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Interdomain Routing and Games

Interdomain Routing and Games. Michael Schapira Joint work with Hagay Levin and Aviv Zohar. האוניברסיטה העברית בירושלים. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The Agenda. An introduction to interdomain routing (a networking approach).

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Interdomain Routing and Games

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  1. Interdomain Routing and Games Michael Schapira Joint work with Hagay Levin and Aviv Zohar האוניברסיטה העברית בירושלים The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

  2. The Agenda • An introduction to interdomain routing (a networking approach). • A Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) perspective (an economic approach). • Our Results: • A formulation of interdomain routing as a game. • Realistic settings in which BGP is immune to rational manipulations. • …

  3. An Introduction to Interdomain Routing (A Networking Approach)

  4. UUNET AT&T Comcast Qwest Interdomain Routing Establish routes between Autonomous Systems (ASes). Currently done only by the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP).

  5. UUNET AT&T Comcast Qwest Why is Interdomain Routing Hard? • Route choices are based on local policies. • Expressiveness: Policies are complex. • Autonomy: Policies are uncoordinated Always chooseshortest paths. Load-balance myoutgoing traffic. Avoid routes through AT&T ifat all possible. My link to UUNET is forbackup purposes only.

  6. Interdomain Routing • Routes to every destination AS are computed independently. • There is an AS graphG=<N,L>. • N consists of n source nodes 1,…,n and a destination node d. • L represents physical links between ASes.

  7. receive routes from neighbours send updatesto neighbours choose“best” neighbour Interdomain Routing • Every source-node i is defined by a valuation function vi that assigns a non-negative value to each (simple) route from i to d. • The computation performed by a single node is an infinite sequence of stages:

  8. Interdomain Routing • The route assignment reached by BGP forms a confluent routing tree rooted in d. • Routes are consistent (route choices depend on neighbours’ choices). • Routes are loop-free (nodes announce full routes). • The final route assignment is stable. • Every node prefers its assigned route over any other available route.

  9. Example of Stability Prefer routes through 1 2 1 1, my route is 2d Prefer routes through 2 2, I’m available 1, I’m available d

  10. Assumptions on the Network • The network is asynchronous. • Nodes can be activated in different timings. • Update messages can be arbitrarily delayed along selective links. • Network malfunctions are possible. • Link and node failures.

  11. BGP Pros: • Nodes need have no a-priori knowledge about the network topology or about other nodes. • The protocol is adaptive to changes in network topology (link and node failures). • …. Cons: • The lack of global coordination might result in persistent route oscillations (protocol divergence).

  12. Example of Instability: Oscillation 2, my route is 1d Prefer routes through 1 BGP might oscillateforever between 1d, 2d and 12d, 21d 2 1 Prefer routes through 2 1, my route is 2d 1, 2, I’m the destination d

  13. The Hardness of Stability • Theorem: Determining whether a ``stable solution’’ exists is NP-Hard. [Griffin-Wilfong] • Theorem: Determining whether a ``stable solution’’ exists requires exponential communication between the source-nodes. • Independent of the P-NP assumption. • Communication complexity is linear in the “size” of the local preferences of nodes.

  14. Guaranteeing Robust Convergence • Networking researchers seek constraints that guarantee BGP stability (for any timing, even in the presence of network malfunctions). [Balakrishnan, Feamster, Gao, Griffin, Jaggard, Johari, Ramachandran, Rexford, Shepherd, Sobrinho, Wilfong, …] • A realistic and well known set of such constraints are the Gao-Rexford constraints. • The Internet is formed by economic forces. • ASes sign long-term contracts that determine who provides connectivity to whom.

