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The Af-Pak Imbroglio: Implications for Stakeholders in a Complex Geopolitical Landscape

This comprehensive analysis, presented by Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari from Nanyang Technological University, explores the multifaceted issues surrounding Afghanistan and Pakistan. It delves into the roles of non-state actors, the complexities of insurgency, and the divergent strategies of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and US-NATO forces. The paper critiques ongoing counterinsurgency operations, and examines the evolving dynamics among key stakeholders, including regional players and the Taliban. It highlights the challenges of governance and the socio-political ramifications of prolonged conflict in the region.

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The Af-Pak Imbroglio: Implications for Stakeholders in a Complex Geopolitical Landscape

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  1. The Af-Pak Imbroglio: Implications for the Stakeholders Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

  2. Contents • Importance of Afghanistan & Pakistan • Non-State Actors in the Af-Pak Theatre • Insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan • Policies of Pakistan, Afghanistan and US-NATO • Conclusion

  3. Non-State Actors • The Two Taliban • Insurgency not monolithic, but united against a “common enemy” • Religion-driven with an ethnic undercurrent, but attempts by Taliban to downplay ethnic identity

  4. US COIN Operations • Insurgency on the rise – “un-winnable war”, “headed for failure”; • Operation “Moshtaraq” in Marjah, Helmand (Feb 2010) • Operation “Dragon Strike” in Kandahar (Sept 2010) • Lack of public support to COIN operations – 94% Kandaharis opposed military confrontation with the Taliban – April 2010 (Inter-Press Service) • Failure to deliver a “government-in-a-box”

  5. FATA & NWFP 2006 FATA & NWFP 2008

  6. Pakistan’s COIN Operations • Pakistan’s COIN Strategy: “Clear, hold, build and transfer” • Three Phases: • To encourage local population out of the area, clear the area and maintain long-term presence; • Rebuild and restore basic amenities/infrastructure • Encourage the IDPs to return back; strengthen local government; raise tribal Lashkars and safeguard the cleared area; • Undertake economic development

  7. Cont’d; • Terrorist infrastructure destroyed; training camps, means of finances and recruitment largely affected due to military operations; • Failure to contain conflict within the area of operation – Subsequently Taliban leadership remains evasive; • Internally displaced persons refuse to return back to their native areas for fear of Taliban return and retribution (SECOND PHASE); • Local governments remain weak and largely dependent on Pak Army to run day-to-day affairs; • Economic development still a pipe dream and recent floods tend to take the focus away from FATA to flood affected areas (THIRD PHASE);

  8. The Three Stakeholders • Main players – Afghanistan, Pakistan and US-NATO • Other important players: Iran, CARs, Russia, India, S.Arabia and UAE • Centrifugal forces at work; major disagreements between Afghanistan, Pakistan and US-NATO; • Afghanistan government largely failing • Corrupt and unable to provide even a semblance of governance • Losing legitimacy – the presidential and parliamentary elections • Karzai clan-dominated government , with strong commercial interests

  9. Cont’d • Major differences over the execution of war with US • Afghanistan emphasizes on CT instead of COIN – pursue the terrorist sanctuaries outside Afghanistan; • Domestic opposition from non-Pushtuns regarding peace overtures to the Taliban; • US-NATO in a Catch-22 situation; • International failure to stabilize Afghanistan • Reconstruction and rebuilding remains nominal on the ground despite spending around $40 billion (IRIN March 2010);

  10. Cont’d; • Total Cost of Afghan war from 2001-2010 is $336 billion (CRS-Sept 2010). The cost earmarked for war in 2010-11 is $65 billion • $27 billion spent on raising Afghan National Army (ANA) • Desertion/defection rate in ANA remains at roughly 23 percent and Afghan National Police at 17%; • US and NATO under domestic compulsions to initiate withdrawal of troops • Differences on CT and COIN

  11. US exasperation with Pakistan “ambivalence” over sanctuaries on the Af-Pak border; • Pakistan’s descent into political, economic and social turmoil continues; • Taliban-led violence in Pakistan spreading upto Karachi • Differences over approach to the Afghan solution – with whom to talk and whom to boycott?

  12. Cont’d: • Attempts to drive a wedge between various insurgents in Afghan theatre; • India as a factor, containment of China through not allowing establishment of railway and road structures

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