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Linear Cryptanalysis of DES

Linear Cryptanalysis of DES. M. Matsui. Linear Cryptanalysis Method for DES Cipher . EUROCRYPT 93, 1994. The first experimental cryptanalysis of the Data Encryption Standard . CRYPT0 94, 1994. . Linear Approximations.

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Linear Cryptanalysis of DES

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  1. Linear Cryptanalysis of DES M. Matsui. Linear Cryptanalysis Method for DES Cipher. EUROCRYPT 93, 1994. The first experimental cryptanalysis of the Data Encryption Standard. CRYPT0 94, 1994.

  2. Linear Approximations • A function with one bit output is a linear function over if output is XOR of input bits. • Example: • If the f function in DES is linear then we can break DES. • g has a p-linear approximation if with probability p the output is equal to a linear function. • Example: has a 3/4-linear approximation. • Every function has a ½-approximation.

  3. Using Linear Approximations of DES • Assume that 1 bit of the output has a linear approx. • Example: Assume that if we pick M at random and C=DES(M,K), then with probability 0.51 Attack: • Pick a pair message, encryption M, C= DES(M,K), at random. • Compute and conclude that with probability 0.51. • To increase probability repeat many times and take majority.

  4. Using Linear Approximations of DES How do we find linear approximations in DES? We will consider 3-round DES, without IP and IP-1. We will start with a S-BOX.

  5. The S-Box S5 • Does not look random: • 1,2 ,7,11 appears only in left side • 4,12,13 appear 3 times in left side • 8,10,14 appear 2 times in each side • 0,3,5,9,15 appears only in right side • 6 appears 3 times in right side • The XOR of the numbers in left-side is 1 S5

  6. The f function of DES 17—20

  7. The permutation P We need to trace the bits 17-20 that come from to S5 After P they are bits 3,8,14,25

  8. The f function of DES Bit 26 in k 26 26 17-20 Bits 3,8,14,25

  9. The Expansion function E We need bit 26 – the second bit that goes to S5

  10. The f function of DES Bit 17 in R Bit 26 in k 26 26 17-20 Bits 3,8,14,25

  11. 3 Round DES Bits 3,8,14,25 Bit 17 Bit 26 Bits 3,8,14,25 Bits 3,8,14,25 Bit 26 Bit 17 Bit 17 Bits 3,8,14,25

  12. The Attack on 3 Round DES • From first round with probability 52/64 • From third round with probability 52/64 • Thus, with probability (52/64) 2+(12/64)2 0.7 • Finds one bit of the key

  13. Linear cryptanalysis: Learning One Bit • If a bit of the outputs has a 1/2+p linear approximation in i-round DES, then • Get O(1/p2) message, encryption pairs • For each pair compute “the bit” of the key • Take the value that appears more times • Get correct value with high probability • Learn one bit of key • Can do better…

  14. 4 Round DES ? Bits 3,8,14,25 Bit 17 • Only 6 bits in K4 affect bit 17 of • With the correct 6 bits the • 3-round approximation holds with • prob. 0.7 • With incorrect 6 bits • is random • Check 26 options of these bits and • find the correct bits • Found 7 bits of key! Bit 26 KK Bit 26 ? Bits 3,8,14,25 Bit 17 K4 4 4 Bits 3,8,14,25

  15. Linear cryptanalysis • If a bit of the outputs has a 1/2+p linear approximation in i-round DES, then we choose O(1/p2) messages in (i+1)-round DES and compute 7 bits of the key. • Can do the same trick with first round and last i-rounds, get another 7 bits • Use exhaustive search to find the other 42 bits.

  16. Known Attacks • 8 rounds: 221 plaintexts (40 seconds) • 12 rounds: 233 plaintexts (50 hours) • 16 rounds: 243 plaintexts (50 days, 12 computers) • Uses two 14-rounds approximation • Using each approximation it finds 13 bits • Finds 30 bits by exhaustive search

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