US FOREIGN POLICY AND EUROPE

1. US FOREIGN POLICY AND EUROPE Readings Carter CH 14, Beasley CH 2-4, Kagan, Moravcsik, BRZEZINSKI

2. Guiding Questions What unified the transatlantic relationship during the Cold War era? What conceptions of power shape British foreign policy? French foreign policy? German foreign policy? What is the state of the transatlantic relationship in the post Cold War era? Can the relationship be saved?

3. Cold War US/Europe Relations • Acceptance of CW boundaries in Europe resulted in the creation of two alliances: NATO and the Warsaw Pact. • Western Europe was crucial for US foreign policy goals. • In theory, relations should have been relatively easy to maintain. • The US and Europe shared similar identities. • European governments wanted the protection of the US nuclear umbrella. • Most governments agreed that economic cooperation was necessary to rebuild economies. • In practice, the relationship was not always so simple. • Rebuilding Germany, Suez Crisis, Nuclearization of NATO, Ostpolitik, French Third Way • Both sides questioned the resolve of the other

4. US CONCERNS EUROPEAN CONCERNS Mutual Tensions • US provision of public goods promoted shirking. • Once nuclear umbrella provided Europe unlikely to pay • Anti-Washington position-taking by European governments. • Dependence on the US would make Europe a “junior” partner. • France ‘s “Third Way” • Fear over US commitment to fight a continental war over Europe. • US “Forward Defense” strategy scared Europe. • Fostered “glass plate/trip wire” strategy to keep US in Europe.

5. The End of the Cold War • November, 1989 • The Berlin Wall came down. • Germany eventually unified • Neorealists expected Europe to “return to history” • War would break out in the absence of a common threat • Instead, Europe has remained mostly peaceful. • Integration seen as a way to “mitigate” the effects of anarchy • Raises questions about whether or not the transatlantic relationship is obsolete

6. Whither the Transatlantic Relationship? • What is the role of NATO? • Euro-American antiterrorism alliance? • Should it be disbanded? • What is the future of European-American relations? • Disagreements over the 2003 Iraq War. • Increasing economic competition • What is the future of the European Union? • Increased political integration. • How far east will it expand? Ukraine? Russia? • Will it challenge the US as an “alternative soft power” superpower? • What is the status of ESDF? • Praline Summit sought to balance NATO. • Current British, French and German governments seek ESDF that compliments NATO

7. Europe as an Idea • Habermas and Derrida 2003 • Protests surrounding second Iraq War prompted authors to determine what constitutes a “core Europe” mentality • UK and eastern Europe often not included in any discussion of “core Europe” • European “political mentality” includes: • 1) Privatization of faith • 2) Acceptance of state/distrust of markets • State should step in to correct market failures • 3) Limitations on the value of technological progress • Progress vs. traditional forms of life • 4) Struggle for “social justice” • Support for the welfare state • 5) “Sensitivity to injuries to personal and bodily integrity” • Be it on the battlefield or by the state (i.e. ban on death penalty) • 6) Support for multilateralism (via the EU, UN, etc.)

8. British Foreign Policy STRUCTURAL FACTORS POLITICAL FACTORS • Power: • UK as a middle power • Suez Incident made this apparent. • Institutions: • Globalization has constrained state autonomy. • EU membership makes European institutions key players in the British policy process. • Ideas: • Concept of insularity • Very Eurosceptic • Atlanticism (Special Relationship) • “Bridge building” approach to project a larger role in the system. • The PM/Government key actor in shaping foreign policy. • Blair’s decision to call for a vote in Parliament over Iraq was precedent setting; increased role of Parliament. • Opposition historically sides with the Government on issues of national security. • EU splits this bipartisan consensus. • Public opinion: • Broad support for Atlanticism • Iraq has strained this to some extent.

9. The “Special Relationship” • First classified as “special” by Churchill in 1946. • Common language, heritage, etc often cited as a basis for this relation. • Response post Suez Crisis: repair relations with the US. • Wanted to act like the “older brother” who could advise the US. • Ended up in the position of “junior partner” • With the exception of the Heath government, maintaining this relationship has been the top priority of British foreign policy. • Although the current coalition has suggested that the relationship should be re-calibrated.

10. Anglo Saxon Consensus? • Politically, the US and the UK are not all that similar • Blair paid a high political price for maintaining the relationship. • Came at a cost: greater distance between the UK/EU. • Brown sought to maintain the relationship. • Particularly with Obama • Re-evaluation occurring under Cameron. • Cameron believes the relationship is special but should be re-evaluated. • Clegg believes the UK should focus more on the EU.

