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AD HOMINEM I. Ad hominem = df. Attacking a person rather than his or her argument, view, or position on an issue.
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AD HOMINEM I • Ad hominem = df. Attacking a person rather than his or her argument, view, or position on an issue. • ‘Ad hominem’ is Latin for ‘to the man,’ and the idea in this kind of fallacy is that criticisms are directed towards the person rather than to the person’s thoughts about or arguments for a particular view. • Ad hominem reasoning is fallacious since,logically, the faults of the person are one thing and the defects in what he or she says are quite another. • The faults of the individual don’t automatically attach themselves to what he or she says.
AD HOMINEM II • Joe may be a right wing radical who is anti-government and against gun control, and I might disagree with such attitudes, but that in itselfwill not prove that his reasoning on a particular political issue is automatically wrong. • Jane may be a liberal feminist who is pro-choice in abortion, and I might think that such views are wrong, but that alone will not show that whatever she says about social issues are either right or wrong simply in virtue of her holding these opinions. • Rather, her argument for or against a certain social issue must be assessed on its own merits, and so independently of her personal beliefs. • Thus arguments have to be assessed on their own as arguments, and so independently of our attitudes towards the person by whom the argument is given.
PERSONAL ATTACK AD HOMINEMS I • Disliking either a person or something negative about him, and finding critically acceptable reasons to reject a claim that he makes are two different things. • We commit the error or fallacy of reasoning called ‘ad hominem’ when we reject a person’s claim merely because we dislike the person or something about the person. • This version of ad hominem is called personal attack. • Because we simply reject a claim made by a person or group because we dislike the person or group, personal attack ad hominem pseudoreasoning is much more emotional or psychological than it is rational or logical.
PERSONAL ATTACK AD HOMINEMS II • If we think that a person’s negative characteristics are relevant to rejecting a claim she makes, then it may be plausible to reject the claim. • However, we must be able to explain the relation of those characteristics to the claim being made so that rejecting the claim for this reason can be made plausible. • For instance, if we know that a person x is a hater of another class of people y, then any negative claim about y made by x may be reasonably regarded as being suspicious and likely to be false. • Thus, further information may be needed to assess the claim accurately.
CIRCUMSTANTIAL AD HOMINEMS • Circumstantial ad hominem =df. A fallacy in which a person’s claim is rejected based upon the circumstances of the person making the claim. • In circumstantial ad hominem the attack is not on the person, but her circumstances, and it is inferred that a claim made by the person is false because someone in her position or circumstances would make such a claim. • For instance, thinking that a tax cut proposed by a wealthy congressman cannot be good for the average person because of his position of wealth is a circumstantial ad hominem. • Rejecting Bill’s arguments against the death penalty because he is sitting on death row is also circumstantial ad hominem. • Personal attack and circumstantial ad hominems overlap, and trying to distinguish between them in particular instances can be pointless. • The main thing to recognize is that, if it is an ad hominem, then it is fallacious.
PSEUDOREFUTATION I. • Psedorefutation =df. A type of as hominem based on charges of inconsistency where no relevant inconsistency exists. • Relevant inconsistencies are inconsistencies between claims. • if Jane says that it is both snowing and not snowing at the same time in the same place, then we can reject her claim as logically inconsistent. • But if there are no inconsistencies between claims then the fact that a person may not act (or may not always have acted) as if the claim is true does not allow us to infer that the claim is false or even that the person thinks it is. • For instance, we cannot reject Jane’s claim to love Jim simply by noting that she has never acted as if she loved Jim. • And we can’t then infer that she herself believes her claim about her love for Jim to be false. Either would be pseudorefutation. • We must also recognize that a person can change his mind. • Thus, a person does not contradict herself by now agreeing with the morality of euthanasia when she earlier rejected it. • To say that this is contradictory is pseudorefutation.
