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Arrangements for the Democratic Control of Defence Activities

Arrangements for the Democratic Control of Defence Activities. Col. Andras Ujj PhD, HU AF. “WAR IS A MUCH TOO SERIOUS MATTER TO BE ENTRUSTED TO THE MILITARY” Georges Clemenceau. “But who guards the Guards?” (Plato). WHAT IS THAT?.

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Arrangements for the Democratic Control of Defence Activities

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  1. Arrangements for the Democratic Control of Defence Activities Col. Andras Ujj PhD, HU AF

  2. “WAR IS A MUCH TOO SERIOUS MATTER TO BE ENTRUSTED TO THE MILITARY” Georges Clemenceau

  3. “But who guards the Guards?” (Plato)

  4. WHAT IS THAT? • H. Lasswell: The Garrison State (American Journal of Sociology 46, 1941) • S. Andrzejewski: Military Organisation and Society (London: Routlege & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1954) • S. Huntington: The Soldier and the State: The theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Massachusetts; The Bellknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957) • M. Janowitz: The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (London: The Free Press of Glencoe Collier-Macmillan Ltd. 1960) • S. Finer: The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962) • B. Abrahamsson:Military Professionalization and Political Power (Beverly Hills & London: Sage Publications, 1972)

  5. Criteria of Democratic Control • Division of civilian authority; • Parliamentary oversight; • Subordination of military decision making bodies to civilian institutions; • Military prestige, trustworthiness, accountability; (Jeffrey Simon)

  6. THE PLAYERS Elements of the Democratic Control I.(the Hungarian example) • National Assembly (Defence Com., Budget Com., National Security Com., Com. for Industry, Com. on Science, etc.) • Constitutional Court • President of the Republic • Jurisdictional System • National Audit Office • Government

  7. THE PLAYERSElements of the Democratic Control I.(the Hungarian example) 7.National Security Cabinet 8. Prime Minister’s Office 9. Ministry of Defence 10. Ombudsman 11. Nongovernmental Organisations 12. Mass Media

  8. Principles of Democratic Control • The state is only one actor in society that has the legitimate monopoly of force. The armed forces and security services are accountable to the legitimate democratic authorities; • The Parliament is sovereign and holds the executive accountable for the development, implementation and review of the security and defense policy; • The Parliament has a unique constitutional role in authorizing and scrutinizing defense and security expenditures; • The Parliament plays a crucial role with regard to declaring and lifting a state of emergency or state of war; • Principles of good governance and the rule of law apply to all branches of government and therefore also to the security sector; • Defense and security sector personnel are individually accountable to judicial courts for violations of national and international laws; • Defense and security sector organizations are politically neutral;

  9. Summary of the Theories(Key Aspects of Democratic Control) • Constructive Military-Societal Relations; • Expertise; • Well Institutionalized Democratic Accountability; • Sharing of Responsibility;

  10. The Creation Process of the Democratic Control • Development of the Institutional Structure; • Division of the Jurisdiction and Sphere of Authorities; • Development of Individual Relations to Democratic Control – Shaping of Personal Attitudes;

  11. DIFFERENCES POLITICAL versus DEMOCRATIC CONTROL CONTROL

  12. CHANGES I. • The mission and role of Armed Forces • The social status of Armed Forces • The tools and methods of fulfillment of missions Consequences (among others) New type of relationship between civil society and its own Armed Forces Openness – Mutual Confidence - on base of Transparency

  13. CHANGES II. New strategy • on civil-military relations • on public relations in their nature and methods Non negligible tools: • information • education

  14. CHANGES III. MILITARY EDUCATION versus DEFENSE EDUCATION How to fight?How to use? Special Education and Training for civil servants • executives • decision makers

  15. Public Informationto whom – what about? General Information on a certain level for the civil societyabout: • mission, • tasks, • structure, • command and control, • equipments, • conditions of life and duty, etc. of the Armed Forces.

  16. Practical Aspects • The influence of the policy on the militaries and vice versa • How the military represents the society? • Tensions between civilians and militaries FIGHT or CO-OPERATION? DEPENDENCE or INTERDEPENDENCE?

  17. Relations • Politicians and Militaries; • Militaries and Civil Servants; • Politicians and Politicians; • Defence Sphere and the Citizens;

  18. QUESTIONS ?

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