11. Anglo Saxon Consensus?

12. French Foreign Policy STRUCTURAL FACTORS POLITICAL FACTORS • Power • Middle power. • Suez incident made this apparent. • Interdependence • Boost EU presence to project influence • Ideas • Maintain or boost French status. • Nuclear force. • (Pre-Sarkozy) Multipolar world with a European pillar. President is critical in the field of foreign policy. Political elite consensus on foreign policy goals. Focus strongly on maintaining strong ties with Germany to boost EU influence.

13. French Foreign Policy Emphases EUROPEAN SECURITY HUMAN RIGHTS • Diplomacy key tool in France’s arsenal • Budget would not support military reorganization. • French national security is tied to its relationship with Germany, the EU, and NATO. • Franco-German relationship key • Chirac began the debate on a French “re-think” over NATO • Pushed the possibility of allowing European control of some forces under circumstances where the US does not want to intervene. • Expanding ESDI takes place within this discussion over NATO. • Chirac publicly accepted responsibility for the Vichy collaboration with Nazi Germany. • Publicly chastised the entrance into government of the Freedom Party in Austria. • Began distancing France from its colonial ties • France was often seen as propping up unsavory dictators in Africa. • Often seen as possessing a special role in African and Middle Eastern diplomacy.

14. Evaluating French Foreign Policy • EU remains fundamental; Franco German relations key despite personality conflicts with Merkel • Hollande: Talk of “re-evaluating” EU monetary and budgetary policies does not go down well in Berlin • Uses connections within the Middle East and Africa to boost French influence in multilateral negotiations • Chirac: Theoretical rationale for avoiding Iraq conflict well founded • Sarkozy: Criticism between the US and France should be done in the appropriate manner • Sarkozy: France first state to recognize Libyan rebel forces • Increased Atlanticism under Sarkozy • Brought France back into NATO • Sent French troops to Afghanistan • EU should not “balance” the US • Hollande has suggested that he will not alter this relationship • Improving France/US relations a means to the same ends • Projecting French influence

15. German Foreign Policy STRUCTURAL FACTORS POLITICAL FACTORS • Power • Germany is too big to ignore. • Unification was Cold War goal. • Interdependence • Strong commitment to alliances. • Motor of the EU; Accepted integration and EMU for unification. • Ideas • Committed to preservation of human rights. • Committed to democracy. • Collective/cooperative action. • Germany as a civilian power. • Chancellor and the cabinet shape foreign policy. • Party leaders from both the government and opposition parties play large roles in shaping public policy. • Big decisions usually made by unanimity. • Basic Law prohibits the mobilization of the German army outside of regional, collective security purposes. • Federal Constitutional Court has been critical regarding military intervention. • Public opinion: pacifism, humanitarianism, opposition to nuclear weapons exert a large influence over policy.

16. Evolution of Postwar German Foreign Policy PERSIAN GULF SOMALIA • Hyde-Price 2003 • US asks Germany to provide troops for Operation Desert Shield. • Articles 24 and 87 of the Basic Law appeared to preclude a German role within the conflict. • Forbids military involvement outside of region • Changing the Constitution was a no go as the opposition controlled the Bundesrat. • SOLUTION: • Government agreed to provide monetary support to states most effected by the war. • Refused to send troops or direct military aid. • Hyde-Price 2003 • UN voted for a relief mission to Somalia to provide humanitarian aid. • UN asked for assistance in the form of financial aid and troops • Kohl: wanted to send 1,600 troops but was unsure a consensus could be reached. • Opposition refused to sign on without a change to the Basic Law. • SOLUTION: • Start talks to change the Basic Law (abandoned) • Commit troops under the UN as part of a multinational force • Buy time to allow for support while dealing with constitutional issues

17. Interpreting the Basic Law • Hancock and Krisch 2009; Hyde-Price 2003 • Case initiated by the SPD/Greens who argued that intervention outside of the region and that peace enforcement extends beyond the Basic Law • CDU/CSU/FDP: Collective security missions are allowed under the Basic Law regardless of location. • 1994: Constitutional Court rules: • 1) German military involvement in peace enforcement and peace keeping missions is acceptable • No distinction between the two • 2) German military participation within a collective security arrangement outside of the region is acceptable • Necessary to maintain alliance cohesion • 3) Governments require majority support in the Bundestag for intervention • Informal agreements codified by parliament in 2004

18. Evolution of German Foreign Policy KOSOVO AFGHANISTAN • 1998: SPD/Greens enter government. • Majority in the Bundestag to allow German forces to deploy against Serbia • Air attacks were the first military offensive since WW2. • Call for ground troops threatened the government’s support. • Support tenuous within the Green party. • SOLUTION: Continue the air war (support NATO) and seek a diplomatic solution (bring Russia to the table). • Bundestag sent troops on a peacekeeping mission after the war. • Expressed solidarity with the US following 9/11 • Schröder proposal to provide German military support for NATO efforts created a backlash • Red/Green backbenchers balk • Previous support for involvement depended upon CDU votes • SOLUTION: Authorization a vote of confidence • Willing to use political means to force desired outcome • Exposes German soldiers to risks • Reduced role over time; irritates others NATO members

