What will I be asked?

1. What will I be asked? • Causes of the October Revolution  • Situation surrounding October Rev • Immediate period after October Rev

2. Brief Timeline (July-November)

3. What do historians say? Soviet View: The October revolution was a natural scientific process during which, power was taken by the masses. Liberal View: October Rev was a coup de’tat achieved by a small group who took advantage of the situation in Russia at that time. Post-Glasnost (e.g. Pipes): October was an argument brought on by Lenin’s manipulation of events. Contemporary View: The Revolution happened too early and that attempts to create a socialist state disregarded Marxist teachings. Synthesis View (e.g. Figes): Figes argues that the Bolsheviks were not highly organised or disciplined during the Oct Rev. but they had the support of a more radical working class who wanted stability.

4. Lenin’s role • Lenin’s April Thesis (Pravda, 1917) exemplified his ability to manipulate Marxist theory to fit his own agenda and to apply it to Russia’s situation. • Figes suggests that Lenin “had the knack of finding easy slogans, which he crammed into the heads of his listeners by endless repetition.” • Most important example: ‘Peace, Bread, Land’ which attracted support from peasants, soldiers and industrial workers because it promised the three things they most wanted.

5. Lenin’s role • Phillips argues that the thesis also acted as effective propaganda because it offered alternatives to the unpopular Provisional Government. • However, the thesis did meet with opposition; even from within the Bolshevik party. Evidence that the party was not entirely united. • Oxley highlights that many party members resented Lenin’s ‘interference’ so soon after his 11 years absence. Lenin was calling for an immediate proletarian revolution and promoted the idea of national defeatism (people would gain more from their nation’s defeat) which was seen as a departure from key aspects of Marxism.

6. Lenin’s role • Service argues that many Bolsheviks viewed the thesis as a statement of principle, rather than a precise party action plan, perhaps partially due to Lenin’s pragmatic omission of a precise time and place for when the revolution might take place. • Trotsky placed large importance upon the role of Lenin in bringing about the October Revolution. He even said that without Lenin the revolution would never have taken place. Figesdisagrees but does acknowledge the influence of Lenin’s slogans and logic.

7. Lenin’s role • Figesalso credits Lenin’s pragmatism in his adaptions to his thesis e.g. delaying the call to destroy the PG. This calmed fears of civil war and helped Lenin win a majority over Kamenev. • Lenin did win support of both Pravda and the Vygborg Committee by using his political skills, however, Figesargues that his authority was not strong enough to guarantee victory in a factionalised & divided party. • Soviet & Liberal Historians agree Lenin played an important role in the Oct Rev but their interpretations of his role are different.

8. Lenin’s role • Soviets: Traditionally respect Lenin and view him as a great leader and talented strategist who directly represented the desires of the Russian people. • Liberals: Provide an unfavourable picture of Lenin’s role. Shapiro views Lenin as nothing more than a scheming opportunist. This is supported by Oxley who proposes that Lenin used slogans to hijack the revolutionary fervour of the radicalised soldiers, workers and peasants & then manipulated them to comply with his own agenda. • Phillips believes that Lenin was not willing to wait for the inevitable process of revolution as outlined by Marx; he thought Russia needed immediate solutions and that he was the one to provide them. Arguable that this impatience was increased by the PG’s situation.

9. Trotsky • Lenin seems to all the attention and so Trotsky’s role is often – to an extent – overlooked by historians. • It is important to note that although Lenin was looked up to as the great leader of the Bolsheviks he did in fact spend much of the time after the July Days in hiding in Finland. • Trotsky, on the other hand, remained an active public figure. Indeed, leading Menshevik Sukhanov highlighted Trotsky’s influence, “every worker and every soldier in Petrograd knew and listened to him”. • Lynch describe Lenin as the “architect” of the revolution, but Trotsky as the “master builder”; an analogy supported by Trotsky’s active role in the October revolution.

10. Provisional Government • Arguably weak from the beginning. Oxley describes the PG as a discordant and unstable group. • Wade highlights the early divisions within the government • Corin & Feihndiscuss the importance of these divisions between moderates and radicals. • Phillips discusses the questionable legitimacy of the PG as it had not been elected; made up instead of former Duma members. This resulted in unfavourable comparisons with the democratically elected Petrograd Sovietand control & communication with the military.

11. Provisional Government • Lynch believes that this lack of military support was disastrous particularly as the government seemed incapable of making decisions regarding social and economic policy. • This situation was worsened by the Soviet’s Order No.1 which confirmed the Soviet’s control over the army. • Lynch points out that history traditionally shows that a government without military control is essentially a government without real power.

12. Provisional Government • HOWEVER, Oxley suggests that the PG experienced a brief period of popularity following the Feb Rev and even implemented some progressive reforms BUT their persistent failure to address the key issues of the time (peace, bread and land) resulted in a swift decline in support. • As pointed out by Darby the PG was only meant to be temporary until a Constituent Assembly was elected. Kerensky’s decision to postpone the elections until November allowed the Bolsheviks the time they needed to fully organise their bid to take power.

13. Provisional Government & WWI • The war effort did not improve under the PG. • Russia could not compete with the technological superiority of Germany. Nove discusses the uneven industrialisation across Russia left Russia weak in terms of engineering, munitions and transport. • Morale low and valuable resources wasted e.g. disastrous losses early in the war such as Tannenberg, 1914. • Even though the war effort was improving by 1917 (as discussed by Oxley), the hardships of war were still very real and so these improvements were not obvious to the Russian people.