PSEUDOREFUTATION II. • A child might be punished by her parents for cheating on a test because she is told by them that “cheating is morally reprehensible.” • For the child later to reject the claim that cheating is immoral because she finds out that her parents cheat on their taxes would be an example of pseudorefutation. • She has not used reasoning to reject the view, but has thought that “if it’s okay for you it’s okay for me.” • She could rightly accuse her parents of being hypocritical, but their behavior is not itself a reason for finding cheating acceptable. • The child might cheat again and then, after being caught, attempt to justify her actions by saying “you do it too!” • This brand of pseudorefutation is called tu quoque or “you too” pseudoreasoning.
“POSITIVE”AD HOMINEM I. • To this point we have looked at ad hominem arguments in relations to something negativeabout a person, and have seen that, in abusive or personal attack ad hominem,a person’s claim is rejectedmerely because we dislike the person or something about the person. • However, it is also fallacious to accept an argument merely we like the person or something about the person. • This form of pseudoreasoning does not have a name in the literature, but it is an ad hominem because a person’s claim is accepted, not on the basis of critically acceptable arguments, but because of an agreeable characteristic(s) which the person has. • Accordingly, it is once again emotional or psychological rather than rational or logical.
“POSITIVE” AD HOMINEM II. • However, as before with negative characteristics, if we think that a positive characteristic(s) of a person is relevant to accepting a claim she makes, then it may be plausible to accept the claim. • However, we must be able to explain the relation of those characteristics to the claim being made so that accepting the claim for this reason can be made plausible. • For instance, if we know that Jane is a lover of classical music, and her love has made her listen carefully and extensively to such music, then a claim which she makes about the worth of a particular classical composition might be accepted hypothetically as likely to be true, at the same time that further information may be needed to assess the claim accurately.
POISONING THE WELL I • Poisoning the well =df. Attempting to discredit in advance what a person might claim by relating unfavorable information about the person. • This is a kind of pseudoreasoning which “can be thought of as an ad hominem in advance.” • For instance, A says: “B’s loyalty is to her political party and therefore anything she says about a particular issue will simply reflect the party line.” • The idea is that B’s thinking about an issue then need not be considered on its own, and so A has poisoned the well of discourse.
POISONING THE WELL II • When A poisons your mind about B by relating unfavorable information about B, you may be inclined to reject what B says to you. • Psychological studies show that even a statement such as “It is not true that Professor x grades unfairly” may bias our thinking about someone in advance. • However, a critical thinker must be extra careful not to reject what a person says just because we have an unfavorable impression of the individual.
GENETIC FALLACY I • Genetic fallacy =df. Rejecting a claim, policy, or position on an issue simply because of its source, associations, or history. • For instance, a member of political party x commits the genetic fallacy when he rejects an idea simply because it came from a member of a different party y. • Ad hominem pseudoreasoning is a kind of genetic fallacy since here we are rejecting a claim or something due to a person based on where it comes from, namely, that person. • For instance, to reject the music of Richard Strauss, to say that it cannot be good, simply because it is said that Strauss was sympathetic to the Nazis is to commit the genetic fallacy.
GENETIC FALLACY II • When we reject a claim, policy, or position just because of its source, associations, or history, we commit the genetic fallacy. • However, we also commit a genetic fallacy if we accept a claim, policy, or position only on the basis of its source, associations, or history.
BURDEN OF PROOF I • (Inappropriate) burden of proof =df. The burden of proving an issue is placed on the wrong side of an issue, or is placed too heavily on one side rather than another. • When person x makes a claim that a certain thing t is true, and another person y disagrees and thinks that that thing is false, one side or the other has the burden of proof: Does x have the burden of proving that t is true, or does y have the burden of proving that t is false? • It depends on the nature of the claim. • It is legitimate to talk of burden of proof concerning claims. • Burden of proof names a fallacy or a kind of pseudoreasoning only when the burden of proof is placed on the wrong or too heavily on one side: when x should have the burden of proof, but the burden of proof is placed on y, or the other way around.
BURDEN OF PROOF II • Initial plausibility. The general rule that most often governs the placement of burden of proof is: The less the initial plausibility a claim has, the greater the burden of proof on the one making the claim. • For instance, if I assert that there is a rhinoceros in the room with us, and there is no evidence of that, then I have the burden of proving that it is in the room. • This is because any claim which conflicts with your own direct observations is open to serious doubt. • Accordingly, the burden of proving that a rhino is not in the room would be inappropriately placed on you. • To say: “Prove that it is not in the room” would be the fallacy of (inappropriate) burden of proof.
