1 / 22

Suzanne Sangree Chief Solicitor, Adm. Division City of Baltimore Dept. of Law * * * Sub-Prime Lending Revisited: Loc

Suzanne Sangree Chief Solicitor, Adm. Division City of Baltimore Dept. of Law * * * Sub-Prime Lending Revisited: Local Costs, Local Action. Negative Equity – Scale. US residential negative home equity: approx. $630 billion

amelie
Télécharger la présentation

Suzanne Sangree Chief Solicitor, Adm. Division City of Baltimore Dept. of Law * * * Sub-Prime Lending Revisited: Loc

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Suzanne Sangree Chief Solicitor, Adm. Division City of Baltimore Dept. of Law * * * Sub-Prime Lending Revisited: Local Costs, Local Action

  2. Negative Equity – Scale • US residential negative home equity: approx. $630 billion • Comparison: Resolution Trust Corporation total assets approx. $395 billion (inflation adjusted approx. $695 billion) • Comparison: European sovereign and banking crises • Greek bailout: approx. €245 billion • Spanish bailout : approx. €100 billion • Cyprus bailout : approx. €10 billion 4.9 million in PLS Systemically significant financial crisis

  3. Negative Equity – Local Costs • * Negative equity: a costly problem even without default • Approx. $90 billion per year excess interest expense (windfall to hedged lenders) • Reduced local spending including lower property maintenance • Increased social welfare costs including health care • Additional costs from foreclosures and short sales • Cost to city, neighbors and borrower up to $43,000 per foreclosure • Costs of foreclosures to neighbors: approx. $2 trillion to date, over half in minority neighborhoods • Indefinite reduction in property tax revenues from lower assessments • Absentee investor purchases and transient rental neighborhoods • Increased police, fire, and code enforcement costs 4.9 million in PLS

  4. Insert here a slide on negative equity in Baltimore City

  5. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLANDBALTIMORE DIVISION____________________________________ )MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL )OF BALTIMORE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 1:08-cv-00062-JFM )WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. ) ) and ) )WELLS FARGO FINANCIAL )LEASING, INC., ) ) Defendants. )____________________________________)COMPLAINTJohn P. Relman George Nilson, City SolicitorGlen SchlactusSuzanne Sangree, Chief SolicitorRELMAN, DANE & COLFAX, PLLC City Hall, 100 N. Holliday Street1225 19th Street NW, Suite 600 Baltimore, Maryland 21202Washington, DC 20036 (202) 728-1888 (410) 396-3297Attorneys for Plaintiff

  6. Predatory Lending Targeted Baltimore’s African-American Neighborhoods Wells Fargo’s sub-prime loans are disproportionately concentrated in African-American neighborhoods. • 43% of its African-American mortgage customers put in subprime loans in Baltimore in 2007, but only to 9% of white customers. • In 2006, the respective rates were 65% and 15%; in 2005, they were 54% and 14%; in 2004, they were 31% and 10%.

  7. Foreclosures Also Disproportionately in African-American Neighborhoods Over 50% Wells Fargo’s Baltimore’s foreclosures from 2005 to 2009 in census tracts that are more than 80% African-American • 62% were in tracts that are over 60% African-American • 12% were in tracts that are 20% or less African-American • The figures were virtually identical for Wells Fargo’s foreclosures from 2000 to 2004 • Most of Wells Fargo’s mortgage lending in Baltimore was in white neighborhoods

  8. COMPLAINT

  9. Wells Fargo Settlements • Baltimore’s case: • Down payment Grants to Home Purchasers $4.5 million • City Foreclosure Fund $3 million • Wells Fargo Investment Commitment to Qualified Borrowers in City • $425 million home purchase financing over 5 years • $125 million committed to low and moderate income borrowers. • Justice Dept. case: • Compensation to Wells Fargo borrowers steered to subprime when they qualified for prime loans--$250 million to compensate borrowers nationwide- $15,000 per household. For loans originated between 2004 and 2009. • Both: New standards and staff training to prevent racial steering in lending