14. Provisional Government & WWI • Initially, the PG avoiding making a definite stance on the war due to the conflicting pressures from all sides. • In ‘Appeal to all the Peoples of the World’ (14th March) the Petrograd Soviet called for a just and democratic peace – but many Soviets were actually willing to continue with a defensive war strategy. Remember; Lenin’s April Thesis called for an immediate end to the war – echoing the desires of peasants, soldiers and workers. • However, the PG was under immense pressure from their allies to remain in the war; particularly as Russia was dependent upon foreign war loans and would potentially make large territorial gains from the secret treaties of 1915. • Lynch argues that the government had no choice but to stay in the war in order to survive the threat of Germany and to remain in the allies favour, yet, in doing so they provoked internal anger and hastened its downfall.

15. Provisional Government & WWI • Kerensky’s attempts to turn the war into a revolutionary crusade were failures. • Figes argues that this was partially because of the divides between the right and left. • Oxley points out that rather than bringing about unity and increasing morale, Kerensky’s efforts merely led to mutiny, desertion and less support for the government.

16. Discontent • The PG inherited peasants who were still unhappy with the problems created by the 1861 Emancipation Act (for brief details see Corin & Fiehn p6) and the high redemption payments that followed. • Lynch highlights a lack of fertile land. • Corin & Fiehnhighlight the divisions caused in society by Russification. • After the downfall of Nicholas II, peasants had expected positive changes however, when their problems weren’t solved the peasants became restless and resented the new government. Oxley argues that this frustration led to land seizures in the summer of 1917.

17. Discontent • It is suggested that the government had good reason for failing to deal with the peasants’ complaints. Darby argues that the issue of war and land were inextricably linked. As a large number of rank and file army were peasants, the government was concerned that fulfilling the land question would result in large numbers of deserters – in order to claim their own land at home. • The government obviously could not take this risk and officially opposed land seizures. • But, as Figes points out, many Liberals (e.g. Lvov) were sympathetic to the peasants cause.

18. Discontent • The government’s inability to deal effectively is exemplified by the Volost Committees which were initially set up to deal with the problem of land seizures. • However, Figes argues that in reality they politicised, organised and to an extent even radicalised the peasantry.

19. July Days • Corin & Fiehnnote that the July Days represented the growing frustrations of the soldiers and peasantry at the failures of the PG. • Figes believes there was little Bolshevik leadership in the July Days. More balance is provided by Williams who argues that even though Bolshevik leadership was absent, lower ranking party members were instrumental in stirring up discontent. • Regardless of their supposed involvement, this gave the PG the opportunity to discredit the Bolsheviks. • It can be argued that only the weaknesses of the PG enabled the Bolsheviks to survive.

20. Kornilov Affair • Kornilov appointed by Kerensky as Supreme Commander of the army in an attempt to stabilise the troops. However, Kornilov soon emerged as a representation of right wing conservative groups such as industrialist, officers and landowners who hoped he could overthrow the revolutionaries. • When Kornilov and his troops attempted to march on the capital, Kerensky denounced him and – in a panic – turned to the Bolsheviks for help.

21. Kornilov Affair • Historians disagree about the motives of Kornilov’s march. • Figes: He was trying to save the government • Lynch: Kornilov set out to crush internal opposition • Pipes: It was all engineered by Kerensky to discredit Kornilov and gain support from the left. The outcome? • Kornilov lost all credibility and the Menshivik Party suffered similarly as a result of their association with him. • The Bolsheviks emerged as the saviours as the city and of the revolution. • Despite the decline in govt. support after the Kornilov affair, Read argues that Bolshevik support was already increasing and so the Kornilov affair hastened the downfall of the PG.

22. Long term factors • You ought to make reference to long term factors throughout your essay but do not spend too much time on them. Prioritise!!

23. SOURCE A from Russia and History’s Turning Point, the memoirs of Alexander Kerensky (1965) The Winter Palace was cut off, and even telephone contact was broken. After a long meeting that had lasted into the early hours of the morning, most of the members of the government had gone home to get some rest. Left alone together, Konovalov and I walked over to the district military staff, which was a stone’s throw away on the Palace Square. Another minister, Kishkin, one of Moscow’s most popular Liberals, accompanied us. After a brief discussion it was decided that I should drive out at once to meet the troops. We were all quite sure that the paralysis of will that had seized democratic Petrograd would pass as soon as it was recognised that Lenin’s plot was by no means a “misunderstanding”, but a perfidious blow that left Russia entirely at the mercy of the Germans. How Useful is Source A for understanding events surrounding the October Revolution? (12)

24. SOURCE B from Patriarch Tikhon’s address to the Council of People’s Commissars 26th October 1918 . . . everyone is living in constant fear of searches, robbery, eviction, arrest and shooting. Hundreds of innocent people are being seized, left to rot in prison for months, and often executed without even a nominal trial. These unhappy people, taken as “hostages”, are being killed in revenge for crimes committed by others who not only do not share their views, but are often your own supporters or hold views close to yours . . . At your incitement, lands, estates, factories, mills, homes and cattle are being taken away, and money possessions, furniture and clothes are being stolen. . . . you cannot but admit that by ruining such a large number of citizens you are destroying the country’s wealth and ruining the country itself . . . You promised freedom . . . How fully does Source B explain the immediate political and social consequences of the October Revolution? (12)

25. Essay Questions… • To what extent was it military defeat rather than the actions of the Bolsheviks that brought about the downfall of the Provisional Government? • To what extent was October a “proletarian revolution” rather than a “coup d’état”? • ‘Peace, bread, land’. Is this an adequate explanation of the October Revolution? • To what extent was growing support for the Bolsheviks the main cause of the October Revolution?