Accountability around the budget: What is working? What isn’t and why?

1. Accountability around the budget:What is working? What isn’t and why? Geir Sundet, workshop on “The Political Economy and Accountability Structures of Tanzania,” Protea Courtyard Hotel, 14-15 September 2005.

2. Accountability and the budget • About the study • What the MPs thought of the budget process • What the landmark decisions tell us about patterns of accountability • Do budgets matter? • Some findings from a related study on accountability at the local level • What is working, what isn’t and why?

3. The Study • Objective of study was to find who’s accountable to whom, for what and how • Semi-structured interviews with 26 MPs • Analysis of budget performance • Analysis of five landmark decisions • Conclusions on dimensions of accountability: • Horizontal • Vertical: Electoral and societal • External

4. What the MPs thought about the budget process

5. Overall Assessment • 2/3 felt the Tanzanian budget process was weak or less than satisfactory • 3/4 felt there had been improvements over the last five years • Inadequate transparency over how and why decisions are made • Limited answerability as there are few opportunities for questioning decisions • There are mechanisms in place for controllability, but these are rarely used due to constraints of time, resources and capacities

6. Dimensions of Accountability I • Horizontal • Executive dominance (President, Key Ministers, Party) • Technocrats dominate policy making and implementation, while Party sets the boundaries of policy (Technocracy and Party aren’t necessarily mutually exclusive categories) • Existing institutional checks and balances not effective • Party dominates Parliamentary proceedings, while formal accountability processes through PAC and LAAC are stymied by lack of resources, timely information, time, capacities, as well as by little or no follow-up and enforcement

7. Dimensions of Accountability II • Vertical – electoral • The voters’ power very keenly felt by MPs • Double hurdle, first party selection, then elections • Party Manifesto mentioned by almost all as the document by which they are judged • MPs are by and large judged by whether they’re “bringing the goods home” • Largely individualistic: “voters first look at the candidate, only second at the party…”

8. Dimensions of Accountability III • Vertical – societal • Media seen as important, but mostly as a (negative or positive) campaign tool, rather than as a check against poor performance • Religious institutions seen as influential at the local level. Also regarded as useful source of goodies (schools, dispensaries…) • Trade unions not seen as important (except Teacher’s Union) • NGOs seen locally mostly as a useful source of projects. Some of the national NGOs regarded as influential • Development trusts, traditional institutions not seen as important

9. Dimensions of Accountability IV • External • Most MPs feel donors are “too influential” • Many distinguish between World Bank/IMF and the others • Donor financed projects in constituencies unanimously seen as a good thing • Many MPs also see donors as a necessary check on the Government

10. Summary of what the MPs thought • Strong Executive dominance undermine horizontal accountability • Party exerts strong control, discourages criticism and dissent • Politics very personalised • Electoral accountability important, while societal accountability still relatively weak • Politics is largely about bringing home the goods

11. The Landmark cases • The abolition of school fees • The abolition of the development levy • The (re)introduction of agricultural subsidies • Decentralisation • Budget allocations under the PRSP

12. Abolition of school fees • Decision made by Executive, with no consultation in Parliament and little discussion evident at cabinet level • World Bank support seen to be crucial • Civil society lobbying might have had some impact • Universally popular decision

13. Abolition of development levy • First and foremost politically motivated, decision seems to have come from the Party • PO-RALG was not consulted • Also a popular decision (with the exception of LG officials who lost revenue) • Donors broadly in support, but their influence seem to have little if any bearing on the decision

14. Agricultural subsidies • The Executive launched this decision, with no consultation with Parliament • Ministry of Agriculture pressed hard for this • Party may have played a role • Donors generally not in favour • Pressure continue for expansion of subsides - this may be one to watch…

15. Decentralisation • The Executive and Party initiators of the reform – first appeared as policy objective in CCM’s 1995 manifesto • At that time it was against the advise of the World Bank • Strong vested interests have interfered with the progress of the reform • Many MPs critical of what they see as backtracking • Control of resources at stake, donors seem to have limited influence

16. PRSP and the budget • The PRSP started as a donor driven process – HIPC conditionality • However, PRS has had no discernable impact on budget, on the contrary, the relative allocation to priority sectors has gone down • NSGRP more home-grown, also reflected in incorporation of ‘economic growth’ • However, little consultation with Parliament • MKUKUTA does not figure at constituency level • Little evidence of donor influence after first PRS

17. Who decides what? • Executive dominates, and the Ruling Party emerges as having most weight in big political decisions, while technocracy controls the nitty-gritty of policy making (PRSP, MKUKUTA, etc.) • MPs can command influence through Party, but the formal structures of Parliament has no major role in decision making • Donors influence seems to be more limited than what the MPs believe. • National consultative process is to a large degree playing for the galleries. Most major decisions are taking behind closed doors and leave no paper trail.

18. Do budgets matter? • Why budgets are important: • Set framework for use of public resources • Focus for stakeholder participation • Something to hold authorities accountable against • Factors that suggest they are over-rated: • Budgets are very easy to revise after initial approval • Budgets tend to be highly aggregated, leaving a large room for discretion • Budgetary discipline is lax and there is little or no enforcement of audits

19. Some recent findings on accountability in Local Government • Regulations on financial transparency (public postings, etc.) largely followed • Negligible impact on public oversight (the posted information not useable) • Very limited understanding of budgets • No feeling of entitlement • No workable mechanisms for accountability from below outside of elections

20. Concluding Thoughts

21. What Is Working • There are well defined structures and procedures in place • PER process opened up the budgetary process to a wider group of stakeholders (although Parliament’s not included) • Parliamentary capacities, through the Standing Committees, continue to improve

22. What Isn’t • Decision making very opaque • Budgetary oversight still extremely weak • Little or no enforcement of audits • Societal accountability remains weak, though slowly improving

23. And Why? • Executive dominance with weak checks and balances • Committee work still hampered by lack of information, resources and time • Dominant Party always capable of by-passing formal processes • Politics dominated by personalities, not issues, and focus on “bringing home the goods” – patrimonial tendencies with limited understanding of entitlement • Limited capacity and space for public to question budgets and implementation