Is Consciousness a Brain Process

1. Is Consciousness a Brain Process? U. T. Place With some reflections on Dennett

2. Am I my brain?

3. This isn�t a scientific question We can agree that every mental state is correlated with some brain state Philosophy doesn�t deal with this issue--it�s a matter for empirical science The philosophical question is whether, given the results of empirical research, the relation between mental states and brain states is identity.

4. Why the answer isn�t a no-brainer My brain and I don�t have all the same properties E.g. I weigh (a lot) more than my brain It�s not clear that I am wherever my brain is Could I be a brain in a vat? If my brain were in a vat, would I be there?

5. Hamlet contemplating Yorick

6. Where Hamlet goes there goes Dennett?

7. Where Yorick goes there goes Dennett?

8. Where Fortinbras goes there goes Dennett?

9. Is it an illusion?

10. Are mental states brain states? Indiscernibility problems Spatial location of experiences Privileged access Qualia Necessity of identity problems Multiple realizability Physicalism, if true, is contingent

11. The Identity Theory: pre-history Rylean behaviorism Mental state talk is talk about behavioral dispositions Motivation: we�re in the business of analyzing ordinary language Problem Works for, e.g. believing, wanting, etc. But not for �feely� mental states

12. Missing Qualia

13. Reversed Qualia

14. Privileged Access

15. �Inner States� Behaviorism can�t account for psychological talk that seems to refer to �inner states.� An acceptance of inner processes does not entail dualism The thesis that consciousness is a process in the brain cannot be dismissed on logical grounds

16. Are mental states brain states? Mental state talk can�t be analyzed as brain state talk because The relation between mental states and brain states is contingent But there are other models�

17. His table is an old packing case

18. But there�s a difference� Most tables aren�t old packing cases and most old packing cases aren�t tables �Consciousness is a process in the brain� is a general or universal proposition applying to all states of consciousness

19. �Logical� and ontological independence Typically, we�re justified in arguing from the �logical� independence of two expressions to the ontological independence of the states of affairs to which they refer. Since when two characteristics invariably go together their linkage becomes embodied in a �rule of language� But there are exceptions�

20. A cloud is a mass of droplets Clouds are always masses of droplets But this hasn�t become a �rule of language� because We never make the observations necessary to verify the statement �this is a cloud,� and those necessary to verify the statement �This is a mass of tiny particles in suspension,� at one and the same time�

21. When are two sets of observations observations of the same event? We treat the two sets of observations as observations of the same event, in those cases where the technical scientific observations set�provide an immediate explanation of the observations made by the man in the street. In the case of the cloud we could in principle make the connection by moving toward or away from the cloud. The brain state/mental state case is different, so let�s try another analogy�

22. Lightening is a motion of electric charges

23. Mental states are brain states If this account is correct it should follow that in order to establish the identity of consciousness and certain processes in the brain, it would be necessary to show that the introspective observations reported by the subject can be accounted for in terms of processes that are known to have occurred in his brain.

24. But what about qualia?!!?! �Feely� mental states seem to have a character that the underlying brain states which account for them don�t have. E.g. the firing of C-fibers doesn�t feel like anything but Pain hurts! My mental imagery has a character that brain states don�t have.

25. The Phenomenological Fallacy The mistake of supposing that when the subject describes his experience�he is describing the literal properties of objects and events on a peculiar sort of internal cinema The phenomenological fallacy�depends on the mistaken assumption that because our ability to describe things in our environment depends on our consciousness of them, our ability to describe things in our environment our descriptions of things are primarily descriptions of our conscious experiences.

26. Seeing a green afterimage

27. Seeing a green afterimage:topic-neutral description

28. Does this solve the qualia problem? Not if zombies are naturally possible. If reversed spectra are naturally possible we have a dilemma If same mental state only if same brain state then multiple realizability is a problem If not then it seems we can have same brain state, same sincere reports, but different mental states Is that possible?

29. Spectrum Reversal

30. �You just forget you�re wearing them� These contacts don�t do anything to brain states presumably. Years later, having forgotten that I�m wearing them, all of my behavioral dispositions are �back to normal.� Does it make sense to say that even so I may still be seeing things differently from the way I used to?

31. Contingent Identity Every thing is necessarily identical to itself. But some true identity statements are contingent. How can that be? If a mental state in some sense �is� a brain states, is that the �is� of identity? Correlation in and of itself is not identity.

32. The Moral Science does not answer philosophical questions. Philosophy does not contradict science. When the scientific questions are answered, the conceptual (philosophical) questions begin.