nations . We have learned that operations will be assessed through the lens of information effects. Information engagement is not a staff section�s responsibility or an operations order annex, but a commander�s program through which all efforts, lethal and non-lethal, must be viewed. Counterinsurgents must constantly ask, �What are the various audiences, and how will this action be perceived by each one? Then, ask what can we do to shape that perception to our advantage?� A successful counterinsurgent is proactive in shaping the information message of his actions. When reacting to events in the current media environment, speed and accuracy are key. To increase tempo, media engagement authority must be decentralized as much as possible out of theater and corps headquarters down to battalions and companies . Creating credible perceptions of increasing success and momentum are critical to re-establishing legitimacy and restoring the population�s confidence and trust in the host government. Reference Combined Arms Center Commander LTG William Caldwell IV�s 2008 article �Changing the Organizational Culture� located at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/01/changing-the-organizational-cu-1/. LTG Caldwell states bluntly, �Responding to this challenge requires changes in our approach to warfare. The one thing we can change now does not require resources � just a change in attitudes and the organizational culture in our Army.� Identified in the March-April 2008 Military Review article �Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point� http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MarApr08/Smith_AnbarEngMarApr08.pdf by the author and COL(P) Sean MacFarland. Borrowed from a concept outlined by COL (ret) Rick Everett.

4. The desired effects of IE are to destroy, degrade, disrupt, deny, deceive, exploit, and influence enemy actions and enhance the legitimacy of the host nation government. 4

5. Divide, disorganize, and induce defection of insurgents Reduce/eliminate civilian support of insurgents Dissuade civilians from insurgent activities Win the active support of non-committed civilians Preserve and strengthen the support of friendly civilians Win popular approval (from the civilians) of the local presence of friendly military forces Obtain national unity or disunity (within the civilian population) as desired 5 Multiple AIF groups have multiple goals and only overlap on certain aspects. Drive the wedge between groups, religion vs. secularism, foreign fighters are criminals, killing HN people. Even tacit support of the insurgents allows them freedom of movement. If I cannot feed my family, I might as well earn some money by attacking Americans Much of the population has a don�t ask, don�t tell or it doesn�t matter to me�we need to make it matter to them Address patriotism, democracy, freedom of speech, self-governance, and freedom Continue to provide work projects, put the �HN face� on the projects. Get the children, get the parent. Emphasize national HN pride.Multiple AIF groups have multiple goals and only overlap on certain aspects. Drive the wedge between groups, religion vs. secularism, foreign fighters are criminals, killing HN people. Even tacit support of the insurgents allows them freedom of movement. If I cannot feed my family, I might as well earn some money by attacking Americans Much of the population has a don�t ask, don�t tell or it doesn�t matter to me�we need to make it matter to them Address patriotism, democracy, freedom of speech, self-governance, and freedom Continue to provide work projects, put the �HN face� on the projects. Get the children, get the parent. Emphasize national HN pride.

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7. Imperatives of IE in COIN Prepare for IE before deployment Involve every soldier Anticipate and respond with speed, accuracy, and truth Establish and sustain an integrated team approach Intelligence supports IE IE supports intelligence 7

8. Holistic IE Principles in COIN IE is tied to every aspect of COIN FID (Foreign Internal Defense) CMO (Civilian-Military Operations) Force Protection Population Security Lethal Ops INTEL Plan for Contingencies 8 FID: Billboards depicting the �strong HN Soldier,� protecting his family, tribe, and community. Assisting in educating the populace on voting. CMO: Credit for projects going to the HN government and Army Force Protection: Provide education/information on Escalation of Force to the public so they are not caught by surprise. STAY AWAY FROM THE FOB FRONT GATE. PULL OVER FOR MILITARY CONVOYS. Logistics: Convoy behavior. Population Security: The HN Army and Coalition Forces are here to keep you safe, and follow through. Provide anonymous tip phone lines, drop boxes. Kinetic: Always have a plan for JOE and TED to talk to the locals. Emplace translators with the cordon. INTEL: Use the enemy�s IE campaign to �track-back.� If a rumor or product starts at a definable location, exploit that knowledge to shut down or capture the source.FID: Billboards depicting the �strong HN Soldier,� protecting his family, tribe, and community. Assisting in educating the populace on voting. CMO: Credit for projects going to the HN government and Army Force Protection: Provide education/information on Escalation of Force to the public so they are not caught by surprise. STAY AWAY FROM THE FOB FRONT GATE. PULL OVER FOR MILITARY CONVOYS. Logistics: Convoy behavior. Population Security: The HN Army and Coalition Forces are here to keep you safe, and follow through. Provide anonymous tip phone lines, drop boxes. Kinetic: Always have a plan for JOE and TED to talk to the locals. Emplace translators with the cordon. INTEL: Use the enemy�s IE campaign to �track-back.� If a rumor or product starts at a definable location, exploit that knowledge to shut down or capture the source.

