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Civil Society and Implementation of UNSCR 1540 Vienna, 8-10 January 2013 Tim Trevan

Civil Society and Implementation of UNSCR 1540 Vienna, 8-10 January 2013 Tim Trevan. Risk Spectrum. Non-residual Risk is addressed pre-event by prevention, mitigation, resilience & preparedness (& avoidance)

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Civil Society and Implementation of UNSCR 1540 Vienna, 8-10 January 2013 Tim Trevan

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  1. Civil Society and Implementation of UNSCR 1540 Vienna, 8-10 January 2013 Tim Trevan

  2. Risk Spectrum Non-residual Risk is addressed pre-event by prevention, mitigation, resilience & preparedness (& avoidance) Residual Risk is addressed post-event by Emergency Response (detection, diagnosis, containment, treatment, recovery, investigation) Natural Accidental Intentional

  3. Synthetic Biology and 1540 Varying views on what synthetic biology is. Engineering approach to biology: • Design for purpose • Use of standard components 

  4. What are the risks? • Security – misuse to design BW • Combination of improved genomics, IT, automation of sequencing/synthesis and on-line services (including design tools), making design possible, easier and more accessible/distributed • Safety – unintended consequences • Of research or of continued evolution of genetically modified species released into the environment • Safety – laboratory accidents/release 

  5. Who is involved? • Gene Foundries (main clients academia and Big Pharma) • Fabrication Centres • Oligo producers • Gene-design tool creators/Gene designers • Academia (6 Academies, iGem, FBI) • Corporate R&D (eg biofuels) • Citizen scientists

  6. ICLS Synthetic Biology Project Objectives • Global adherence of gene foundries to a version of the ‘Code’ • Vertical expansion to include all involved in synthetic gene commerce (suppliers, designers, manufacturers, clients) • Development of a code for all active players in synthetic biology (ie all above plus academia, corporate R&D, citizen scientists) • Creation of a global forum to discuss issues as they arise • Keep ahead of the curve in managing associated risks

  7. What has been done? • IASB and IGSC Codes of Conduct • US DHSS Guidelines • Common features: • Check orders for gene sequences of concern • Check clients • Keep records • Links with law enforcement (FBI outreach initiative) • DIYer Codes, iGem rules, SynBerc • ICLS Heidelberg Meeting/SynBio Project

  8. European DIYbio Code

  9. US DIYbio Code

  10. ICLS Heidelberg MeetingAddressing Global Security Meeting • Perceived needs • Common customer (black and white list) and gene sequence databases • International coordinating body and ‘seal of approval’ for gene foundries • International law enforcement Points of Contact equivalent to FBI programme • A code of conduct and a systems approach to biosafety and biosecurity for all working in SynBio Synthetic Biology: Biosafety and Biosecurity Considerations

  11. Heidelberg Outcomes:Don’ts • No to shared client data: • No white lists • Black lists the responsibility of governments • No to commongene sequence database • Not practicable/proprietary • Problems of gene sequence vs species

  12. Heidelberg Outcomes: Dos Part 1 • Use Common language to explain to clients need for screening • Test ‘Seal of approval’,certifying guidelines-compliant • Address gene sequence vs species issue jointly • Keep a watching brief on pathways/new constructs • Consider client code of conduct

  13. Heidelberg Outcomes: Dos Part 2 • Consider licenses for smaller research outfits/citizen scientists/small market clients • Seek global adherence to the gene foundry code • Create a global forum for discussion of SynBio issues • Seek a general code of conduct for all SynBio actors • Address environmental and biosafety issues

  14. Heidelberg Outcomes:Dos Part 3 • Engage Interpol as global PoC on law enforcement issues • Engage BTWC National PoCs • Use the BTWC meetings to progress synbio issues • Address sales to legitimate entities in ‘pariah’ states • Address issues of transport of synbio products • Leverage existing synbio networks to work on broadening and globalisation issues

  15. Heidelberg Outcomes:Report • Printed copies available • Distributed by FBI at 6 Academies Meeting in DC, June 2012 • Special thanks to sponsors • UK SPF • FBI • Sloan Foundation • Thanks to partners • IASB • IGSC • Other participants

  16. Next steps • Engage Interpol • Engage the Six Academies • Engage more governments • Engage Citizen Scientists, Corporate R&D, Big Pharma • Meet Chinese gene foundries (Aug 2012, Shanghai) • ICLS/BGI co-host conference in Hong Kong, 7-8 March 2013 • Engage/invite BRIC and emerging biotech countries • Broaden participation vertically and horizontally • Lay groundwork for biosafety and environmental engagement

  17. Relative Strengths of Government vs Civic Society Government • International aspects • Legislation and regulation • Surveillance • Interdiction/Prevention • Preparedness and Planning • Enforcement • Forensic assessments • Education Civic Society • Institutional Practice • Personal Practice • Culture/Self-policing • Cutting Edge Knowledge • Distributed Networks: • Flexible and Responsive • Resilient • Innovative • Local and global - REACH

  18. Basic Home Truths 1 • If you want things to happen, they need to add value locally, not make your interlocutor’s work harder • To be sustainable, action plans have to address local priorities • This means local priority setting and ownership, which is loss of control of the agenda for the outside ‘helpers’

  19. Basic Home Truths 2 • In most countries, there are no biosecurity specialists • Biosafety and biosecurity is not even the second hat – way down the list • Must be careful how we use good people – must not take them away from doing things which are more important

  20. So … • If biosafety and biosecurity, and BWC implementation, are secondary priorities with other players then, in engaging these other players, we must address these issues as secondary objectives within a greater whole which addresses locally identified priorities.

  21. Motivations • Biosafety • Biosecurity • Certification • Career advancement • Compliance • Liability protection • Financial • Status/image • Altruism • Personal connection

  22. Government and Civic SocietyWorking Together Public Health, Agriculture, Food Safety, Environment Water, Soil Trade, Customs Education Sci/Tech Trade Security Law Enf. Occupational Safety, Industry, Education, Certification Gvt Regulatory Agencies, Customs, Law Enforcement Security Services National Security Import/Export Armed Forces Customs/Border Health Professionals & Societies, farmers etc… Academia Schools Biosafety Associations, Professional trainers NGOs Trade and professional associations Outreach programmes, First responders

  23. Thank you TREVAN@ICLSCHARTER.COM 4245 Fairfax Drive Arlington VA 22203 202-659-8058 www.iclscharter.org

  24. Towards A New Methodology?

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