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Key Establishment Scheme against Storage-Bounded Adversaries in Wireless Sensor Networks

Key Establishment Scheme against Storage-Bounded Adversaries in Wireless Sensor Networks. Authors: Shi-Chun Tsai, Wen-Guey Tzeng, and Kun-Yi Zhou Source: IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, Vol.8, No.3, p.p.1218-1222, 2009. Presenter: Yung-Chih Lu ( 呂勇志 ) Date: 2010/02/24. Outline.

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Key Establishment Scheme against Storage-Bounded Adversaries in Wireless Sensor Networks

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  1. Key Establishment Scheme against Storage-Bounded Adversaries in Wireless Sensor Networks Authors: Shi-Chun Tsai, Wen-Guey Tzeng, and Kun-Yi Zhou Source: IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, Vol.8, No.3, p.p.1218-1222, 2009. Presenter: Yung-Chih Lu (呂勇志) Date: 2010/02/24

  2. Outline • Introduction • Proposed Scheme • Performance Evaluation • Security Analysis • Conclusion • Comment

  3. Introduction (1/3) • Goal • Key Establishment • Saving resource • Computation cost • Communication cost • Storage Overhead

  4. Introduction (2/3) • Assume • Storage-Bounded Adversary • Poor radio quality • Limited coverage area • Adversary’s storage is limited • Adversary cannot pucks up all radio communications.

  5. Introduction (3/3) • Wireless Sensor Network V:Sensor node β:Beacon node

  6. Proposed Scheme • Key Establishment with Beacon (KEB) • Step1: Beacon generates and broadcasts α random bits. • Ex: α =9 • Step2: Each sensorstores μ bits. • Ex:μ=6 • Step3: Each sensorexchanges indices. • Step4: Each sensorfinds common bits. • Step5: Each sensor computes common bits. • Ex: The common key is H(1110) Index:125678 101110 broadcast exchange Index:123456789 Random bits:100111101 Index:456789 111101

  7. Performance Evaluation • Probability of Establishing Shared Keys • Ex: • Sensors will have 4k common bits on average • Ex: (M. Meguerdichian, Cambridge University Press, 2005) k:the length of the shared keys S, T: a sensor node μ:the number of randomly stored bits of a sensor node α : the number of broadcasted random bits

  8. Security Analysis • Security of Shared Keys • Chernoff bound approximation • Ex: k=128, δ=2/3, ε=1/2 • = 1.125x10-7 • At least (1-2/3-1/4)512 ≈ 43 common bits are securely A:the stored bits by the adversary. B: the common stored bits by two neighboring sensor nodes α : the number of broadcasted random bits

  9. Conclusion • The proposed scheme don’t pre-load secrets to sensor nodes. • High connectivity ratio. • Resiliency against node capture. • Shared key can be updated.

  10. Comment • Key Establishment without Beacon Index:123456 Index:56 101110 01 Shared key is H(0110) exchange Index:123456 Index:12 111101 10

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