Enhancing Remote User Authentication in Chemistry: A Comprehensive PKI Approach

1. Comb-e-Chem PKI Mike Surridge, Steve Taylor IT Innovation

2. Public Key Infrastructure(PKI) • Requirements: • be able to authenticate remote users • be easy to operate by Chemists (e.g. NCS) • be secure enough for academic users • Analysis of existing NCS authentication: • uses personal knowledge of user community • uses contextual information (e.g. EPSRC project codes) • lightweight for both NCS and their customers • Public key infrastructure developments: • Comb-e-Chem certification policy agreed • procedures developed for NCS to certify remote users • operational responsibility transferred to Chemistry

3. PKI Roles • Grid community • defines security policy and certificate policy (CP) • approves certification authorities • Certification Authority (CA) • defines certification practise statement (CPS) • engages registration authorities • issues certificates in accordance with policy • Registration Authority (RA) • checks credentials of certificate applicants • enforces security and certificate policy

4. PKI Trust Network

5. Comb-e-Chem CP • CP is Certification Policy • a set of rules by which a PKI must operate • follows a format described in RFC2527 • areas such as user registration, physical security, certificate life cycle, etc… • Comb-e-Chem CP pays particular attention to • user registration • certificate life cycle

6. NCS CPS • CPS is Certificate Practice Statement • A description of how the NCS CA (Sam) abides by and implements the rules in the CP • describes operational procedures for implementing the CP’s requirements • contains a number of agreement forms to be signed by the parties involved

7. PKI - Lessons Learned • The PKI must have well-defined procedures and strict adherence to them • CP & CPS • The CA must exercise rigour in operational procedures • checking of credentials • following procedures to the letter • physical security • audit trails • backups • revocation

8. PKI - Lessons Learned 2 • User education must be addressed • the concepts of PKI are complex • the overhead of education can be a barrier to take-up • ill-informed users can worsen security • do users understand what is meant by (for example) a private key and a certificate? • do they understand their security obligations? • in the NCS case, users are guided by the RA

9. Comb-e-Chem Security Mike Surridge, Steve Taylor IT Innovation

10. Overview of Activities • Security risk management • applied to the NCS service • Security implementation • operating policies and public key infrastructure • deployment of security features at NCS

11. Asset-Based Security Risk Analysis Risk Management Identify and value assets Define risk management approach Identify threats and risks Implement defences Identify and cost defences

12. Risk Analysis • Value assets based on impact of compromise • high: likely to cause total business failure • med: significant but not fatal impact • low: irritating but no significant impact • Threats based on likelihood of attack • high: attacks will definitely take place • med: attacks may occur from time to time • low: attacks are unlikely • Risks based on likelihood of success • taking account of existing defences

13. Risk Management • Determine appropriate response to threats • acceptance: live with the potential consequences • reduction: introduce defences • avoidance: don’t use the system • Leads to cost-effective security • as much security as you need • not more than you can afford

14. Risk Analysis Facilitation

15. Application to NCS Service • Assets: • campus system and network integrity (med/high) • sample tracking data (med) • experimental result data (low/med) • grid service integrity (low/med) • Risks: • system attacks from outside campus (high likelihood) • systems attacks from inside campus (med likelihood) • compromise of remote user credentials (high likelihood) • internal user error (med likelihood)

16. Security Threats

17. Conclusions • Progress with core technology developments • authorisation and WS-Security • relevant for service integration • NCS security risks analysed • appropriate defences identified • Security procedures and infrastructure implemented • public key infrastructure (CA, RAs, policies) • firewalls and protocols for NCS deployment

18. Comb-e-Chem Security Mike Surridge, Steve Taylor IT Innovation

19. Conclusions • Progress with core technology developments • authorisation and WS-Security • relevant for service integration • NCS security risks analysed • appropriate defences identified • Security procedures and infrastructure implemented • public key infrastructure (CA, RAs, policies) • firewalls and protocols for NCS deployment

20. CA1 CAn User Resource User Resource PKI can have Multiple CAs

21. Registration Procedure