1 / 8

Family Law

Family Law. Why is marriage? Why has marriage become less common, less stable? Why have out of wedlock births greatly increased? 19th century seduction law Should we legalize the baby market? The future of marriage and reproduction. Why is marriage?.

ashley
Télécharger la présentation

Family Law

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. Family Law • Why is marriage? • Why has marriage become less common, less stable? • Why have out of wedlock births greatly increased? • 19th century seduction law • Should we legalize the baby market? • The future of marriage and reproduction

  2. Why is marriage? • Family as a unit to exploit division of labor makes sense, but … • Why traditionally as a lifetime contract? • Why do long term contracts exist in general? • Firm specific sunk costs create a bilateral monopoly • With opportunities for bargaining cost etc. • So specify the terms in advance • Marriage as an example • Relationship specific sunk costs in • Specializing in being X’s spouse, and … • Shared children • Permanent contract as one solution. • Still room for bargaining within marriage • Partly controlled by traditional roles • Penalties for breach another, but … • Hard to know who is breaching, since … • Quality of performance hard to observe. • Al-Tanukhi story.

  3. What has changed? • Divorce more common because such sunk costs reduced by … • Lower infant mortality and … • Division of labor taking much household production out of the house. • But divorce on demand raises a new problem of opportunistic breach, because … • Women perform early, men late, aka • Women depreciate faster than men on the marriage market • So if on demand without penalty, men can engage in opportunistic breach • And women respond by adjusting the timing of performance • Later child-bearing • Less specialization in household production • Both of which have happened • Analogous to my house building story in the previous chapter.

  4. Out of Wedlock Births • Have increased enormously over past 40 years • Not only in the U.S. • And not only among the poor • Why? • Welfare? Perhaps. • But that does not explain the increase among the not poor • Perhaps several simultaneous causes? • Gender ratio • More war, less death in childbirth • Shifts the market against women? But not by very much in the U.S. • Rising income? • Why put up with a husband • If you can afford to do without one? • Akerlof Yellin argument—effect of birth control and abortion. • Joint product link—implication. Marriage or commitment if… • Breaking the link improves opportunities for women who like sex and don’t want children, but … • But their competition worsens the opportunity for women who want children. • Men have more opportunity for sex without long term commitment

  5. Glittering Bonds • The puzzle: Why the custom of engagement rings • The problem • How can women have sex before marriage without • Risking being seduced and abandoned? • Which badly hurts her value on the marriage market • The legal solution • The tort action for breach of promise • Which was gradually abandoned by U.S. courts • The private solution • The man gives the woman a valuable ring when they get engaged • Sex after engagement is permitted • If the man jilts her, the ring forfeits. A performance bond • The custom declined as • Increasing acceptance of non-marital sex • And better contraception • Reduced the risk

  6. Byways of seduction law • 19th c. English and American law • Adult daughter is seduced and pregnant • Father sues, as • Master collecting damages for injury to a servant • The legal explanation • Daughter cannot sue, because fornication is illegal • And she participated • So use the fiction of master servant instead • My explanation • “Seduction” might be a way of evading paternal control over who she married • If she controlled the action, makes tactic work better • If father controls it, makes it work worse

  7. Law, sex and markets • The baby market • Why is it illegal for adoptive parents to pay the mother? • She can transfer parental rights • Why can’t she sell them? • Why the strong feeling against it? • Anyone not share it? • Can anyone explain it? • Prostitution • To prevent competition with marriage? • Because it “commodifies” sex? • More generalized puzzle about attitudes towards money • To varying degrees taboo • In social interactions. • Friends might owe me a dinner, but can’t pay with cash • We give gift cards when cash would be easier for both sides

  8. Are babies a good thing? • Over population argument, econ version • Children produce negative externalities • So people have too many of them • So we need to limit population increase • What are the negative externalities? • Use scarce land, resources? • As long as those are private property • Consuming them is a cost, but not an external cost • Pollute, commit crime, go on welfare, … • But there are also positive externalities • Make new discoveries from which others benefit • Pay taxes--perhaps to pay for welfare • To make the argument, you need to somehow estimate all of these well enough to sign the sum

More Related