9. IE Vacuum 9

10. Effective Communication 10 We transmit, but how well is our message received, understood, and accepted? Too often we communicate using methods the populace doesn�t understand or use in ways that undermine our message. Early on, we distributed Arabic language flyers into Turkoman-speaking populations, and wondered why our messages didn�t resonate. Once we learned and understood how the host nation communicates, we used those streams, and our efforts improved markedly. In some areas messaging may best be carried out in tea shops, use newspapers in another area and local leaders in a third. Once we learned to communicate though appropriate mediums in the host nation our successful results multiplied. We learned to place local figures at the forefront. A local citizen is always more credible than a foreign one in any setting. Many Iraqis believed �Baghdad Bob�s� fantastic tales of victory because he was an Iraqi. �Baghdad Bob� was Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf, the Iraqi Information Minister known for such statements as "Their infidels are committing suicide by the hundreds on the gates of Baghdad. Be assured, Baghdad is safe, protected." At the same time, US forces were in control of Baghdad Airport. He was believable enough that many Baghdad residents were shocked to encounter US forces in the capitol shortly after. We transmit, but how well is our message received, understood, and accepted? Too often we communicate using methods the populace doesn�t understand or use in ways that undermine our message. Early on, we distributed Arabic language flyers into Turkoman-speaking populations, and wondered why our messages didn�t resonate. Once we learned and understood how the host nation communicates, we used those streams, and our efforts improved markedly. In some areas messaging may best be carried out in tea shops, use newspapers in another area and local leaders in a third. Once we learned to communicate though appropriate mediums in the host nation our successful results multiplied. We learned to place local figures at the forefront. A local citizen is always more credible than a foreign one in any setting. Many Iraqis believed �Baghdad Bob�s� fantastic tales of victory because he was an Iraqi. �Baghdad Bob� was Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf, the Iraqi Information Minister known for such statements as "Their infidels are committing suicide by the hundreds on the gates of Baghdad. Be assured, Baghdad is safe, protected." At the same time, US forces were in control of Baghdad Airport. He was believable enough that many Baghdad residents were shocked to encounter US forces in the capitol shortly after.

11. Political vs. Military Mobilization Insurgent/Extremists failure to achieve classic �military objectives� should not be interpreted as a failure to accomplish the �mission.� Tet Offensive in Vietnam Intifada I �Final Offensive� in El Salvador Spectacular Attacks in Iraq Serena Hotel Attack in Kabul Hizbollah vs. Israel � 2006 Of note, these examples shared characteristics of a possible outcome in Iraq or Afghanistan: All were failures militarily All were victories psychologically and politically The psychological and political goals were ultimately more important than military objectives 11 Served psychological and political purposes rather than conventional military objectives. Intifada I � an uprising among Palestinian Arabs of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, beginning in late 1987 and continuing sporadically into the early 1990�s, in protest against continued Israeli occupation of these territories. Serena Hotel Attack � January 14, 2008 - first on a Kabul hotel since the Taliban were pushed from power in 2001. They were targeting �senior foreign military officers.� The hotel bills itself as �an oasis of luxury in a war-ravaged city.� The 177-room, newly built five-star hotel is the finest in Afghanistan. The hotel attracts diplomats and high-end business people.Served psychological and political purposes rather than conventional military objectives. Intifada I � an uprising among Palestinian Arabs of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, beginning in late 1987 and continuing sporadically into the early 1990�s, in protest against continued Israeli occupation of these territories. Serena Hotel Attack � January 14, 2008 - first on a Kabul hotel since the Taliban were pushed from power in 2001. They were targeting �senior foreign military officers.� The hotel bills itself as �an oasis of luxury in a war-ravaged city.� The 177-room, newly built five-star hotel is the finest in Afghanistan. The hotel attracts diplomats and high-end business people.

12. Impact of Attacks and IE Factor Media coverage and public outcry following spectacular and widespread attacks will stimulate insurgents� efforts� Impact of spectacular attacks by insurgents: Magnifies the group�s effort International and domestic press coverage Damage government credibility Impact public and political support in the US and Coalition countries Reduce counterinsurgent morale� 12 Islamic extremist media releases stated the Abu Ghurayb attack would be followed by more against US installations. Islamic extremist media releases stated the Abu Ghurayb attack would be followed by more against US installations.

