NNSA Chief of Defense Nuclear Safety

1. NNSA Chief of Defense Nuclear Safety Jim McConnell ISM Workshop January 10, 2006

2. Chief of Defense Nuclear Safety Role Functions Activities Staff

3. CDNS Role Support the Central Technical Authority in establishing and implementing nuclear safety policies, regulations, and Directives in a consistent and effective manner. Encourage, challenge and assist Site Offices and HQ elements in promoting nuclear safety consistent with the principles of Integrated Safety Management. Promote the elimination of hazards where plausible and the development of effective controls to reduce risks. Ensure technical inquisitiveness by promoting technical debate and serving as the focal point for addressing complex-wide safety issues affecting nuclear facilities.

4. CDNS Functions Evaluate requirements in contracts to ensure that nuclear safety is adequately covered. Evaluate requests for exemptions from nuclear safety requirements. Review safety-related R&D needs to be included in the annual budget and planning cycle. Coordinate the NNSA review of DOE nuclear safety Directives and Standards. Coordinate the preparation of nuclear safety guidance for the CTA to issue for NNSA use. Direct the NNSA Differing Professional Opinion Process.

5. CDNS Functions (continued) Evaluate nuclear safety-related documents such as DSAs, TSR, ISMS Descriptions and SNRs to maintain operational awareness of nuclear safety performance. Conduct on-site reviews (including Biennial Reviews) of NNSA sites to ensure that nuclear safety requirements and guidance are implemented appropriately and effectively. Evaluate the selection, training, and qualifications of NNSA nuclear safety personnel. Publish quarterly NNSA Technical Bulletins. Provide guidance, advice, and assistance to NNSA HQ and Site Office management in the implementation of DOE 0 425.1 C, Startup and Restart of Nuclear Facilities.

6. CDNS Activities Biennial Reviews Recommendations 2004-1 & 2004-2 Integration of Safety into Design Delegation of Authority Review of Contractual Requirements Operational Awareness

7. CDNS Staff Chemical – Jim Poppiti Electrical – William (Ike) White Facilities/Design – Jeff Kimball Fire Protection – Sharon Steele Nuclear – Don Nichols Operations – Dick Crowe Safety Basis – Pat Cahalane

9. High Reliability Organizations What is High Reliability Organizational Theory? How are HRO principles being incorporated into ISM?

10. Normal Accident Theory Complex, Tightly-Coupled Systems Opacity Latent Failures Normalization of Deviation Practical Drift

11. High-Reliability Organization Theory Characterized by a high cultural value on safety, effective use of redundancy, continuous learning, and questioning attitude Elements extraordinary technical competence sustained high performance processes that reward the discovery and reporting of errors equal value placed on reliable production and operational safety a strong institutional safety culture

13. Tie Between HRO and ISM ISM Guiding Principles Supplemental Guiding Principles Similar to INPO “Principles of a Strong Safety Culture”

14. ISM Guiding Principles Line Management Responsibility for Safety Clear Roles and Responsibilities Competence Commensurate with Responsibilities Balanced Priorities Identification of Safety Standards and Requirements Hazard Controls Tailored to Work Being Performed Operations Authorization

15. INPO Safety Culture Principles Nuclear safety is everyone’s responsibility. Leaders demonstrate commitment to safety. Trust permeates the organization. Decision-making reflects safety first. Nuclear is recognized as different. A questioning attitude is cultivated. Organizational learning is embraced. Nuclear safety undergoes constant examination.

16. ISM Supplemental Guiding Principles Operational Excellence Individual Attitude and Responsibility for Safety Oversight for Performance Assurance Organizational Learning for Performance Improvement

17. Operational Excellence Leadership involvement and awareness Attention to detail Open and candid 2-way communications Healthy skepticism Flexible decision-making based on expertise and experience Organizational redundancy for defense-in-depth

18. Individual Attitude and Responsibility for Safety Workers actively involved in work planning and monitoring of safety Personnel anticipate and prepare for problems – mindfulness Questioning attitude, awareness of conditions Prompt reporting of problems and errors Strong bias toward resolution of degraded conditions rather than acceptance or even compensation

19. Oversight for Performance Assurance Robust, frequent, and independent oversight at all levels Oversight and feedback are valued by the line and are “value-added” Assessment data is complete, accurate, and forthright Leaders are involved in oversight and model constructive response to oversight

20. Organizational Learning Multiple sources of information High levels of trust – information reported without fear of retribution Reviews and critiques conducted promptly and often Root causes of issues are identified and effective corrective actions are tracked to closure and verified

21. Conclusion ISM Works existing Guiding Principles and Core Functions are clear and generally well-implemented HRO principles add needed additional attention to safety culture Example of a learning organization learning from external events