  15. Gao-Rexford Framework Neighboring pairs of ASes have one of: • a customer-provider relationship(One node is purchasing connectivity fromthe other node.) • a peering relationship(Nodes have offered to carry each other’stransit traffic, often to shortcut a longer route.) peer providers peer customers

  16. Dispute Wheels • If BGP oscillates, the valuation functions and the topology of the network induce a structure called a Dispute Wheel. [Griffin-Shepherd-Wilfong] • The absence of a Dispute Wheel ensures robust BGP convergence. • The Gao-Rexford constraints are a special case of “No Dispute Wheel”. [Gao-Griffin-Rexford]

  17. Dispute Wheels • A Dispute Wheel: • A sequence of nodes ui and routes Ri, Qi. • ui prefers RiQi+1 over Qi.

  18. 1 d 2 Example of a Dispute Wheel Prefer routes through 1 2 1 Prefer routes through 2 d

  19. A DAMD Perspective (An Economic Approach)

  20. Do Nodes Always Adhere to the Protocol? • BGP was designed to guarantee connectivity between trusted and obedient parties. • The commercial Internet: ASes are owned by economic and often competing entities. • Might deviate from BGP if it suits their interests.

  21. Two Research Agendas • Security research • Malicious nodes. • Cyptographic modifications of BGP (S-BGP) • Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design [Feigenbaum-Papadimitriou-Shenker] • Rational nodes. • Seeks realistic conditions for which BGP is incentive-compatible. [Feigenbaum-Papadimitriou-Sami-Shenker]

  22. Our Results

  23. Our Main Results • A novel game-theoretic model of interdomain routing. • A surprising connection between the two research agendas (security and DAMD). • Theorem: (bad news): BGP is not incentive-compatible even if No Dispute Wheel holds. • Theorem: (good news): Cryptographic modifications of BGP (e.g., S-BGP) are incentive-compatible if No Dispute Wheel holds (no monetary transfers).

  24. Interdomain RoutingGames

  25. A Static Game • The source-nodes are the strategic agents (their valuation functions define their types). • Each source-node chooses an outgoing edge. • Choices are simultaneous. • A node’s payoff is: • vi(R) if the route R from i to d is induced by the nodes’ choices. • 0 otherwise.

  26. A Static Game • A pure Nash equilibrium is a set of nodes’ choices from which no node wishes to unilaterally deviate. • Pure Nash equilibria = stable routing outcomes Prefer routes through 1 2 1 Prefer routes through 2 d

  27. The Convergence Game • The game consists of an infinite number of rounds. • A node that is activated in a certain round can perform the following actions: • Read update messages announcing routes. • Send update messages announcing routes. • Choose a neighbouring node to forward traffic to.

  28. The Convergence Game • There exists an adversarial entity called the scheduler that is in charge of: • Deciding which nodes are activated in each round. • Delaying update messages along selective links. • Removing links and nodes from the AS graph. • Informally, a node’s strategy is its choice of a routing protocol. • Executing BGP is a strategy.

  29. The Convergence Game • A route is said to be stable if from some round onwards every node on the route forwards traffic to the next-hop node on that route. • The payoff of node i from the game is: • vi(R) if there is a route R from i to d which is stable. • 0 otherwise.

  30. BGP and Incentives • A node is said to deviate from BGP (or to manipulate BGP) if it does not follow BGP. • What forms of manipulation are available to nodes? • Misreporting preferences. • Reporting inconsistent information. • Announcing nonexistent routes. • Denying routes. • …

  31. BGP and Incentives Two possible incentive-related requirements from BGP: • Incentive-compatibility: No unilateral deviation from BGP by an AS can strictly improve the routing outcome of that AS. • Collusion-proofness: No deviation from BGP by coalitions of ASes of any size can strictly improve the routing outcome of even a single AS in the coalition without strictly harming another [Feigenbaum-S-Shenker].

  32. About the Convergence Game • The game is complex. • Multi-round. • Asynchronous. • Partial-information • No monetary transfers! • Very rare in mechanism design. • Unlike most works on incentive-compatibility and interdomain routing • More realistic.

