Ireland 1987

2. Ireland 1987 • Coalition of Fine Gael and Labour collapses because of disagreement about budget • Labour doing badly in poll – decide to leave. • New election called • Fianna Fail – no coalition!

3. Elections Ireland 1987 Party Seats Fianna Fail 81 Fine Gael 51 Progressive Democrats 14 Labour Party 12 Workers’ Party 4 Democratic Socialist Party 1 Independent Fianna Fail 1 Tony Gregory (left-wing) 1 Sean Treacy (ex-Labour) 1

4. Coalition bargaining • What are the possibilities? • Fianna Fail insists on its single party coalition • 1982 similar situation – makes a deal with Workers’ Party and Tony Gregory • Now, Haughey: ‘No Deal’ • Either minority Fianna Fail government or another election

5. Coalition bargaining • The Workers’ Party, Labour and the DSP announce that they will vote against a Fianna Fail government • Fine Gael expected to vote against FF • IFF and Sean Treacy support FF • 83 out 166 seats. • Chairman (Speaker) still to be choose

6. Coalition bargaining • The opposition refuses to offer a chairman from its ranks • 82 out of 165 seats. A minority! • Tony Gregory the only one who has not declared his stand – looking for a deal • The investiture vote – Gregory and FF are still holding out

7. Coalition bargaining • On the vote Gregory decides to abstain and there is tie 82-82 • A tie is broken by the chairman • Fianna Fail takes seat as a minority cabinet

8. Lessons • Government participation and electoral costs • Bargaining power • Commitments – why did Gregory become so pivotal? • Refusal of parties to cooperate with Fianna Fail – intended to put a strain on FF • The role of rules: i) Tie-breaker, ii) when election is called, iii) president’s role in formation process

9. The role of coalition theory • Cases, such as Ireland, offer some intuition about coalition formation • The role of theory is to generalize such intuitions, explain causal mechanism, and predict outcomes

10. Two Tradition in Coalition Studies • The ‘European Politics’ Tradition • Cross-national studies of coalitions • Empirical • Inductive • Problems: Limited data, no testing possible • The Game-Theoretic Tradition • Coalition formation as a constant sum game

11. Laver & Schofield’s Goal • Bring the two traditions together • Does game theory help in explaining coalition formation? • Understanding coalition politics is extremely for our understanding of politics in parliamentary systems

12. Who plays the coalition game? • Political parties are composed of politicians: • Leaders • Legislators • Rank and file members • In studying coalitions we have to decide who’s behaviour we want to explain

13. Who plays the coalition game? • Ideally, we would focus on individual politicians. • Empirically, parties form coalitions. • Focusing on parties therefore simplifies our explanations. Do we lose anything?

14. Parties as unitary actors • Parties are not unitary actors • Do the act as unitary actors? • Can we think of parties as individuals making rational decisions? • Often they appear not to be – talk of party factions, threats of splitting parties, etc.

15. Parties as unitary actors • What about legislative behavior? • European parties act very cohesive • 80-90% vote together in the most fragmented systems • Votes are end results – the process of leading to the vote is not necessarily without conflict • A closer look must be taken

16. Coherent vs. Factional Parties • No party really acts like a unified actor • Communist parties tend to be more unified • Rarely considered viable coalition partners • Some other parties are also fairly unified • Importance of party structure

17. Coherent vs. Factional Parties • Coalitions of mini-parties • Christian democratic parties • ‘Parties of government’ • Factions not necessarily similar in terms of policy preferences • Factions attempting to secure their place in government

18. Party vs. Parliamentary Party • Parliamentary party important because vote of confidence is important • Voting discipline • Expulsion • The rank-and-file • Can influence party when in opposition • Loses importance when in government • Place more important on policy than office

19. Party Discipline and Party Splits • Parties can be disciplined but prone to splits • Only option for dissent • Scandinavian party • Snapshot vs. the long run unity

20. Electoral Coalitions and Electoral Systems • Electoral coalitions, parties, coalition governments? • Democratic Alliance in Portugal • CDU/CDS in Germany • Influence of electoral system on: • Electoral coalitions • Party splitting

21. Deviations from the Unitary Actor Assumption • Four categories of parties • Coherent parties • Communist • Authoritarian organization • Parties prone to splitting • Coalition bargaining produces stress • Unitary at a fixed point in time

22. Deviations from the Unitary Actor Assumption • Non-unitary parties • E.g. the Italian Christian Democrats • Collection of faction after different things • Electoral coalitions • Parties announcing that they will work together • Unitary?

23. Deviations from the Unitary Actor Assumption • In the long-run the assumption of an unitary actor is problematic • If we are focused on a fixed point in time the assumption appears fairly reasonable with a few exceptions

24. What if not unitary? • Constrains party leaders in coalition negotiations • Avoid issues controversial within parties • Luebbert: Coalitions formation is complicated because of intra-party bargaining • Offers an explanation of minority and oversized coalitions

25. The Party as a Coalition of Politicians • Idea: Forming a coalition is a two-step process: • First politicians form coalitions (parties) and then the parties form a coalition government • First principles • Problems: • Difficult • Unrealistic – groups/parties are fairly stable • Number of possible coalitions • Iceland 1983: How many different ways to form that particular party system?

26. Iceland 1983 9,813,276,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 • Small number compared with larger legislatures!!!

27. The Party as a Coalition of Factions • Factions may be important actor • Difficult to define a faction – potential to make ‘convenient’ assumptions • Splitting potential of parties • How do we measure?

28. Summary • Unitary Actor Assumption • Not as serious as it appears • European parties are disciplined • May be a serious problem if we are concerned with long term development • At the (game) theoretical level the unitary actor assumption is a necessary first step.