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Tipping into what in Europe? What lies ahead for Romania? Daniel Daianu

Tipping into what in Europe? What lies ahead for Romania? Daniel Daianu. 26 October, Bucharest, 2011. contents. Global context: the Great Shift and the New Normalcy Euro-zone crisis; A new recession looming? (crisis management vs. solving the euro zone crisis) Romania’s predicament

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Tipping into what in Europe? What lies ahead for Romania? Daniel Daianu

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  1. Tipping into what in Europe?What lies ahead for Romania?Daniel Daianu 26 October, Bucharest, 2011

  2. contents • Global context: the Great Shift and the New Normalcy • Euro-zone crisis; A new recession looming? (crisis management vs. solving the euro zone crisis) • Romania’s predicament • Policy issues and debunking myths

  3. 1.The Great Shift • The Great Shift: the rise of Asia • Uphill capital flows! • Black swans (tail risks): financial/economic, ecological; demographic crises • The struggle over limited resources: oil, food, water (new terms of trade) • Inter-connectedness and systemic risks/ Financial markets as anin-built destabilizer and extracting an undue rent • Overstretched societies: economically; socially; militarily…political strain; • Governance bottlenecks (national; regional (EU); global) • An age of uncertainty, insecurity and distributional struggle (volatility, domino effects/contagion; back up systems…costs) • Economic slowdown (quasi-stagnation) in industrial societies (Japanization)?

  4. 1.1 The Crisis impact • Massive costs of bail outs • Debt problem compounded by dimmed growth prospects (debt deflation?) • Fear and lack of confidence factors • Global crowding out effect : impact on interest rates • Social strain (erosion of the middle class, but which has started in the early 90s) • A fairness issue (a winners’ take all society?) • An ethical issue (socializing costs) • Getting out of an era of profligacy in an orderly way… • Entering an age of forced diminished expectations • Intensity of contagion effects

  5. 1.2 Relapse into a new recession (same crisis)? • Signs: flight to liquidity (equity markets); bonds valuations; banks’ funding (do markets freeze again?); rising CDSs • Economic slowdown: the IFIs estimates for the EU in Q3 and Q4, and forecasts for 2012 revised downwards • Dysfunctional politics; confidence crisis, market sentiment… • Policy stalemate in the EU (EMU) • The specter of 1937…

  6. 1.3 Scenarios • Tipping into a new recession by sheer dynamics of market forces and inaction of policy-makers; worsening of bank balance-sheets (new bank recapitalization…)…vicious circles • Avoiding a new recession by FED and ECB intervention; bigger firepower of the EFSF (leverage it up), G20 coordination and IMF support… • A new Lehman Brothers (disorderly default in the Euro-zone): • An orderly default of Greece; can contagion be avoided (is a firewall possible)? • A long stagnation/contraction (Kondratiev cycles, but with the great shift in the world economy

  7. 2. The Euro zone crisis • It is a structural/design crisis (EMU deficits are below those of the US: 85% vs. 95% of GDP for public debt; cca.6% vs 8% of GDP for budget deficit in 2010) • Public debts have gone up by 1/3 on average following bail outs and automatic stabilsers • Public and private debts are to be blamed for the sovereign debt crisis; Spain and Ireland had public debts of below 40% of GDOP before 2008; Spain has a public debt inferior to Germany’s (60% vs. 75%) but markets judge growth prospects • There is no Monetary Union without a common treasury (lender of last resort) and tools for coping with asymmetric shocks • Crisis management vs. dealing with structural flaws • The political hurdle (no taxation without representation) • How to foster economic growth?

  8. 2.1 Rescuing the euro-zone: crisis management vs. dealing with structural problems • Fiscal rules are necessary, but not sufficient • Bolster the EFSF to over 2,000 billion • ECB operations • Bank recapitalization • Orderly restructuring of sovereign debts where necessary • Crisis management of long duration?

  9. 2.2 Fortune reversals? NMS vs EMU periphery • Euro as shelter vs. euro as a major constraint on adjustment policy • The Great Moderation as a Great Misperception; CDSs reflected market myopia and overshooting (misperception); when euro-zone weak links borrowed very cheaply –resource misallocation • NMSs are better rated now by markets than EMU periphery (CDSs) • Huge externality (the euro zone crisis): finance, trade, market sentiment, etc

  10. CDS, 5y

  11. GDP dynamics Source: IMF-World Economic Outlook, Sep 2011, Eurostat

  12. Current account dynamics Source: Eurostat, European Commission Spring Forecast 2011

  13. Budget deficit Source: Eurostat, European Commission Spring Forecast 2011

  14. Gross public debt 14 Source: Eurostat, European Commission Spring Forecast 2011

  15. 2.2 Pluses of NMSs, but…no decoupling possible • Lower public debts (except Hungary) • Capacity to adjust • Being outside the euro-zone • Some NMSs are more compatible, competitiveness-wise, with the hard core of the EMU

