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U.S. Government Nuclear Forensics Operations

U.S. Government Nuclear Forensics Operations. September 16, 2014. Jeffrey Morrison Program Manager National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center. The Challenge: Nuclear Terrorism is a Persistent Threat.

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U.S. Government Nuclear Forensics Operations

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  1. U.S. Government Nuclear Forensics Operations September 16, 2014 Jeffrey Morrison Program Manager National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center

  2. The Challenge: Nuclear Terrorism is a Persistent Threat “I continue to believe that nuclear terrorism remains one of the greatest threats to global security. That’s why working to prevent nuclear terrorism is going to remain one of my top national security priorities as long as I have the privilege of being President of the United States.” President Obama (NDU, 3 Dec 2012) A nuclear attack would change our way of life. Terrorists have called for a nuclear attack on the US. The availability of nuclear and radiological material continues to increase as nations develop the capability to produce nuclear power. Nuclear terrorism remains an enduring risk because of its potential consequences.

  3. IAEA Illicit Trafficking Data Source: IAEA Incident &Trafficking Database

  4. DHS’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office • DNDO was established in DHS as an interagency office in 2005 (NSPD 43/HSPD 14) and authorized by the 2006 SAFE Port Act. • “To improve the Nation’s capability to detect and report unauthorized attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or transport nuclear or radiological material for use against the Nation, and to further enhance this capability over time.” • DNDO’s National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center was established in 2006 (NSPD 17/HSPD 4) and authorized by the 2010 Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act (P.L. 111-140). • “To ensure an enduring national technical nuclear forensics capability to strengthen the collective response of the United States to nuclear terrorism or other nuclear attacks.”

  5. Nuclear Forensics: from Deterrence to Attribution • Trace origin of materials to help identify and close smuggling networks. • Inform national response decisions. • Disrupt follow-on event. • Support prosecution. • Enhance deterrence. Intelligence Community } Technical Nuclear Forensics All-source info fused Law Enforcement Deter- Dissuade Post-Det Cons. Mgmt. Render Safe Recovery Attribution Interdict Secure Detect Materials Device Debris Nuclear Defense Spectrum

  6. U.S. Policy “Renewing the U.S. commitment to hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use WMD, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts.” Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010

  7. Interagency Mission DOE DoD FBI LEAD AGENCY INVESTIGATION PRE- TO POST- DET POST-DET DOS DHS ODNI INTERNATIONAL PRE-DET MATERIALS INTELLIGENCE ANL INL LANL LLNL NBL NIST ORNL PNNL SRNL SNL Y-12 DoD Labs

  8. DNDO’s Primary Interlocking Nuclear Forensics Missions

  9. USG Integration and Readiness • Joint planning • National Strategic Plan, Implementation Plan, Annual Review to Congress • Executive Council, Steering Committee, Working Groups • Nuclear Forensics Requirements Center • Joint exercising • “Snowmaggedon” in New York • “Prominent Hunt” in Indiana • International (“Iron Koala” & “Galaxy Serpent”) • Attribution TTX • Joint assessments • National Academy of Sciences: “Nuclear Forensics: A Capability at Risk” • OSTP “Nuclear Defense R&D Roadmap” • Pipeline and Workforce studies DNDO’s NTNFC leads the integration of the USG interagency through joint planning, exercising and assessments.

  10. Technology Advancement for Materials Material Production Timelines • Signature Discovery • Improving Analysis Methods • Certified Reference Materials and Performance Testing • Pattern Recognition and Other Evaluation Tools

  11. Academic Pathway to a Nuclear Forensics Career • Relies on Multi-Disciplinary Expertise: • Radiochemists • Geochemists • Analytical Chemists • Nuclear Engineers • Reactor Engineers • Process Engineers • Physicists • Nuclear Physicists • Statisticians • Metallurgists National Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development Program • DNDO leading effort to restore the expertise pipeline – back from the brink • Provided support to over 300 students and faculty and 23 universities since 2008, in close partnership with 11 national labs • 19 new PhD nuclear forensic scientists in the workforce; on track to meet near-term milestone of 35 new PhDs by 2018 • Program now viewed as model – Nuclear Security Summit 2014; future IAEA collaboration Undergraduate Scholarships, Summer School Junior Faculty Awards Post-doctoral Fellowships National Lab Mentoring Graduate Fellowships, Internships University Education Awards Multi-Year R&D Funding

  12. Nuclear Forensics International Cooperation Strengthening international collaboration is essential: Develops nuclear forensics core capabilities, shares best practices and lessons learned, and builds NF community

  13. Quality Assurance “You have to be right – and you have to be able to prove that you’re right” Michael Chertoff Former Secretary of Homeland Security NTNFC Program Review – 29 July 2013

  14. QA Systems in Nuclear Forensics • Measurements must be scientifically and legally defensible • ‘Daubert’ Standard • Empirical testing: whether the theory or technique is falsifiable, refutable, and/or testable. • Whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication. • The known or potential error rate. • The existence and maintenance of standards and controls concerning its operation. • The degree to which the theory and technique is generally accepted by a relevant scientific community. • QA systems are used to provide a high level of confidence and reliability in nuclear forensics measurements • ISO 17025 Accreditation • Annual Proficiency Testing • Annual Audits • Certified Reference Materials • Methodology Benchmarking Studies • Exercises

  15. Nuclear Forensics Certified Reference Material Traceability Chain ANSI N42.23 BIPM CCQM/CCRI (Core Competencies) InterLab Comparisons Bq, g National Metrology Institutes: (NIST, IRMM, LNHB, NRC, NPL, PTB, etc.) SRMs/CRMs Isotopics/Assay Measurement Traceability & Evaluations (IRMM NUSIMEP/REIMEP Mass) Nuclear Forensics MQO/QC Requirements FBI, NMIP, DOE/NNSA, DoD, DHS Reference Laboratory: DOE/NBL InterLaboratory Comparisons LANL Pu Exchange AWE U Exchange IRMM NUSIMEP/REIMEP CRMs MeasEval Prog (Mass, Isotopics) CRM Measurements Other Nat’l/Int’l Measurement Laboratories: (AWE, IAEA, CEA, ITU etc.) Measurement Laboratories: National Labs (INL, LLNL, LANL, PNL, SRNL, ORNL, etc.)

  16. Methodology Benchmarking Studies • Methodology Benchmarking Studies Designed to Establish: • Data on the accuracy and precision of analytical methods used by different laboratories, including variation within and between laboratories. • The most appropriate analytical methods for determining required TNF conclusions. • A set of modern baselines and expectations for nuclear measurement performance. • A compendium of “best practices” and “best standard operating procedures” for TNF. • Strengths and weaknesses in measurement capability. • Data for method validation and laboratory quality assurance. • Uranium Methodology Benchmarking Completed in FY11 • Plutonium Methodology Benchmarking Completed in FY12 • Trace Actinides in Uranium Benchmarking Completed in FY14 • Trace Actinides in Plutonium Benchmarking Underway

  17. Key Points • Nuclear forensics supports (does not equal) attribution • Technical conclusions may be crucial to USG’s case • May help to deter the facilitators (not the terrorists themselves) • NTNF is a tightly coordinated multi-agency, cross-disciplinary mission • The expertise pipeline is rebounding – promising career path • QA is critical to ensuring defensible results • “You have to be right – and you have to be able to prove that you’re right” • Expectation management is crucial: “Substantial capabilities exist today, but much work remains to be done in order for capabilities to match expectations.”

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