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Political Changes in Post-Soviet Russia Vladimir Gel’man (EUSP/University of Helsinki) Sciences Po, Bordeaux, lecture 7, 5 April 2019 The Foreign Policy of Russia: A Long Farewell with an Empire?. The Foreign Policy of Russia.
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Political Changes in Post-Soviet Russia Vladimir Gel’man (EUSP/University of Helsinki) Sciences Po, Bordeaux, lecture 7, 5 April 2019 The Foreign Policy of Russia: A Long Farewell with an Empire?
The Foreign Policy of Russia • Why the Russian foreign policy nowadays is aggressive, conflict-ridden, and often unpredictable? • What are the major domestic and international drivers of Russian foreign policy? • How we can explain the recent tensions of Russia’s relations with the United States and the European Union (in quarter century since the end of the Cold War)? • What we might expect for the future?
The Foreign Policy of Russia Frameworks for analysis of foreign policy (not incompatible): Realism – eternal struggle between great powers for influence and resources; military and economic might as tools of this struggle; ”national interests” and ”spheres of influence” as key categories (foreign policy is driven by interests, works well during the Cold War); Constructivism – foreign policy is a projection of both domestic power struggles and of ideationally-driven construction of allies and rivals on the international arena; ”important Others” as key category (foreign policy is driven by ideas)
The Foreign Policy of Russia • The Soviet legacies of the Russian foreign policy: • ”Yalta system” of 1945 – Europe has been divided between East and West until 1989, ”Iron curtain”, Soviet Union as a global veto player (UN security council permanent member); • Cold War – Soviet countering to US hegemony elsewhere at the globe (Vietnam war of 1965-1973, Cuban missile crisis of 1962, war in Afghanistan of 1979-1989); • Detente of the 1970s – only partial effects
The Foreign Policy of Russia • 1991 – “collapse of an empire”: Soviet Union ceased to exist; Russia as a successor state; • Major decline of economic and military might in the 1990s amid pro-Western stances of elites and masses alike; • Russia got little and mostly symbolic international aid from the West (nothing comparable with ”Marshall plan” after the World War II); • yet in 1996 Russia joined the G7 group of leading capitalist countries (high status of a ”regional power”) • … turn of Russian elites to disillusionment vis-a-vis the West
The Foreign Policy of Russia • 1999 – first conflict with the West over Kosovo conflict (Russia attempted to defend Serbia from NATO actions, failed on the international arena but was praised domestically); • The early 2000s – Putin took power with merely pro-Western stances (unanimous support of the US after 9/11), but not received major benefits from it; • 2003 – US invasion into Iraq, major tensions increased; • 2003-2005 – the wave of ”color revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan: Russia failed to prevent them, widely considered as Western plots of “democracy promotion”
The Foreign Policy of Russia • In the 2000s: • The recovery of Russia’s economic and military might turned into new status-seeking (realist argument); • Ideology of ”a good Soviet Union” - Soviet influence on the global agenda as a role model for Russia (constructivist argument); • Disillusionment of elites in Russia’s relationships with the West resulted in major turn from pro-Americanism in the 1990s to anti-Americanism in the 2000s (Sokolov et el., 2018)
The Foreign Policy of Russia • Russia’s counter-attacks vis-a-vis the West: • 2007 – Putin’s Munich speech (aggressive denial of the Western agenda, claim for exclusive Russia’s sphere of influence in Eurasia, call for new Yalta agreement); • Increasing expenditures for rearmament of the Russian military, large-scale modernization of the Russian army; • ”Soft power” – large-scale laundering of the Russian image abroad, byuing of support from many Western politicians, business people and celebrities; • US reaction – ”reset” agenda by Barak Obama (misleading approach)
The Foreign Policy of Russia • 2011-2012: large-scale protests in Russia – a new proof for ”conspiracy theory”? • ”McFaul affair”: major ideologist of US ”reset” policy appointed as an ambassador to Moscow in 2012-2014; • Attacks toward Western influence in Russia: ”foreign agents” law, law on media control, and the like; • ”Turn to the East” – a widely announced proposal to build close partnership with China and serve as a counter-balance between China and the West (”new Eurasianism”)
The Foreign Policy of Russia • 2014 – a major divorce with the West: • Annexation of Crimea – a brutal response to overthrow of Yanukovych in Ukraine: the decision made unilaterally by Putin (the only economic consideration was the amount of currency reserves in Russia); • ”Novorossia affair” – attempt to take over control in Eastern and Southern regions of Ukraine by pro-Russian militants backed by the Russian military (failed in Kharkiv, Odessa, Dnipro, but successful in Donetsk and Luhansk) • Donetsk and Luhansk ”people’s republics” – puppets of the Kremlin, de-facto non-recognized states (military presence of Russia), de-facto war between Ukrainian army and separatists
The Foreign Policy of Russia • Domestic response – highly enthusiastic: Putin’s popularity skyrocketed (approval rate increased in 2014 from 63% to 88%); • International reaction – non-recognition of annexation of Crimea by almost all foreign countries, individual sanctions of the US and of the EU against leading Russia’s politicians, business people and military/security leaders; • July 2014 – flight Amsterdam – Kuala-Lumpur shot over Donetsk by the Russian missile, 298 victims: aggressive denial of responsibility by Russia, toughening of American and European sanctions; • Russia’s response – food counter-sanctions since August 2014
The Foreign Policy of Russia • Minsk agreements of August 2014 and February 2015 (Russia, Ukraine, Germany, France): ceasefire yet no peace in Donetsk and Luhansk; • Russian-Ukrainian relations – near zero point since 2014, the rise of anti-Russian mood in Ukraine; • Donetsk and Luhansk republics – replacement of leadership (turn of field commanders by criminal gangs), out-migration of local population to Russia or to Ukraine (over 40%), no signs of improvement
The Foreign Policy of Russia • Russia – the politics of besieged fortress, both domestically and internationally; • Domestic arena – rising isolationism amid creeping toughening of foreign sanctions; • More control over the Internet and spread of information, especially from abroad (attempts to takeover of social media sites, the struggle against Telegram messenger, etc.) • Economic ”domestication” of production and state procurement – major problems with the use of certain equipment, software, and the like • Do Russia follow the path of Iran, if not North Korea?
The Foreign Policy of Russia • International arena – the logic of special operations against the West (to some extent, inherited from the Soviet past): • Expectations – Russia may stick with the same foreign policy for long decades, while the West may be weakened in one way or another; • Mobilization of pro-Russian lobbyists: business people (for lifting of Western sanctions), proxy politicians (largely funded by Russians through various means) and like; • Russia’s meddling to elections in the US, Brexit referendum, and the like (use of hackers and trolls, etc.): to what extent it matters?
The Foreign Policy of Russia • What will be the next steps of Russia in the foreign policy arena? • No chances for rapprochement with the West as of yet (failed hopes on Trump, failed hopes on undermining unity of the EU); • Little evidence of successful ”turn to the East” (some economic gains from cooperation with China but no major political gains, risks of turning into ”raw materials appendage” of China); • Proposals of ”hostile takeover” of Belarus in anticipation of 2024 presidential elections in Russia – negative reaction both from Belarus and from the Russian public opinion
The Foreign Policy of Russia • Russia’s foreign policy cannot be fundamentally changed under the current leadership of the country despite certain calls from various corners of the Russian elites and society at large; • The ”new Cold War” – is this argument correct? • To what extent ideas or interests dominates Russian foreign policy landscape?; • And how anti-Western turn coincide with ”offshore aristocracy” phenomenon? • … or, maybe, major challenges lies ahead?