1 / 11

Microfinance Beyond Group Lending

Microfinance Beyond Group Lending. In the last class we argued that under the threat of not being refinanced by the MFI, and under the threat of social sanctions, group–lending can potentially circumvent credit market imperfections

Télécharger la présentation

Microfinance Beyond Group Lending

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. Microfinance Beyond Group Lending • In the last class we argued that • under the threat of not being refinanced by the MFI, and • under the threat of social sanctions, group–lending can potentially circumvent credit market imperfections • Is successful implementation of the group-lending methodology only possible in densely populated areas and close – knit societies? No. In particular, in today’s class we will argue that there are other innovations: 1) Some peculiar to group – lending à la Grameen, but that do not hinge on group lending per se 2) Some that do not involve groups at all

  2. 1) Innovations that already exists in group - lending Progressive lending Assume two periods of production An investment requires $1 And at the end of each period the borrower generates y > $1 If the borrower defaults strategically, she will not be able to invest in the second period As before, we use the same methodology to determine R y + vδy = y - R + δy

  3. At the end of the first period: R = δy (1- v) which is maximized when bank sets v = 0 → R = δy

  4. Now suppose progressive lending like group – lending à la Grameen Is good for incentives as it increases the opportunity cost of non-repayment λ δy > δy And: R’= λ δy > R = δy Remark # 1: In a multi-period model borrowers can wait to strategically default until loan sizes have grown substantially unless there are reputation considerations (absent from this simple model) Remark # 2: Competition undermines a “progressive lending device”

  5. Frequent Repayment Installments

  6. Explanations: • “Early warning” system • “Saving constraints” • Capture household flows earlier Remark # 1: Transactions costs need to be relatively low Remark # 2: Seasonality in agricultural areas is a problem And, in general, covariant risk in agriculture is a major problem

  7. Targeting women • More reliable than men • More “cautious” • More sensitive to verbal hostility • Have fewer alternative sources of credit

  8. 2) Innovations not seen in group lendingCollateral

  9. Public Repayments Some advantages from the lender’s standpoint: • Threat of stigma • Transaction costs are reduced • Eliciting information about errant borrowers • Facilitates education and training • Encourages inexperienced borrowers to approach the bank • Enhancement of internal control and lower incidence of fraud

  10. Information gathering by bank staff And Cross Reporting

  11. Now, when comparing group – lending contracts with bilateral contracts we find the following: → Next class: A-M Chapter 8

More Related