24th ECPR PhD Summer School on ‘ Political Parties in New Democracies ’ September 7-13, 2014

1. THE SOCIAL GROUND FOR PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION: EVIDENCE FROM RUSSIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS (2003-2011) Elena V. Sirotkina, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia. e-mail: sirotkina.elena@gmail.com 24th ECPR PhD Summer School on ‘Political Parties in New Democracies’ September 7-13, 2014

2. Research Problem • How can we measure party system institutionalization (in non-democratic states)? • Does limitation of competition promotes voters’ loyalty to the continuous parties? • Is stability/volatility of voting preferences in Russia rooted in the social cleavages (other stable determinants)? Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014

3. The literature Institutionalisation • What to measure? • Four dimensions (Huntington 1968) • Value dimension (Alexis de Tocqueville 1969), value infusion (Levitsky 1998; Selznick 1957) • The mentioned dimensions might not exist simultaneously at one system (Ben-Dor 1975) • Party institutionalisation is more about a party’s reification in the public mind (Janda 1970) • Institutionalization and democratic consolidation emerge with the stability in rules for party competition (Mainwaring and Scully 1995) • ‘Systemness’, ‘value infusion’, ‘decisional autonomy’ and ‘reification’ (Randall & Sväsand 2002) Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014

4. Why stability (volatility) of electoral support? • a minimum satisfactory criterionfor judging the level of a party system institutionalization (within non-democracy) • shows the level of voters’ persisting commitment to parties (voters’ status quo ) • catches the logic of parties inan non-democracy - implicitly takes into account other dimensions Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014

5. What is specific about non-democratic states?The Russian case Restrictions for participation • 5-7% threshold • 200.000 signatures to collect or electoral deposit to pay • Obligatory regional party branches in the majority of the regions • Only parties not party associations or party blocs are to participate • Not free and fair elections (reporting of falsifications, electoral authoritarian practices) The evolution of the competitors list (the ballot) • No ‘NOTA’ (against all) column Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014

6. The Russian case The evolution of the competitors list (ballot) Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014

7. Hypotheses • H1: Limited competition in non-democratic Russia promotes stable support for the continuous parties • H2: Voting stability/volatility is determined by stable regional characteristics (voting cleavages) Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014

8. Methods. Party system institutionalization measurement Two-step party system institutionalisation measurement: • national-level stability: Average(Corr(p1(2003); p1(2007)); (Corr(p1(2007); p1(2011)); (Corr (p1(2003); p1(2011))….p4 2) regional-level stability (Average supportchanging): Sum ( mod(p1(2007) – p1(2003)); (p1(2011) – p1(2007))/av.p1* Different from Volatility-Pedersen’s Index: takes into account the average result of a party in a region * for every region Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014

9. Methods. ‘Social ground’ explanation Multiple linear regression (OLS) • Dependent: Changing of the average support • Independent: • 1) Urban/rural population, • 2) Religion (Orthodoxy, Atheism, Islam) • 3) Personal wealth (Average per capita income (per month) • 4) Internet (share of internet users per 100 people) • 5) ‘Good governance’ • 6)Security level (Crime rate per 100,000 people) • Case studies Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014

10. Data description 1) Electoral data: Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation Excluded regions: • those, who changed the boundaries • those, reported to have high falsifications rate 2) Social-economic data: Russian Federal State Statistics Service, Moscow Carnegie Centre report Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014

11. Results. Party system institutionalisation measurement. National level Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014

12. Regional level Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014

13. The overall level of parties’ support volatility Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014

14. The effect of cleavages on volatility of electoral support Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014

15. Interpretation • National level: no stability in parties’ support within moderated elections and limited competition (the only medium-volatile is KPRF in 2007-2011) • Fluid party system within stable number of participants • Regional level: UR has the most volatile support (volatile voting twice higher than its average), KPRF has the most stable support • Voting stability/volatility in the Russian case is not determined by the voting cleavages or stable socioeconomic characteristics of the territories Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014

16. Case-studies General trends: • UR electoral support decrease in the majority of the regions in 2011 • Increase of absenteeism Deviant cases (the most unstable): • ‘The personality factor’: 1) The ‘long-living’ governor factor (Kostroma Oblast, Tomsk Oblast) 2) The opposition activity factor (AstrakhanOblast) Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014

17. Concluding remarks • Voting stability measurement – minimal requirement for party system institutionalization • Limitation of competition does not promote voters to stick to their choice and does not serve for party system institutionalisation • Voting stability/volatility is not determined by voting cleavages and stable characteristics of the territories • The more sufficient is personality factor (the governors’ and the opposition activity) + general trends which highlight the overall changing of voters attitude • Is there any ground? Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014

18. Thank you!