13. Information Engagement Officer �Designated IE Officer assists the staff in integrating IE into each COA. The IE officer addresses how each IE element supports each COA and its associated time lines, critical events, and decision points. The IE officer revises IE concepts of support as needed during war gaming." FM 5-0, Planning and Orders Production, JAN 05 13

14. Divisive IE Political, social, economic, and ideological differences among insurgent elements Leadership rivalries within insurgent movement Insurgents as criminals, inept, anti-values Danger of betrayal from among the insurgents Harsh living conditions of insurgents Selfish motivation of opportunists supporting the insurgents Foreign domination of the movement 14 DIVISIVE Al Qaida vs. FRE, Sadr vs. AMZ, killing peaceful civilians, inept, criminal, anti-Islamic, insurgents do not allow members to leave voluntarily, living on the run�in hiding, criminals working hand-in-hand with insurgents, black marketers taking advantage of security gaps, influence from Jordan, Saudi, Iran, Pakistan DIVISIVE Al Qaida vs. FRE, Sadr vs. AMZ, killing peaceful civilians, inept, criminal, anti-Islamic, insurgents do not allow members to leave voluntarily, living on the run�in hiding, criminals working hand-in-hand with insurgents, black marketers taking advantage of security gaps, influence from Jordan, Saudi, Iran, Pakistan

15. IE That Counters Insurgent IE Proactive campaign, projected by the host nation, themselves designed to neutralize the psychological impact of future attacks Acknowledge the possibility/likelihood of future spectacular attacks The three pillars of MNF/ITG/ISF IE should be insurgents, especially Islamic extremist who: Lead Criminal attacks against host nation Have Foreign ties and leadership And are Ineptitude Ridicule can be very powerful, particularly against insurgent recruitment 15 Proactively portray future attacks as: �The last ditch efforts of a desperate, defeated insurgency� Highlight the death and destruction to civilians (Muslim on Muslim) Violations of the Muslim�s Lesser Jihad (��fighting to protect Islam from attack or oppression.� In such fighting, no woman, child, or innocent civilian is to be harmed��) and �Whosoever killed a person�it shall be as if he killed all mankind; and whoso saved a life, it shall be as if he had saved the life of all mankind.� Qur�an 5:32 Ineptitude of Insurgent/Extremist�s tactics and leadership Insurgent groups are made up of criminals and foreign terrorists who are shameful and without honor as they carry out rapes and murders of innocent civilians HNSF ability to defeat, delay, and destroy the enemy; HNSF honor and valor Proactively portray future attacks as: �The last ditch efforts of a desperate, defeated insurgency� Highlight the death and destruction to civilians (Muslim on Muslim) Violations of the Muslim�s Lesser Jihad (��fighting to protect Islam from attack or oppression.� In such fighting, no woman, child, or innocent civilian is to be harmed��) and �Whosoever killed a person�it shall be as if he killed all mankind; and whoso saved a life, it shall be as if he had saved the life of all mankind.� Qur�an 5:32 Ineptitude of Insurgent/Extremist�s tactics and leadership Insurgent groups are made up of criminals and foreign terrorists who are shameful and without honor as they carry out rapes and murders of innocent civilians HNSF ability to defeat, delay, and destroy the enemy; HNSF honor and valor

16. Psychological Operations �Few insurgencies have been won or lost by large, decisive military battles. More commonly, insurgencies are won by a combination of military and political means. Much of the political leverage involved in such settlements is derived from effective psychological operations, which have structured the environment necessary for a political solution.� -DA Pam 500-104 16