  16. 3. Romania: a fragile growth model • Overreliance on external indebtedness (mostly done by the private sector!) • Premature opening of the capital account (EU rule; it has overlooked Asian/Latin American experience and the danger of fickle capital flows) • Rising external (CA) deficits during 2005-2008 (3/4 due to the private sector) • Non-tradable sectors oriented growth • massive euroisation induced by financial liberalization and high interest rate differentials • Very low fiscal revenues (at 28% of GDP,cca 4% lower than NMSs average and about 10% below EU-27 average)

  17. 3.1 Impact of the crisis • Deep recession • The level of potential output has been reduced; • The potential yearly economic growth rate has probably come down from cca. 5-5,5%, before the crisis, to about 3%, but… • Twin deficits syndrome since 2009 • Debt service up • The crisis of the euro zone: CDS spreads + economic slowdown in Europe + undermining confidence in local markets too + the Greek conundrum (banking sector) • Strategic importance of EU funds

  18. 3.2 Romania (1) • Fiscal consolidation underway (but a new recession in Europe?) • Strong reduction of the CA deficit (from double digit numbers before 2009 to around 4.5% during 2009-2011) • Higher exports, though they are likely to slowdown; • Strong disinflation after the VAT shock of 2010 • A plus: not being in the euro-zone (autonomous MP and Ex rate policy, but partially emasculated by euroization)

  19. 3.2 Romania (2) • Rising public debt (speed of borrowing): from cca 18% end 2008 to 36%, with a big rise in external borrowing • The rising cost of sovereign debt service (in spite of sovereign rating improvement) • Fiscal consolidation needs further steps: the deficit of the social security system; the inefficiency of the public sector • EU funds and better tax collection can prevent a strongly pro-cyclical fiscal correction (a 3% budget deficit in 2012 involves a correction of cca 2.5% of GDP assuming a 2% GDP growth rate, and a higher correction if growth is below 2%). For a 2% budget deficit the correction would rise above 4% since GDP dynamics is impacted by the very fiscal correction. • EU economic slowdown further complicates the policy choice

  20. Budget expenditures Source: European Commission Spring Forecast 2011

  21. Budget revenues 21 Source: European Commission Spring Forecast 2011

  22. Budget/Tax revenue: RO, NMSs and EU27 22 Source: European Commission Taxation Trends, 2011, European Commission Spring Forecast 2011

  23. 3.3 Economic policy in Romania, next (the 3L and 3H) • Continue fiscal consolidation • Do the utmost to increase EU funds absorption • Raise fiscal revenues (fight tax evasion; corruption; increase royalties); a more optimal taxation is needed • Structural reforms (labor markets; state companies); privatization • Agriculture, infrastructure, industrial rejuvenation projects: the role of EU funds • Trade links outer the EU • Plan B

  24. 3.4 The 3L and 3H • 3 L (low EU funds absorption; low fiscal revenues; low productivity) • 3H (high corruption; high waste, high inefficiency)

  25. 4. The convergence challenge in the EU • It is of long vintage (structural and cohesion funds) • Only very partial success: the “mezzogiornification of the southern fringe”/ fractures in the EMU (EU), which were obscured by the Great Moderation period (cheap credit and imports) • The competitiveness challenge in the EMU (in the EU); • Weaknesses of the growth model in NMSs • Redesigning growth models in a new world context • What can EU policies do? • The role of the EU budget

  26. 4.2 EU funds in Romania • An absorption ratio of above 3% of GDP would increase budget revenues by 2% (cca 1% of Romania’s GDP is its contribution to the EU budget) • A net rise in budget revenues/expenditure of 2% of GDP could increase the economic growth rate by 0,6-1% • Should worst case scenario occur, EU funds could play a significant damage limitation function

  27. 4.3 EU funds in Romania (II) • In the case of deeper euro-zone crisis: can EU funds be used in order to protect the local banking sector? • Agriculture in a world with rising relative food prices; it should be seen as a priority for the EU as a whole; • Infrastructure development • The scarcity of capital worldwide puts an additional premium on EU funds; • The opportunity cost of not absorbing EU funds is enormous: a/ EU funds could be reoriented to other users; b/ the economic cost per se; c/ it could backfire by signaling fiscal indiscipline and resulting sanctions

  28. 5. Debunking myths • The EU as a shelter (the euro zone) • The EMH (efficient markets hypothesis) • FDI as a deus ex machina (the role of domestic saving) • Crises do not befall mature economies on a large scale (due to strong institutions and good practices) • Sovereign debt crises have fiscal origins par excellence • The Great Moderation as a Great Misperception

  29. 6. Rethinking policies for longer term dynamics • A premium on “Policy space” (policy flexibility) • Diversity of policy/ instruments (when policy aims are many (Dani Rodrik) • Questionable policies: neglect of industrial policies; premature opening of the capital account, etc • Stimulate domestic savings • Diminish euroization • Foster tradable goods oriented investment. There is need for hands on policies • Dealing with fairness (burden sharing and income distribution) • Managing expectations in an age of frugality • Taming financial markets is a must for regaining financial stability and fostering economic growth (Glass Steagall: implementing anti–trust policies; segregating banks geographically?)

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