140 likes | 265 Vues
This paper examines a novel and efficient unlinkable secret handshakes scheme proposed by Huang and Cao. The scheme is designed for affiliation-hiding authentication, enabling parties (like FBI agents) to interact without disclosing their affiliations. This work analyzes the advantages and practical applications of unlinkability, addressing security concerns raised by previous models. Huang and Cao’s scheme, distinguished by its efficiency, significantly enhances authenticated key exchange security. However, subsequent critiques highlight vulnerabilities, raising important discussions on secure communication protocols.
E N D
A novel and efficient unlinkable secret handshakes scheme Author: Hai Huang and ZhenfuCao Source: IEEE Comm. Letters 13 (5) (2009) Presenter: Yu-Chi Chen
Outline • Introduction • Huang and Cao’s scheme • Conclusions
Introduction • A secret handshakes • affiliation-hiding authentication • firstly introduced by Balfanz et al. • For example, two FBIagents, Alice and Bob, want to discover and communicates with other agents, but they don’t want to reveal their affiliations to non-agents.
Introduction • An unlinkable secret handshakes • provide unlinkability • an adversary cannot link any two different instances of same party. • Given C, to guess C is AB, A’B’, or other. • unlinkabilityhas been widely considered in many applications.
Introduction • Jarecki et al.’s scheme • an unlinkable secret handshakes • not efficient • Huang and Cao presented an unlinkable secret handshake scheme • novel and efficient • Simple, so it can be published in IEEE-CL.
Outline • Introduction • Huang and Cao’s scheme • Conclusions
Huang and Cao’s scheme This figure is copied from IEEE Comm. Letters 13 (9) (2009), page 731
Conclusions • Huang and Cao analyzed this scheme can provide authenticated key exchange security, affiliation-hiding, and unlinkability. • The scheme is more efficient than Jarecki et al.’s.
On the security of a novel and efficient unlinkable secret handshakes scheme Author: Renwang Su Source: IEEE Comm. Letters 13 (9) (2009)
Su found Huang and Cao’s scheme is not secure. • Cannot provide authenticated key exchange security.
This figure is copied from IEEE Comm. Letters 13 (9) (2009), page 731
Security analysis of an unlinkable secret handshakes scheme Author: T.-Y. Youn and Y.-H. Park Source: IEEE Comm. Letters 14 (1) (2009)
Youn and Park also found Huang and Cao’s scheme is not secure. • Cannot provide authenticated key exchange securityand affiliation-hiding.
Receiving vB,thentry find PK where vB=H1(KA, (PK, EA, EB), resp)