Enhancing Airport Security: History, Challenges, and Outlook

1. Airport Security

2. Airport Security Outline • Major consideration in Terminal planning and design • Who? What? • History – Why? • How? • Airport Security Program • “Failure of Imagination”

3. Airport Security • How much delay due to security?

4. Terminal Design Objectives • Walking distances • Aesthetic design • Services • Security • Cost effectiveness

5. Flight Interface • Arriving passenger areas • Security • Departure lounges • Corridors • Departure Gates All are important for different reasons, mostly to be more efficient, make more money… But Security is only to protect life/property!

6. Introduction • Safety vs. Security • Safety-freedom from unintentional danger, etc. • Security-freedom from intentional acts of violence, danger, risk of injury, loss, etc. • Who is/are the problem? • Terrorists • Hijackers • Suicide bombers • Criminals – “Inside Threat”/Outside job • Disruptive Passengers – intentional and not

7. Introduction • What is the problem? • Individual attacks to… • Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) • Nuclear • Full nuclear detonation to “dirty” bomb • Biological • Chemical • Conventional weapons – large explosives • Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED) • Mass attacks with military weapons • Unconventional weapons – large A/C flown into targets…

8. Introduction • Why airports? • Vital to a stable economy • Important to community operation • High density of people – targets • Very visible, high profile facilities

9. History of Airport Security • FAA/TSA regs are written in blood • Crash/incidentNew regulations • First hijacking - 1930 Lima, Peru • Revolutionaries dropping leaflets • 1930s to ‘55 - Several hijackings • Eastern Europeans seeking asylum • 1st Fatal ‘47 – Romanians killed a crew • 1955 First Major Criminal Act • Jack Graham blew up A/C, 33 dead • Killed his mother for insurance money

10. Airport Security Hist. (Cont’d) • 1960 First Suicide Bomber • Again, for a heavy life insurance payout • Political/public demand for baggage inspection • Flying down to Cuba- 1959 to ‘80s • First hijackings to escape Cuba, then… • Hijacking to Cuba for money or politics • Political/public demand for Pax screening and hijacker profiling* • 1972 – Southern Airways Flight 49 • DC-9 diverted LEX, hot refueled, next - Havana • December- LEX Pax/carryon screening begins

11. Airport Security Hist. (Cont’d) • 1972-Part 107 Fed Aviation Regulations • Screen all pax, carry-on and baggage • All airports must: • Identify their Air Operations Area (AOA) • ID those areas with little/no protection against unauthorized access due to poor infrastructure • Create their Airport Security Plan to upgrade their facilities to comply with current and future regulations with a timetable and budget estimate • Successfully reduced security incidents

12. Airport Security Hist. (Cont’d) • 1980s International Incidents USA • 1985 TWA in Lebanon – Pax murdered • 1988 Pan Am Lockerbie Scotland-all dead • Threats to US personnel - gaining access through foreign security • New US Regulations applied to foreign facilities • Screen all pax, carry-on and baggage • Reconcile pax/bags or “no go” • 1990s - FAA sponsored more research • New Equipment to detect bombs/weapons • Upgrade facilities/procedures…then…

13. History of Airport Security • September 11, 2001 • Airport Security world changed • “Failure of Imagination” –routine security • ALL A/C ordered to “Land immediately” • @0945 over 4500 A/C IFR + 1000s VFR • LEX tasked to create plan for 30-50 A/C • 1215 nothing but Mil A/C - unprecedented • All regs RE:airport sec’ty/air opsTSA responsibility • Airports begin improvised security checklist • LEX begins flight ops 1250 September 13 • KyANG airmen/soldiers stand guard

14. History of Airport Security • 9/11/2001

15. History of Airport Security • Aviation & Transportation Security Act • Transportation Security Admin (TSA) created • Develop/enforce new guidelines • Title 49 CFR – Transportation • All regs RE:airport sec’ty/air opsTSAresponsibility • Part 107 cancelled… • 2003 US Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS) • TSA/USCG/Customs/INS combined

16. Airport Security Program • TSA is responsible for Airport Security • Main source for planning/design guidelines • Air Operations Area (AOA) • Secure Area • Sterile area • Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) • Exclusive Area • Risk Management/Assessment

17. Airport Security Program • Security Identification Display Area(SIDA)

18. Pier/Finger Terminal

19. Security @Commercial Airports • Passenger Screening • Baggage Screening • Employee Identification • Perimeter Security