  33. Known Results Valuations are policy consistentiff, for all routes R1 and R2 R1 . . . . k i d . . . THEN vi((i,k)R1) > vi((i,k)R2) R2 IF vk(R1) > vk(R2) (analogous toisotonicity [Sob.03])

  34. Known results • Policy consistency is known to hold for interesting special cases: • Shortest-path routing. • Next-hop policies. • Theorem: If No Dispute Wheel andPolicy Consistency hold, then BGP is incentive-compatible, and even collusion-proof. [Feigenbaum-Ramachandran-S, Feigenbaum-S-Shenker]

  35. Known results • A Problem: Policy Consistency is unrealistic. • Too strong. • Can it be removed?

  36. Realistic Settings in which BGP is Incentive-Compatible and Collusion-Proof

  37. m1d m12d m1d m12d 1 1 m m 12d 1d 12d 1d d d 2 2 2md 2d 2md 2d with manipulation without manipulation Is BGP Incentive-Compatible? • Theorem: BGP is not incentive compatible even in Gao-Rexford settings.

  38. Can we fix this? • We define the following property: • Route verification means that an AS can verify that a route announced by a neighbouring AS is available. • Route verification can be achieved via security tools (S-BGP etc.). • Not an assumption on the nodes!

  39. Does this solve the problem? • Many forms of manipulation are still available: • Misreporting preferences over available routes. • Reporting inconsistent information. • Denying routes. • …

  40. Our Main Results • Theorem: If the “No Dispute Wheel” condition holds, then BGP with route verification is incentive-compatible. • Theorem: If the “No Dispute Wheel” condition holds, then BGP with strong route verification is collusion-proof.

  41. Dispute Wheels – A Reminder • A Dispute Wheel: • A sequence of nodes ui and routes Ri, Qi. • ui prefers RiQi+1 over Qi. The Gao-Rexford constraints are a special case of the “No Dispute Wheel” condition.

  42. BGP with Route Verification • Theorem: If the “No Dispute Wheel” condition holds, then BGP with route verification is incentive-compatible. • Proof(sketch): • By contradiction. • Assume that the “No Dispute Wheel” condition holds, and that BGP is not incentive-compatible. • We present sequences of nodes and routes that form a dispute wheel.

  43. s Ms Ts d Proof Sketch • Let s be the manipulator. • Let T be the routing tree reached if all nodes follow the protocol. • Let M be the the routing tree reached after s rationally manipulates BGP. • vs(Ms)>vs(Ts)

  44. M1 T1 Proof Sketch • There must exist a node i on Ms such that Mi≠Ti • Let 1 be the node closest to d on Ms with this property. • For each node i that is closer to d on Ms it holds that Mi=Ti. • This implies: v1(T1)>v1(M1) s Ms 1 Ts d

  45. Proof Sketch • Similarly, Let 2 be the node i closest to d on T1 such that Mi≠Ti. • This implies: v2(M2)>v2(T2) s Ms 1 Ts M1 d T1 T2 2 M2

  46. Tk k Mk Proof Sketch • We choose 3,4,5,… in asimilar manner. • Eventually some nodewill appear twice (assume that this nodeis s). • We have a dispute wheel! s Ms 1 Ts M1 d T1 T4 T2 M3 4 2 T3 M2 3

  47. Ls Proof Sketch • Why do we need route verification? • The manipulator can lie about its route. • For instance, k might believe that s’s route in M is Ls. • Still,vs(Ms)>vs(Ts) >vs(Ls) s Ms Mk k 1 Ts Tk M1 d T1 T4 T2 M3 4 2 T3 M2 3

  48. BGP with Route Verification • Theorem: If the “No Dispute Wheel” condition holds, then BGP with route verification is collusion-proof. • A Problem: Is route verification achievable even in the presence many manipulators?

  49. BGP is Socially Just • Corollary: If No Dispute Wheel holds, then BGP is Pareto optimal. • Pareto optimality means that BGP’s outcome is such that there is no other outcome that is: • Strictly preferred by one node. • Weakly preferred by all other nodes.

  50. What About Social-Welfare? • The total social welfare of a routing outcome is the sum of values nodes assign to their routes = ∑ivi(Pi). • No Dispute Wheel and Policy Consistency guarantee BGP convergence to a social-welfare maximizing solution. [Feigenbaum-Ramachandran-S]

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