19. Evaluating German Foreign Policy Schröder Merkel • Willingness to use German foreign policy, to achieve civilian AND national ends. • Involvement in multilateral endeavors promotes collective security (civilian) while also advancing national goals (permanent UN seat) • German-US relations • Close ties before Iraq war ended after 2002 elections • German-French relations • Critical; Push for ESDP that could balance NATO • German-Russian relations • Bridge between EU and Russia • Dependence on oil creates vulnerability • Also willing to use German foreign policy (including military) to achieve civilian AND national ends. • Support for Afghanistan mission (civilian) advances national goals (permanent UN seat) • German-US relations • Sought to repair relations with the US • ESDP should compliment NATO • German-French relations • Personality conflicts exist • Willing to work with other nations where necessary • German Russian relations • Takes a much tougher line on Russia (pushes democracy and human rights)

20. Can This Relationship Be Saved? • Moravcsik 2003 • Pundits say Iraq killed NATO; both sides realized something…. • Terror is a threat for the US, not for the EU. • Unilateral intervention proves US can act without the EU • But, winning the peace is rougher than winning the war. • Is this a question of diverging ideologies or temporary differences in domestic political situations?

21. Mars vs. Venus? • Kagan 2003 • US and EU view threats in fundamentally different ways • US is Mars and the EU is Venus • US embracing the use of power in an increasingly anarchic world (Hobbesian). • Technological gap in capabilities boost willingness to fight. • Prefer to act with others but are not compelled to do so. • Sees the world in black and white. • Strength and perspective make it the primary target. • Seeks to share defense burden with the EU. • US is BOTH a military and economic power; EU is not

22. Mars vs. Venus? • Kagan 2003 • EU is moving “away from power” towards international law (Kantian). • Support UN Security Council legitimation of conflict. • Push for universal applicability of ICC. • See the world in shades of gray. • Nuanced view privileges diplomacy rather than force. • Do not believe that 9/11 really targets them directly. • Strategic dependence on the US for military resources; unwilling to spend on defense. • Economic but not a military power. • Domestic politics prevents increases in defense spending.

23. Should It Be Saved? • Kagan 2003 • Yes; But be realistic; the nature of the relationship has changed. • Fundamental worldviews of both sides are unlikely to change. • BUT, these differences are not as unmanageable as they appeared after the Iraq war. • Moravcsik 2003 • Yes; Transatlantic cooperation remains the most important diplomatic relationship in the world. • Three possible paths: “agree to disagree”, part ways, or good cop/bad cop. • The latter has the greatest potential for returns; ending the alliance would require Europe to build its own military. • Brzezinski 2012 • Yes; A renewed west is key for enhancing the principles of the West • US must promote unity within the West and be able to balance and conciliate the East • US/EU connections could pull Russia and Turkey into the orbit of the West • Critical for US/Asian relations

24. Conclusions: Repairing the Rift • Kagan 2003 • US/EU cannot allow the relationship to deteriorate. • US can provide military might while the EU can provide legitimacy. • EU must realize: • US will sometimes have to act unilaterally. • US hegemony is good for the EU. • Should build up at least a token force; would help EU shoulder some of the defense burden. • US must realize: • A strong Europe is a good thing. • Pay respect to multilateral institutions • Needlessly provoking the EU is counterproductive • Build political capital for use when you have to act unilaterally.

25. Conclusions: Repairing the Rift • Moravcsik 2003 • Preventive interventions • US should avoid when possible; commit to quiet consultation without public attacks • UN Security Council • EU cannot use UN to restrain the US (UN wasn’t intended to do this). • US cannot keep thinking that WW2 gives them a blank check • Push for EU Defense Force? • Unlikely; Would just duplicate the US capabilities • Develop comparative advantage • US brings military strength and the EU brings civilian strength (access to economic markets)

26. Next Unit • If You’re Interested…. • Reid The United States of Europe • KaganOf Paradise and Power • Leonard Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century • Next Unit: US and Asian Pacific Relations • Cox and Stokes CH 14 • US/Japanese Foreign Policy • Beasley CH 7 • Heginbotham et al. (Foreign Affairs-September/October 2011) • Packard (Foreign Affairs-March/April 2010) • US/Chinese Foreign Policy • Beasley CH 6 • Carter CH 12 • Economy and Segal (Foreign Affairs-May/June 2009) • Pei (Foreign Policy July/Aug 2009) http://bit.ly/zdNFDo