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Arguing with limited beings (us, that is)

Arguing with limited beings (us, that is). Konrad Talmont-Kaminski, KLI & UMCS. Aims. To consider the impact of bounded rationality upon our understanding of argumentation To argue the required response is to consider argumentation as part of a cooperative cognitive process. Plan.

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Arguing with limited beings (us, that is)

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  1. Arguing with limited beings (us, that is) Konrad Talmont-Kaminski, KLI & UMCS

  2. Aims • To consider the impact of bounded rationality upon our understanding of argumentation • To argue the required response is to consider argumentation as part of a cooperative cognitive process

  3. Plan • Standard objections • Assumptions behind the objections • Bounded rationality and arguments • Reconsidering the objections • The pessimistic view • The optimistic view • Cooperation and objective values

  4. Standard objections • Arguments inadequate because of: • Informal fallacies • Misrepresenting the facts • Appeal to emotion

  5. Assumptions behind objections • Human reasoning approximates an idealised rationality, but • Swayed by emotions • Misled by fallacious reasoning

  6. Bounded rationality • Herbert Simon, Bill Wimsatt • No idealised rationality to approximate • Similarity to Harman and to Toulmin • Rationality constituted by heuristics • Limited use of resources • Biased • Context-dependent • Open-ended • Normally considered in context of decisions • Can be applied in context of argumentation

  7. Harman’s distinction Arguments Inferences Inferences to be understood in terms of heuristics Arguments as: Abstract objects (Rational) form of decision-making (Rational) form of communication Three kinds of arguments

  8. Biggles wears boots Nazis wear boots Biggles is a Nazi Hans wears boots, a hat with a skull… Nazis wear boots, hats with skulls… Hans is a Nazi Some cases of informal fallacies are rational arguments Inadequate arguments can be reinterpreted as enthymematic People can distinguish bad and good arguments of the same apparent form Arguments treated as heuristics Fallacies and enthymemes

  9. Gigerenzer example City of 1 million 1000 infected 5% false positive How likely to be ill? 95%? About 2%! 50,000 false positive Both examples provide the same information Way information presented important Need to understand actual heuristics Bias and argument

  10. Over two million Burmese affected by cyclone Actual effect upon a single individual Engaging empathy Not clearly inappropriate Role of emotions in rapid response to stimuli Emotion plays a cognitive role Emotions as simple heuristics Emotion and cognition

  11. The pessimistic view • Human reasoning deeply flawed • Known biases can be consciously abused • The notion of ideal rationality can be used to hide abuse • No general strategy to avoid biases • Emotions can not be excluded • No way to generally distinguish appropriate arguments • Argumentation is just another way of getting others to do what you want

  12. The optimistic view • Can identify and avoid individual biases • Use heuristics for this • Can develop new heuristics to deal with problematic cases • Can use arguments for cognitive cooperation given shared goals • Heuristics a realistic way to move social epistemology beyond ‘trust’

  13. Cooperation and values • Objective values • Truth • Can underpin a shared cognitive effort • Such efforts self-defeating if no such values • Rorty’s notion of solidarity probably not robust enough for this

  14. Thank you konrad@talmont.com

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