  10. Predatory Loans in PLS Trusts • All subprime mortgages securitized in PLS • Private Label Mortgage Backed Securities (PLS) • Not issued by a GSE (Fannie, Freddie) • Not guaranteed by Ginnie Mae

  11. UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSIONWashington, D.C. 20549Form 10-Q QUARTERLY REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 For the quarterly period ended June 30, 2013 Commission File No.: 0-50231 Federal National Mortgage Association (Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter) Fannie Mae Federally chartered corporation 52-0883107

  12. Fannie Mae 10Q Loss Projection • 61.8% of the loans in PLS Trusts will default • 68.9% of the value of those loans will be lost • Fannie Mae will lose $12 billion because it is invested in PLS Trusts

  13. PLS Loans Baltimore

  14. PLS Loans in Baltimore City Total12,844 Disaster in the Works

  15. PLS Foreclosures To Mirror Predatory Lending Cedmont, Cedonia, > 60% African –American 1,284 21213 Belair-Edison >80% African-American 814 Park Heights >80% African-American 1,205 21218 Waverly >60% African-American 1,002 21224 Patterson Park 27% African- American 1,130 21229 Uplands, Irvington >70% African-American 1,127 Hard hit neighborhoods – majority African-American

  16. Problem  Mortgage Loans In Private Label Securitizations • Nationally, millions of loans in securitizations not guaranteed by federal government • Toxic loans not conforming to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac or FHA standards (option ARMs, interest only, subprime, etc.) • Not effectively eligible for federal programs created since the housing crash • Much more likely to be deeply underwater and to default than other loans • Securitizations forbid loan sales and significantly limit or prohibit principal reduction 4.9 million in PLS

  17. Required Response – Principal Write Downs • Federal Housing Finance Agency: PLS loans are the “crux . . . of the problem we face in foreclosure prevention. If we are going to stabilize the housing market, we have to address” PLS loans. • Martin Feldstein: “To halt the fall in house prices, the government should reduce mortgage principal when it exceeds 110% of the home value.” • American Action Forum: 4.9 million in PLS “Ultimately, America has a choice: Do we continue to insist that the people who made bad bets in the housing market get punished . . . or do we focus on creating policies that have the best chance of ending our economic malaise?” Practical and necessary policy for local recovery: principal reduction

  18. Need for Government Response • American Securitization Forum • seismic economic challenges in housing market too great for private sector loan modification solutions . . . expanded government programs may be effective in addressing potential foreclosures that commercial and contractual arrangements cannot prevent . . . ASF supports TARP purchasing distressed loans from securitization trusts to give government the unlimited discretion to modify the loans • Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association • disappointed that Treasury is de-emphasizing the asset purchase portion of TARP . . . based on Resolution Trust experience, a key ingredient of a strong recovery is price discovery through a transparent purchase program . . . hope government will comprehensively revisit this important program 4.9 million in PLS

  19. Lack of Federal Response – Different Interests • 2008-09: Not in my district, Tea Party, TARP diversion to national banking system • Excellent programs but left to industry to implement-- do not fit PLS loans (FHA short refinance, Hardest Hit Funds, HAMP) • Local solutions can be more focused and politically practical • Lawrence Summers: “Surely there is a strong case for experimentation, with principal-reduction strategies at the local level.” • Hal Varian (Google economist): “it makes sense to write down mortgages differently based on local default conditions.” 4.9 million in PLS Local costs demand local action

  20. Emerging State/Local Responses Buy and Fix Underwater Loans • Illinois: • Mortgage Resolution Fund to use federal Hardest Hit funding to buy local underwater loans at discounted market values and modify them • Partnering with not for profit groups • Nevada: • Proposed Nevada Home Retention Program with same goals • Will use Hardest Hit funds and multistate AG settlement funds • Boston: Boston Community Capital • Richmond, California: • Use municipal condemnation power to acquire PLS loans 4.9 million in PLS Buy the loans – not the homes – and fix them yourself

  21. Solutions for Baltimore? 7,825 61% of 12,844 PLS mortgages in the City are going to default and be foreclosed

More Related