20. Passenger Screening • Major changes/overhaul since 9/11 • Since 2003 managed/operated by TSA • Prior by Airlines under FAA regulation • Significant impacts on planning/design • Continuously reviewed and evolving • Facilities/Equipment include: • Automatic process: magnetometer, explosive trace detection, body scanning, biometrics, etc • Manual search procedures/areas • Each airport is unique

21. Passenger Screening • Typical Passenger Screening Layout

22. Baggage Screening • Since 2003, every bag screened • “100% EDS rule”, Explosive Detection System • Like a CT scan • Magnetometer • Greatly complicates baggage handling • Usual solution – Automation (LEX) • 1st in Lobbies, then moved behind counters • Search areas “blast resistant”

23. Baggage Screening • Inline Screening • Initial Standalone Screening in lobbies-exposed

24. Employee Identification • All personnel in the Security Identification Display Area (SIDA): • Must have criminal background check/OK • Trained in facilities and security issues • Prominently display SIDA badge at all times • SIDA Facilities/Equipment needs: • Secure defined perimeter • Automatic electronic controls • Electronically controlled gates, card readers • CCTV, card reader monitoring, personnel

25. Perimeter Security • Airport Security Plan must have a defined perimeter • Perimeter fencing • Title 49 Part 1542 Aviation Security--Airports • Controlled access gates • Kept to a minimum • Security lighting • PSO patrols • NOT routine

26. Vulnerability Assessment • Important for planning and design • ID where security enhancements are needed • Intro security issues early in design • Wide range of threats/vulnerabilities • Threat-anything that may cause harm • Vulnerability-anything the bad guys can take advantage of to carry out a threat • Cannot completely eliminate • Play out scenarios • Implement protective measures/procedures

27. Vulnerability Assessment • Flow diagram

28. Special Design Issues • TSA controls most Security Design… • TSA used to post links on website for design • Mark Day – Must have need to know & get OK • Public Facilities • Limit concealment points, entry control points • Harden emergency systems

29. Special Design Issues • Blast Resistant Design/Mitigation

30. Special Design Issues • Blast Resistant Design/Mitigation

31. Special Design Issues • Blast Resistant Design/Mitigation • Glazing and screens • Structure – harden columns, blast walls, etc. • Mimimize “progressive collapse” • Blast Analysis Plan (BAP) • VERY specialized contractors/suppliers

32. Special Design Issues • Security Facilities • Fencing, gates, controls, CCTV, TSA areas, road barriers, vehicle inspection areas, etc • Joint Military Facilities • Coordinating force protection with TSA • Avoid “Security Theater” • Countermeasures to provide the “feeling” of security…but do little or nothing to achieve it • Sometimes perception is beneficial but… • Actual benefits very debatable

33. Special Construction Issues • All personnel get criminal background checks before access approval • Security during construction • Workers can’t go sightseeing! Areas off-limits! • Security of classified equipment • Fencing, gates, controls, CCTV, etc. • TSA screening areas • Only cleared workers handle the installation

34. Special Security Issues • Presidential/US VIP visit • Secure Ramp/buildings/ • Detailed access to your info • Shut down airspace/terminal/roads/comm • Foreign VIP visit • Queen of England • Emir of UAE and family • Con Air • Federal/International prisoner exchange

35. Security at GA Airports • TSA has not required the same level of security effort at GA airports…but… • Encourage GA airports to develop their own security initiatives • Like Commercial Airports • Awareness programs • Reporting methods • Develop security plans similar to commercial

36. Future Security • Changing/Increasing securityNorm • Keep up with TSA/FAA regulation changes • Airport/perimeter security technology changes • Cannot completely eliminate threats • Continuous vulnerability assessment • Watch the news • Criminals/terrorists are copycats AND innovators • Scare du jour (disease, terrorism) • Europe warning - five A/C bombings for Xmas • Failure of Imagination

37. Airport Security • Questions?

38. Airport Security • References, Links • http://www.bluegrassairport.com/ • http://www.faa.gov/ • http://www.boeing.com/boeing/ • http://www.aaae.org/ • R. Horonjeff, F. McKelvey. Planning & Design of Airports. McGraw-Hill, New York, 2010 • TSA. Recommended Security Guidelines for Airport Planning, Design and Construction. 2006 • R. Souleyrette. CE 633 Lectures • John Cassel, majordadjohn@msn.com • Mark Day, MDay@bluegrassairport.com • * - http://www.kentucky.com/2014/12/16/3596907/tsa-chief-travelers-from-some.html?sp=/99/101/