Stephen M. Sohinki Director Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement

1. ASQ 2005 NationalEnergy and Environmental Conference Stephen M. Sohinki Director Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement September 18-22, 2005

2. Price-Anderson History • Price-Anderson Act enacted in 1957 provided prompt compensation for a nuclear incident  Provided broad financial coverage for damage, injury, and costs of evacuation (up to statutory limit of $9.43 billion per incident)  Required DOE to indemnify contractors 1

3. Price-Anderson History(cont’d) • Price-Anderson Amendment Act (1988) extended indemnification for 15 years and required DOE to establish and enforce nuclear safety rules • Nuclear safety rules for radiological protection, quality assurance, safety basis and contractor employee protection have been issued by DOE 2

4. Price-Anderson History(cont’d) • Price-Anderson Amendment Reauthorization • Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act extended • current indemnification levels until December 31, 2004. • It also required DOE to promulgate final rules by • December 2003 to enforce Occupational Safety and • Health requirements. 3

5. Price-Anderson History(cont’d) • Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act extended indemnification until December 2006  Proposal to repeal remission of Civil Penalties for not-for-profits deferred  Proposal to increase coverage to $10 billion per incident deferred All enforcement requirements were unchanged 4

6. Price-Anderson History (cont’d) • Energy Policy Act of 2005  Indemnifies DOE contractors until December 2025  Increases coverage to $10 billion per incident, subject to adjustment for inflation. Repeals remission of civil penalties for nonprofits upon signing of new contract. Civil penalties limited to total fees paid to contractor in year of violation.  No reimbursement for legal expenses in retaliation cases in which employee wins, unless required by contract signed prior to statute’s effective date 5

7. Enforcement Philosophy • Relationship with contractors different from NRC’s arms-length relationship with regulated utilities  Use of program as a tool to promote proactive contractor behavior resulting in safety performance improvement • Emphasis on promoting contractor timely identification, reporting, and correction of noncompliances  Noncompliance Tracking System Mitigation 6

8. The Big Picture Problems • OE perception: Lack of progress being made in nuclear safety performance improvement • Complex still event-driven • Too many recurring violations 7

9. The Big Picture Problems(cont’d) • Failure to learn from operating experience – this means inadequate:  Corrective Actions  Root Cause  Extent of Condition  Performance Assessment • Real senior management commitment lacking • It all comes down to culture 8

10. INPO Nuclear Safety Culture Definition An organization’s values and behaviors – modeled by its leaders and internalized by its members – that serve to make nuclear safety the overriding priority (emphasis added) 9

11. INPO Principles • Everyone is personally responsible for nuclear safety • Leaders demonstrate commitment to safety • Trust permeates the organization • Decision-making reflects safety first 10

12. INPO Principles(cont’d) • Nuclear technology is recognized as special and unique • A questioning attitude is cultivated • Organizational learning is embraced • Nuclear safety undergoes constant examination 11

13. Improvement Initiatives • EFCOG Assessment Guide • Highlights obstacles and approach to overcome • obstacles •  Available at the following address: • http://www.efocg.org/workgroup/paaa • EFCOG PAAA Working Group developing • extent of condition guidance 12

14. Improvement Initiatives(cont’d) • OE will examine all options available to • encourage senior management to address • recurring violations: • Use of full authority in 2004 •  Escalation for recurring violations expected to be a continuing trend •  Compliance audits? 13

15. Nuclear Safety Excellence Model SAFE OPERATIONS Strong Human Performance Supporting Programs & Safety Features Effective Operational Processes 14

16. Nuclear Safety Excellence Model Safe Operations • No serious or potentially serious nuclear safety events • Only rare occurrences of other important events with lesser nuclear safety consequences 15

17. Safe Operations Serious Events • Loss of all criticality contingencies • TSR safety limit violation • Fire in primary confinement/containment • Explosive safety (ORPS Category 1) 16

18. Safe Operations Serious Events (cont’d) • Radiation exposure (any ORPS reportable) • Radioactive area contamination (100 x 835 value) • Radioactive material loss (100 x 835 value) • Any unplanned offsite release of radioactive material • Personnel contamination requiring medical assistance 17

19. Safe Operations Other Important Events • Loss of one or more criticality controls • TSR and DSA violations (non safety limit) • Actuation of an SSC • Fire (other ORPS reportable) 18

20. Safe Operations • Other Important Events (cont’d) • Explosive safety (other ORPS reportable) • Radioactive area contamination (10-100 x 835 value) • Radioactive material loss (<100 x 835 value) • Personnel contamination (other ORPS reportable) 19

21. Nuclear Safety Excellence Model Human Performance • Management demonstrates effective leadership and commitment to nuclear safety • Workers exhibit a sound nuclear safety culture • Contractor personnel are well qualified 20

22. Nuclear Safety Excellence Model Effective Operational Processes • Broad and effective efforts to identify safety and quality problems • Problemseffectively resolved & corrected • Excellence in work management and conduct of operations 21

23. Nuclear Safety Excellence Model Strong Supporting Programs & Safety Features • Safety Basis & Criticality Safety Controls • Radiological Program Controls • Other Quality Assurance Programs • Facility & Safety Condition 22

24. Serious Nuclear Safety Events Note: Dominated by Radiation Exposure Events 23

25. Other Important Nuclear Safety Events Note: Dominated by SB Noncompliance, Spread of Contamination, and Personnel Contamination Events 24

26. Identifying Problems (NTS W/ORPS) 25

27. Worker Safety and Health Rule10 CFR 851 • Supplemental Proposal issued January 26, 2005 • Comment period ended April 26, 2005 • Comment resolution essentially complete • Final Rule package to Office of Management and Budget by September 30, 2005 26

28. Worker Safety and Health Rule10 CFR 851 • Enforcement philosophy same as nuclear • Enforcement process similar to nuclear • Contractors have 180 days from final publication to submit Safety and Health Program • DOE has 90 days to review and comment • Enforcement starts one year from final issuance 27

29. Worker Safety and Health Rule10 CFR 851 Civil Penalties  $70,000 per day per violation potential maximum  No exemption for not-for-profits  Contract or Civil Penalty but not both Noncompliances  Severity Level I  Serious  Severity Level II   Other than serious NTS Reporting  Thresholds to be established 28