BURDEN OF PROOF III • Affirmative/negative. Other things being equal, the burden of proof falls automatically on those supporting the affirmative side of an issue rather than on those supporting the negative side. • The basic idea is that reasons should be given for why something is the case rather than for why something isn’t the case. • For instance, a person who maintains that global warming is due to industrial pollution has the burden of proving that that is the cause and not something else. • The affirmative/negative rule also applies to existence versus nonexistence, so that a scientist who maintains that life exists elsewhere in the universe has the burden of proving that it does.
BURDEN OF PROOF IV • In general, the affirmative side gets the burden of proof because it tends to be much more difficult – or at least much more inconvenient [and perhaps impossible in some cases] – to prove the negative side of an issue. • It may be possible to prove the negative claim that there is no perceptible rhino in the room, but not that there is no imperceptible rhino in the room. • Still, there is no reason which favors such an assertion, and so it should be rejected. • Saying “No one has proved that there are no invisible rhinos, therefore it is perfectly acceptable to believe in them” is an appeal to ignorance. • An appeal to ignorance =df. Saying that absence of evidence against a claim counts as evidence for that claim.
BURDEN OF PROOF V • Special circumstances. Sometimes getting at the truth is not the only thing we want to accomplish, and on such occasions we may purposely place the burden of proof on a particular side. • For instance, in our system of justice a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and the burden of proving that an accused is guilty rests with the prosecution. • Also, it is reasonable to place a higher burden of proof on someone who advocates a policy that could be dangerous or costly if he or she is mistaken. • For instance, one would place a high burden of proof on someone who recommends a risky health procedure or substantial financial investment.
STRAW MAN • Straw man =df. Ignoring an opponent’s actual position, and presenting a distorted, oversimplified, or misrepresented version of that position in place of that position. • For instance, saying that “John’s view about abortion is simply that no one has a right to tell a woman what to do with her body” is straw man rhetoric if John’s position about the abortion issue and the rights of the mother versus the rights of the child is considerably more sophisticated than this.
FALSE DILEMMA I • False dilemma =df. Limiting consideration to only two alternatives when in fact there are others that deserve consideration. • Thus, to think that x or y are the only options, when in fact there is at least one other option z is to commit the fallacy of false dilemma. • For instance, saying that either we replace the school cafeteria with fast food franchises or students will not each lunch on campus. • However, another alternative which could be considered would be to improve the food at the cafeteria.
FALSE DILEMMA II • False dilemma also occurs when we think that, of two alternatives x and y, one must be true and the other false when both x and y could be false. • If this is the case, then to say that, because y is false, x must be true, is to commit the fallacy of false dilemma. • For instance, saying that “Either party x is going to have to get control of Congress in the next election or we are going to have war” is a false dilemma in that it might both be false that party x gets control of Congress and false that we have war.
FALSE DILEMMA III • Recall that placing a distorted, oversimplified, or misrepresented version of a person’s position is called “straw man” because the position of the real man is replaced with a position which he or she does not hold – hence the position is as false as a straw man is unreal. • False dilemma pseudoreasoning can involve straw man pseudoreasoning. • A person who attempts to get someone to accept position x may present an alternative position y in such a way that y is distorted, oversimplified, or misrepresented. • For instance, a candidate who is trying to get you to vote for her may so misrepresent her opponent’s position in an effort to get you to vote for her, that the position described is that of a straw man.
FALSE DILEMMA IV • A false dilemma is opposed to a true dilemma, one in which only two alternatives truly present themselves, as when a physician tells a patient “Either you have surgery or you will die.” • False dilemma pseudoreasoning only occurs when reasonable alternatives are ignored. • Before you accept x because some alternative y is false, make certain that x and y cannot both be false; look for some third reasonable alternative, some way of rejecting y without having to accept x. • The either x or y alternative characteristic of false dilemma can also be stated as “if not x, then y.”
