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Social epistemology of scientific inquiry: beyond case studies in history vs . philosophy

Social epistemology of scientific inquiry: beyond case studies in history vs . philosophy . &HPS1 (Thematic Session: Beyond Case Studies) University of Pittsburgh October 13, 2007 Melinda Bonnie Fagan Department of Philosophy Rice University . Social epistemology of scientific inquiry:.

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Social epistemology of scientific inquiry: beyond case studies in history vs . philosophy

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  1. Social epistemology of scientific inquiry: beyond case studies in history vs. philosophy &HPS1 (Thematic Session: Beyond Case Studies) University of Pittsburgh October 13, 2007 Melinda Bonnie Fagan Department of Philosophy Rice University

  2. Social epistemology of scientific inquiry: Normative: “does not merely seek to describe social practices that are actually in place, nor to trace their historical development,” but “has the distinctive normative purpose of evaluating or appraising [our] practices on the veritistic dimension, that is, in terms of their respective knowledge consequences” (Goldman 1999, 6-7). Descriptive: does seek to describe and trace the historical development of social practices actually in place, and rejects “the idea that some standards or beliefs are really rational [or objective, reliable, warranted, justified, etc.] as distinct from merely locally accepted as such” (Barnes and Bloor 1982, 27).

  3. Outline of talk: I. The problem: dilemma for social epistemology of scientific inquiry II. Social action framework and blood stem cell research III. Solution: scientific objectivity

  4. Preliminaries: Adequacy conditions: (1) distinguish scientific knowledge from opinion (2) explicate this distinction (3) in a way that relates to social aspects of our scientific practices Two approaches: (1) epistemic standard distinguishing knowledge from opinion of a piece with our scientific practices (2) … independent of our scientific practices Neither approach is adequate.

  5. Historical vs. philosophical case studies (HPS) Socio-historical case studies: epistemic standards distinguishing scientific knowledge from opinion in practice result from complex and highly contingent social negotiations (e.g., Fleck 1979[1935], Collins 1975, Knorr-Cetina 1981, Latour & Woolgar 1979, Shapin & Schaffer 1985, Latour 1988, Pickering 1995, Knorr Cetina 1999). Case studies in normative epistemology: ‘exogenous’ epistemic ideals apply to exemplary cases of scientific inquiry (e.g., Hull 1988, Longino 1990, Kitcher 1993, Goldman 1999, Solomon 2001, Kitcher 2001, Longino 2002).

  6. Social action: minimal consensus account Instrumentally rational action:fit between goals and means • achievable goal • coherent means Social action: • more than one person acts to achieve a single outcome • shared goal, coordinated means Instrumentally rational social action: • achievable shared goal • coordinated participant means Image from: Lucy Jane Bledsoe

  7. Why HSC (and why not a case study)? (1) well-suited to the problem: - complex social structure - goal-oriented - includes recognized experimental successes (2) familiarity and access (Weissman lab 1994-1997) (3) significance for history of biomedicine & stem cell research

  8. t=0 t=1d t=10d Search for HSC: therapeutic impetus 1945: embryonic blood cell exchange in bovine twins 1951: radiation rescue Clarke 1998 1961: spleen colony assay

  9. T cells B cells M-E cells Search for HSC: the spleen colony assay HSC capacities: (1) immune reconstitution (2)multi-potency (3) self-renewal Spangrude et al 1988 Till, J. E. & McCulloch, E. A. (1961). A direct measurement of the radiation sensitivity of normal mouse bone marrow cells. Radiation Research, 14, 213-222. Siminovitch, L., McCulloch, E. A., & Till, J. E. (1963). The distribution of colony-forming cells among spleen colonies. Journal of Cellular and Comparative Physiology, 62, 327-336.

  10. Search for HSC: the hematology community shared experimental system, standard representatives/PIs of main groups comparison of diverse methods

  11. Search for HSC: the Weissman lab Spangrude et al 1988 Spangrude et al 1988 Barnes 1988 (1) shared goal: developmental mechanisms of immune cells - inclusive developmental framework - emphasis on single cells (2) opportunistic use of new techniques (FACS) (3) lab as center for continuous, cumulative collaboration - within lab (changing pool of members) - within Stanford Medical Center - within international immunology community

  12. The search for HSC: examination of 1988 success (1) isolation (enrichment) of HSC from mouse bone marrow (2) new model of blood cell development, coordinating HSC capacities with cell phenotype (3) new direction and impetus for the search for HSC (cellular immunology)

  13. Search for HSC: ramifications hematopoietic stem cells cancer stem cells neural stem cells embryonic stem cells invertebrate stem cells

  14. 1989 2006 Search for HSC: further improvements Spangrude 1989 Stem Cell Institute, Lund University

  15. General result: Two aspects of scientific success recognized in practice: (1) construction of improved models of subject matter of inquiry (2) formation of new interfaces with other lines of inquiry ‘Kinship’ withnormative epistemic ideals: (1) empirical accuracy, scope, precision (2) consistency, coherence, unification Social action framework: recognized successes are participant means to shared epistemic goal (scientific knowledge)

  16. An integrative solution: • coordinated means for ongoing scientific inquiry: iterated cycles of model-construction and interface-formation (social mechanism characteristic of successful science) • epistemic standards successful models must satisfy cannot be specified in advance. • shared epistemic goal achievable by these coordinated means (precondition for understanding scientific inquiry in terms of fit between goals and means)

  17. Scientific objectivity: The goal of scientific practices is knowledge such as to possibly satisfy epistemic standards not specifiable in advance. Knowledge that is so only in virtue of the epistemic standards of specifiable groups in particular socio-historical contexts (‘knowledge by agreement’), is not so achievable. Therefore, the shared goal of scientific inquiry is knowledge independent of epistemic criteria specific to particular groups. Scientific objectivity: science aims at knowledge independent of epistemic criteria specific to particular groups.

  18. Conclusion: ‘beyond case studies’ • scientific objectivity: an epistemic ideal implicit in social aspects of scientific inquiry • beyond historical case studies: embedded in social action framework that entails minimal normative requirements, allows for generalization and robust two-part account of scientific success • beyond philosophical case studies: engaging the social aspects of our scientific practices from the outset

  19. Acknowledgements: The National Science Foundation (2006-2007) Louise McNutt Dissertation Year Fellowship (2006-2007, IUB) Mikal Lynn Sousa Award (2006, IU HPS) Thoren Award (2007, IU HPS) Colin Allen Michael Bratman Jordi Cat Robert Coffman Steve Crowley Tom Gieryn Elihu Gerson Helen Longino Sean Morrison Jutta Schickore Fred Schmitt Rob Skipper Jerry Spangrude Irv Weissman Jim Griesemer George Gutman Mark Kaplan Motonari Kondo Libuse Jerabek Adam Leite Elisabeth Lloyd

  20. Clarifications: • not an analysis of the (ambiguous) concept of objectivity, but an explication of an epistemic ideal implicit in social aspects of our scientific practices (resolves the dilemma) • not a full account of epistemic ideals for scientific knowledge, nor an account of the nature or sources of normativity (normative in two senses; a starting point)

  21. The dilemma (reprise): Are epistemic standards distinguishing scientific knowledge from opinion dependent on social structures, values or interests? Yes: epistemology describes socio-historical facts; scientific inquiry recedes into broader social fabric No: epistemology proposes abstract ideals with no clear prescriptive relation to our scientific practices Both inadequate. Solution: an epistemic standard bridging the gap between abstract ideals and our pervasively social scientific practices

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