17. Targets of Psychological Operations PSYOP can assist counterinsurgency by reaching the following targets: - Insurgents - Civilian Populace (US & HN) - Military Force - Neutral Elements - External Hostile Powers - Local Government 17 Insurgents To create dissension, disorganization, low morale, subversion, and defection within insurgent forces No single way exists to influence foreign targets deliberately. Planning stems from the viewpoint of those affected by a conflict The HN government needs national programs designed to influence and win insurgents over to its side. Countering hostile propaganda Civilian Populace To gain, preserve, and strengthen civilian support for the HN government and its counterinsurgency programs Discrediting the insurgent forces to neutral groups Discrediting the insurgent forces groups sympathetic to the insurgents Projecting a favorable image of the HN government and the United States Passing instructions to the HN populace Military Force To strengthen military support, with emphasis on building and maintaining the morale of these forces The loyalty, discipline, and motivation of the forces are critical factors in combating an insurgency Establishing HN command support of positive populace control and protection from insurgent activities Providing close and continuous PSYOP support to CMO Neutral Elements To gain the support of uncommitted foreign groups inside and outside the HN Effective ways of gaining support are to reveal the subversive activities and to bring international pressure to bear on any external hostile power sponsoring the insurgency External Hostile Powers To convince them the insurgency will fail Local Government To establish and maintain credibility. Developing HN PSYOP capabilities Informing the international community of HN and US intent and goodwill Insurgents To create dissension, disorganization, low morale, subversion, and defection within insurgent forces No single way exists to influence foreign targets deliberately. Planning stems from the viewpoint of those affected by a conflict The HN government needs national programs designed to influence and win insurgents over to its side. Countering hostile propaganda Civilian Populace To gain, preserve, and strengthen civilian support for the HN government and its counterinsurgency programs Discrediting the insurgent forces to neutral groups Discrediting the insurgent forces groups sympathetic to the insurgents Projecting a favorable image of the HN government and the United States Passing instructions to the HN populace Military Force To strengthen military support, with emphasis on building and maintaining the morale of these forces The loyalty, discipline, and motivation of the forces are critical factors in combating an insurgency Establishing HN command support of positive populace control and protection from insurgent activities Providing close and continuous PSYOP support to CMO Neutral Elements To gain the support of uncommitted foreign groups inside and outside the HN Effective ways of gaining support are to reveal the subversive activities and to bring international pressure to bear on any external hostile power sponsoring the insurgency External Hostile Powers To convince them the insurgency will fail Local Government To establish and maintain credibility. Developing HN PSYOP capabilities Informing the international community of HN and US intent and goodwill

18. Conduct of Troops During Operations Rules of Conduct:There shall be no confiscation whatever from the poor peasantry. If you borrow anything, return it. Replace all articles you damage. Pay fairly for everything that you purchase. Be honest in all transactions with the peasants. Be courteous and polite to the people and help them when you can. � Mao Tse-tung, 1928 18

19. Conduct of Troops During Operations Effective IE means Be Timely Integrate with all phases of combat operations Use host nation to spread message Decentralize to lowest levels Understand host nation culture/customs 19 TV � satellite Radio News flyers DVDs/VCDs Rumors � Using HN Dismounted patrols Assisting HN civilians (accidents) assess situation Horns on Vehicles IO � broadcast (billboard, radio, etc) traffic rules when US convoys are on the road. Include local leaders in Civil Affairs operations Put the HN face on missions SOI engagements with village leaders TV � satellite Radio News flyers DVDs/VCDs Rumors � Using HN Dismounted patrols Assisting HN civilians (accidents) assess situation Horns on Vehicles IO � broadcast (billboard, radio, etc) traffic rules when US convoys are on the road. Include local leaders in Civil Affairs operations Put the HN face on missions SOI engagements with village leaders

20. IE Best Practices (1 of 2) Ensure IE is synchronized at all levels. Identify all audiences, the news cycles and how to reach them. Manage local populace�s expectations of successful COIN. Develop common, multiechelon themes consistent with HN polices and operation�s objectives. Coordinate and provide a comprehensive assessment of the IE environment. Remember - actions speak louder than words. Work to establish and sustain transparency to help maintain HN government legitimacy. 20

21. IE Best Practices (2 of 2) Success or failure depends on coordinated and thought out IE plan Recognize that COIN is both physical and psychological IE effort begins before the attacks occur Pre-Screen IE products (via host nation or interpreters) IE effort propagated at ALL levels �train your soldiers for �street� IE Train and empower host nation counterparts to become the main IE effort Well-synchronized offensive IE can cripple insurgent armed forces and insurgent political decision making capabilities 21 Much of the concern regarding screening of IE products is to assure they do not backfire here or abroad. This does not necessarily outweigh the message getting out late or reaching the target audience after insurgent/extremist propaganda and biased press reporting. This would help push time-sensitive messages out through credible media channels. in cooperation with HN counterparts, to coordinate and synchronize their day-to-day actions better� Decentralized and projected forward to local HN IE assets who work in cooperation with Special Forces FOB/AOBs, and regional BDEs and BNs. Much of the concern regarding screening of IE products is to assure they do not backfire here or abroad. This does not necessarily outweigh the message getting out late or reaching the target audience after insurgent/extremist propaganda and biased press reporting. This would help push time-sensitive messages out through credible media channels. in cooperation with HN counterparts, to coordinate and synchronize their day-to-day actions better� Decentralized and projected forward to local HN IE assets who work in cooperation with Special Forces FOB/AOBs, and regional BDEs and BNs.

22. Questions? 22

23. Consequence Management Tactical Decision Game

24. Scenario Without effective coordination with your land-owning unit, a river-borne special operations force has engaged in a friendly-on-friendly firefight with a host nation security force (HNSF) patrol providing overwatch of the river. The firefight involved close air support; there were no US casualties, but three HNSF personnel were killed and two critically wounded. How do you react?

25. Video: Consequence Management