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The WTO in suspense: is medieval decision-making part of the problem

unequally penetrated by social and economic forces of globalization ... Jamaica Suriname. St Kitts/Nevis. St Lucia. Gabon. Ghana. Namibia. Honduras. Mongolia. Nicaragua ...

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The WTO in suspense: is medieval decision-making part of the problem

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    1. The WTO in suspense: is medieval decision-making part of the problem?

    Robert Wolfe WTO Public Forum September 26, 2006

    2. Medieval WTO?

    WTO Members vastly different levels of development political and legal systems based on divergent premises unequally penetrated by social and economic forces of globalization Overlapping regulatory domains WTO universe plural if not medieval process for making legitimate decisions inevitably untidy.

    3. Negotiation analysis approach

    NOT does WTO handle the right issues, or provide good policy advice NOT political economy of a compromise Is institutional design appropriate? does WTO facilitate understanding the issues? does the process facilitate agreement? Was this round doomed from start? In sum, does WTO need reform?

    4. Suspension non-issues

    Will evolutionary action be displaced to dispute settlement system? No Are regional negotiations an alternative? No Is it all down to the EU and the U.S.? No But power still counts Is there a democratic deficit? No But much has changed since Seattle, and institutional design matters

    5. WTO decision rules

    Consensus WTO never takes votes Single Undertaking Nothing is agreed until everything and everybody is agreed Bottom up on the rocks? Members want a bottom-up process with content coming from them: Chairpersons should reflect consensus, or where this is not possible, different positions on issues. Death by [square brackets]? Also problems with reciprocity, modalities, meetings

    6. 1) Modalities complexity

    Negotiating development agenda a conceptual minefield Rules inherently multilateral, especially behind the border, but applicability varies widely Services modalities dont work No more Request-Offer for market access principal supplier favours large over small Formula approach elegant, multilateral, confusing coefficients remove ambiguity Equal rates = disparate nominal cuts: fair?

    7. 2) The tangled web of bargains

    Past and present N ? N (reciprocal) N ? S (non-reciprocal demanded) S ? N (resisted as illegitimate) S ? S (ignored?) Arrows indicate direction of concessions Future? N ? S (ODA) N ? BRICSAM (reciprocal) BRICSAM ? BRICSAM (reciprocal) BRICSAM ? S (non-reciprocal?)

    8. 3) Reaching a consensus, with 149 Members

    Ministerial Conferences Formal (for the record) General Council TNC Negotiating groups Informal (where the work is done) Mini-ministerials Senior officials Coalitions Bilaterals Friends of Hundreds of meetings in and out of Geneva: groups help manage the chaos

    USA G1 Source: ICTSD and WTO

    9. Source: WTO, adapted from ideas by ICSTD and Bob Wolfe (Queens University)Source: WTO, adapted from ideas by ICSTD and Bob Wolfe (Queens University)

    10. The evolving logic

    Diverse issues and Members = Single Undertaking Single Undertaking = consensus, not voting Consensus = seeking compromise informally in a bottom-up process Overlapping interests = multiple small groups for each Member Many Members = Green Room (small informal) Green Rooms = red flags [G-6 finished?]

    11. Does it need fixing?

    Two approaches: How interests are aggregated changes outcomes Deliberation aids learning, which changes outcomes

    12. If its all about interests

    Agenda an institutional design choice: What must be in the Single Undertaking? Doha initial agenda too broad May now have contracted too much for OECD Are less-than-universal agreements appropriate? critical mass in NAMA, plurilateral in services differentiation among developing countries: round for free? But beware of temptation to cherry pick The package matters

    13. If learning also matters

    Collective decision engaging all Members requires: Consensual understanding of problems and interests Deliberation that makes effective bargaining legitimate Domestic resonance Learning incomplete at home and in Geneva? Negotiation by communiqu impedes mixed strategy? Do negotiators understand implications of changing roles of developing countries, both BRICSAM and bottom billion? Do negotiators (both Delhi and Washington) have the public understanding that provides room to maneuver?

    14. Reform needed?

    WTO changes through practice Journey not the destination Doha about learning to negotiate in a truly multilateral way, with many more, and more disparate, Members If WTO is medieval, its because the world is too

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