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Future Directions in Role-Based Access Control Models

Future Directions in Role-Based Access Control Models. Ravi Sandhu Co-Founder and Chief Scientist SingleSignOn.Net & Professor of Information Technology and Engineering George Mason University. ACCESS CONTROL. Also called Authorization Entitlement Different from Authentication

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Future Directions in Role-Based Access Control Models

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  1. Future Directions in Role-Based Access Control Models Ravi Sandhu Co-Founder and Chief Scientist SingleSignOn.Net & Professor of Information Technology and Engineering George Mason University

  2. ACCESS CONTROL • Also called • Authorization • Entitlement • Different from • Authentication • Typically requires authentication as a prerequisite

  3. AUTHORIZATION, TRUST AND RISK • Information security is fundamentally about managing • authorization and • trust so as to manage risk • We don’t know how to do this

  4. ACCESS CONTROL PRINCIPLES • Least privilege • Separation of duties • Abstract permissions • Decentralized administration • Keep it simple stupid (KISS)

  5. ACCESS CONTROL MODELS RBAC Role-based access control DAC Discretionary access control MAC Mandatory access control

  6. ACCESS CONTROL MODELS RBAC Role-based Policy configured DAC Identity based Owner controlled MAC Lattice based Policy controlled

  7. WHY DO WE NEED MODELS • Separate the questions of • What • How • Provide a framework for managing complexity • Complex authorization • Simple authorization • Allow us to guarantee and understand policy • Prove safety theorems • Capture policy in constraints

  8. WHY DO WE NEED MODELS • Separate the questions of • What • How • Provide a framework for managing complexity • Complex authorization • Simple authorization • Allow us to guarantee and understand policy • Prove safety theorems • Capture policy in constraints

  9. WHY DO WE NEED MODELS A s s u r a n c e What? Objectives Model Architecture Mechanism How?

  10. ... ADMINISTRATIVE RBAC ROLES PERMISSIONS USERS ADMIN ROLES ADMIN PERMISSIONS

  11. EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY Director (DIR) Project Lead 1 (PL1) Project Lead 2 (PL2) Production 1 (P1) Quality 1 (Q1) Production 2 (P2) Quality 2 (Q2) Engineer 1 (E1) Engineer 2 (E2) Engineering Department (ED) PROJECT 1 PROJECT 2 Employee (E)

  12. EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY Project Lead 1 (PL1) Project Lead 2 (PL2) Production 1 (P1) Quality 1 (Q1) Production 2 (P2) Quality 2 (Q2) Engineer 1 (E1) Engineer 2 (E2) Engineering Department (ED) PROJECT 1 PROJECT 2 Employee (E)

  13. EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY Director (DIR) Project Lead 1 (PL1) Project Lead 2 (PL2) Production 1 (P1) Quality 1 (Q1) Production 2 (P2) Quality 2 (Q2) Engineer 1 (E1) Engineer 2 (E2) PROJECT 1 PROJECT 2

  14. EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY Project Lead 1 (PL1) Project Lead 2 (PL2) Production 1 (P1) Quality 1 (Q1) Production 2 (P2) Quality 2 (Q2) Engineer 1 (E1) Engineer 2 (E2) PROJECT 1 PROJECT 2

  15. WHY DO WE NEED MODELS A s s u r a n c e What? Objectives Model Architecture Mechanism How?

  16. ACCESS-CONTROL ARCHITECTURESERVER-PULL Client Server Authorization Server Authentication Server

  17. ACCESS-CONTROL ARCHITECTUREUSER-PULL Client Server Authorization Server Authentication Server

  18. ACCESS-CONTROL ARCHITECTUREPROXY-BASED Client Proxy Server Authentication Server Authorization Server

  19. WHY DO WE NEED MODELS A s s u r a n c e What? Objectives Model Architecture Mechanism How?

  20. ACCESS-CONTROL MECHANISMSECURE COOKIES IN USER-PULL ARCHITECTURE

  21. ACCESS-CONTROL MECHANISMX.509 CERTIFICATES • X.509 certificates can be used in • User-pull architecture • Server-pull architecture • Secure cookies inherently user pull

  22. WHY DO WE NEED MODELS • Separate the questions of • What • How • Provide a framework for managing complexity • Complex authorization • Simple authorization • Allow us to guarantee and understand policy • Prove safety theorems • Capture policy in constraints

  23. WHY DO WE NEED MODELS A s s u r a n c e What? Objectives Model Architecture Mechanism How?

  24. COMPLEX VERSUS SIMPLE AUTHORIZATION • Complex authorization • Many roles: hundreds, thousands • Dynamic policy and complex administration • Simple authorization • Few roles: tens • Static policy and simple administration

  25. COMPLEX AUTHORIZATION Director (DIR) Project Lead 1 (PL1) Project Lead 2 (PL2) Production 1 (P1) Quality 1 (Q1) Production 2 (P2) Quality 2 (Q2) Engineer 1 (E1) Engineer 2 (E2) Engineering Department (ED) PROJECT 1 PROJECT 2 Employee (E)

  26. COMPLEX AUTHORIZATION Senior Security Officer (SSO) Department Security Officer (DSO) Project Security Officer 1 (PSO1) Project Security Officer 2 (PSO2)

  27. SIMPLE AUTHORIZATION Senior Administrator Internal User External User Junior Administrator

  28. COMPLEX AUTHORIZATION VERSUS COMPLEX PERMISSIONS • A consumer has access to only his own account and to no other account • A branch manager has access to accounts of customers at his branch but no accounts at any other branch

  29. WHY DO WE NEED MODELS • Separate the questions of • What • How • Provide a framework for managing complexity • Complex authorization • Simple authorization • Allow us to guarantee and understand policy • Prove safety theorems • Capture policy in constraints

  30. WHY DO WE NEED MODELS A s s u r a n c e What? Objectives Model Architecture Mechanism How?

  31. RBAC POLICY • Policy in RBAC is determined by • Hierarchies • Constraints • MAC and DAC can be configured in RBAC by suitable design of hierarchies and constraints

  32. ROLE-CENTRIC SEPARATION OF DUTIES • Static SOD : Conflicting roles cannot have common users U = {u1,u2,…un} , R = {r1,r2,…rn}, CR = {cr1,cr2} : cr1 = {r1,r2,r3} , cr2 = {ra,rb,rc} • |roles(OE(U))  OE(CR)| 1

  33. PERMISSION-CENTRIC SEPARATION OF DUTIES • SSOD-CP • |permissions(roles(OE(U)))  OE(CP)| 1 • Variations of SSOD-CP • SSOD-CP  |permissions(OE(R))  OE(CP)| 1

  34. CONSTRAINTS CHARACTERIZATION PROHIBITION OBLIGATION CONSTRAINTS

  35. SIMPLE PROHIBITION CONSTRAINTS • Type 1 • expr  1 • Type 2 • expr   or expr 0 • Type 3 • expr1expr2

  36. SIMPLE OBLIGATION CONSTRAINTS • Type 1 • expr  0 or expr 0 • Type 2 • Set X  Set Y • Type 3 • obligation constraints  obligation constraints • Type 4 • expr   1 • expr   1  expr 1  expr 0

  37. LOOKING AHEAD • Do we need more models or should we focus on understanding how to make better use of existing models? • How do we know we have a good model?

  38. LOOKING AHEAD • Engineering systems with complex authorizations • Deeper understanding of simple constraints and policy that can serve as building blocks • How to implement a model with different trust and performance tradeoffs

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