THE PERFECTIONIST FALLACY • The perfectionist fallacy says “either x is perfect or it must be rejected.” • Saying that no piece of legislation should ever be passed which will not deal exactly with every problem which it is designed to concern is an example of the perfectionist fallacy. • The perfectionist fallacy is a version of false dilemma.
THE LINE-DRAWING FALLACY • The line-drawing fallacy =df. Insisting that a line must be drawn at some precise point when in fact it is not necessary that such a line be drawn. • For instance, if we cannot tell exactly how many grains of sand it takes to have a heap, then we can never say that a number of such grains is or is not a heap. • But clearly some things are heaps and some are not, and this is true even if we can’t specify exactly where to draw the line between a heap and a number of grains which are not a heap. • We can treat the line-drawing fallacy as yet another version of false dilemma. • The claim is “either there is a precise place where we draw the line, or else there is no line to be drawn.” • But there can be a third alternative, namely, that while the line can’t be drawn in a precise place, still it can be drawn. • We can make distinctions even in a “fuzzy” world.
SLIPPERY SLOPE I • Slippery slope =df. Thinking that some thing x must lead to some other thing y when there is no logical necessity in y’s following from x, nor is there any argument given for the necessity. • Saying that euthanasia should not be legalized since, if it were, it would inevitably lead to abuses where people would be euthanized who did not really want it, is an example of slippery slope pseudoreasoning. • The fallacy of slippery slope occurs when there is no reason to think that x will lead to y and yet it is maintained that xwill lead to y.
SLIPPERY SLOPE II • A second version of slippery slope occurs when someone claims we must continue a certain course of action because we have already begun that course. • For instance, maintaining that we must continue the program of military build-up because it has already begun, and so certain industries are counting on it financially, is slippery slope pseudoreasoning if it can’t be shown that there are other more substantial reasons for continuing the build-up other than those which are simply related to the fact that it has already begun. • Any force that slippery slope pseudoreasoning has is psychological rather than logical. • A thought of y mayfollow from a thought of x even though y does not have to follow x in fact.
BEGGING THE QUESTION I • Begging the question =df. Assuming to be true what you are trying to prove. • Obviously, if you assume something in an argument for it then you have not proved it. • For example, if you were to attempt to argue for realism (the view that objects in the external world, such as tables, exist apart from perception) by saying that, if realism were false, you would not then see your table when you enter your kitchen, you would be guilty of begging the question. • The issue is whether or not objects exist unperceived, but that is already assumed in the premise that, apart from realism, you would not perceive your table on entering your kitchen. • Therefore the conclusion that realism is true repeats the truth of realism assumed in the premise.
BEGGING THE QUESTION II • Begging the question is also known as reasoning in a circle because one returns to a premise in the reasoning in which the thing to be proved is assumed. • In the preceding example, the thing to be proved is that objects exist unperceived, but that they do so exist is itself returned to (or assumed) in the premise that you would not perceive what you do perceive unless objects like tables exist unperceived. • But if it is legitimate to question the conclusion, as it is here, then it is legitimate too to question the premise which the conclusion repeats, which is why a question begging argument is not proof, but is a form of pseudoreasoning.
BEGGING THE QUESTION III • Persuasive definitions can beg questions. • Defining capital punishment as “state-sanctioned murder” assumes the immorality of the death penalty in that definition. • However, the definition, and its implicit view that capital punishment is immoral, need not be accepted. • The real problem in cases of question begging is a misunderstanding of what premises (and definitions) it is reasonable for one’s audience to accept. • We are guilty of begging the question when we ask our audience to accept premises that are as controversial as the conclusion we’re arguing for and are controversial on the same grounds.
COMMON GROUND • If you ever to hope for any measure of success in trying to convince someone of a claim, you should always try to argue for it based on whatever common ground you can find between the two of you. • The attempt to find common ground from which to start is what underlies the entire enterprise of rational debate. • For instance, two thinkers cannot debate the existence of God if no definition of ‘God’ can be agreed upon by them. • Even though the theist and the atheist would support different positions on the question of theism, their common ground would be agreeing on what the term ‘God’ means. • If no agreement could be found here, then the rational debate could not take place.
