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How To Recruit Spies on the Internet

How To Recruit Spies on the Internet. Ira Winkler, CISSP ira@isag.com +1-410-544-3435. I’m Sick of Wikileaks, But…. Wikileaks is an example of how an insider can become an Internet-based spy Reportedly Manning worked with Assange about passing the materials over

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How To Recruit Spies on the Internet

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  1. How To Recruit Spies on the Internet Ira Winkler, CISSP ira@isag.com +1-410-544-3435

  2. I’m Sick of Wikileaks, But… • Wikileaks is an example of how an insider can become an Internet-based spy • Reportedly Manning worked with Assange about passing the materials over • Manning had all the characteristics of a “spy” • It is easily understandable • It is an example of a spy recruiting themselves

  3. The First Time It Hit Me • Performing espionage simulation of large high tech company • Open source research found employee posting to singles website • Woman described her ideal man checklist • Security manager wanted me to be her ideal man and see what I could get out of her

  4. What is a Spy? • There are very distinct terms for different tasks within Human Intelligence • Operative – Puppet master, not James Bond • Special Agent – The term for a law enforcement officer, who tracks down spies • Agent – A person who has access to information, and is manipulated by the operative to giving it up • Black Bag Operation – An operative personally tries to compromise information • Generally very rare

  5. Operatives • Try to always keep their hands clean • Primary job is finding, recruiting and maintaining “agents” • Requires a lot of work • Trained to look for people with psychological weaknesses, who are vulnerable to manipulation • Uses a variety of techniques for information exchange once recruited

  6. Russian Illegals • These were the summer spies if you remember • Talk was how they were useless to Russia • However, • Went to top business schools • Partied with Wall Street executives • Mingled in top political and social circles • Put themselves out there as against US policies • Perfect positioning to find potential Agents • We really don’t know their successes in that regard

  7. What Do Operatives Look For? • MICE • Money • Ideology • Coercion • Ego • Frequently a combination of 2 or more • Once sucked in, they solidify the lock

  8. Stan Methodology • Look for regular bar goers • Ask for cigarette • If they talk and have access to information, follow up for next meeting • Ask for basic information • Over reward, and ask for more • Over reward, and ask for more • Get something sensitive, and lock them in with more money

  9. They Might Not Know • A good operative can sometimes get a person to give information and who doesn’t know they are an operative • Operative develops a plausible story, and the person just wants to be helpful • Usually involves a fake identity • Got Stan National Security Council information • Ideal scenario for the Internet

  10. Russian Hacker • Investigating large corporate hacking • Used line analyzer to track hacker • Watched him pop around the Internet and go in chat rooms pretending to be a 5’6”, blonde haired, green eyed, 15 year old girl • Got hackers to tell where they hacked, and asked them to prove it by providing logins, etc. • Yes, they were that dumb

  11. Changing Language Patterns • Stealing becomes borrowing, sharing, or copying • You aren’t a spy, you’re fighting for freedom • They didn’t treat you right and you’re showing them that they have to change their ways • NLP for example

  12. Agents • Manning for example • Generally have significant psychological flaws • Sometimes have gross naïveté, especially frequently when the Internet is concerned • Wanting to believe what they are told on the Internet

  13. More Than “Social Engineering” • The term has become overused and meaningless • Human elicitation is a better term • Unfortunately, the term Social Engineering has taking out the concept of “engineering” • There is a science applied by intelligence operatives • It is a repeatable process

  14. Social Networking is a Treasure Trove • Tells every aspect of your life • Tells your interests, family, employer • People discuss every aspect of their lives • People discuss problems with their employers • People leave tracks that show their vulnerabilities • People don’t realize what’s out there

  15. Spy On Yourself Project • Friend had class he taught research themselves on the Internet for a class intelligence project • Could tell when people started project, because they would show up early to class and ask how they could get the stuff off the Internet • Didn’t even include Facebook • Have you ever researched what the Internet says about you?

  16. Consider • Can you tell if someone needs money from social networks? • Can you tell someone’s ideology and preferences? • Do people post things that are inevitably embarrassing? • Can you tell if someone has ego related issues?

  17. Other People Can Post It • How many people have had “friends” post meeting attendance by you? • What about organizations publishing your involvement? • How much about you is public record? • How many of you had a picture of you turn up on the Internet? • How many of you wish something was posted about you wouldn’t have?

  18. Targeting a Person • The adversary might target an organization and then find a person who is vulnerable • An adversary might target the person specifically • Depends upon the nature of the adversary’s intent

  19. Sophisticated Adversaries • Target high value individuals • Mostly target organizations, then find vulnerable individuals • Anyone can be a target because of their relationships • Frequently, it is for obtaining computer access • Sometimes, it is for recruitment of the individual

  20. China Example • Refer to my previous talk • Search for individuals who are interested in attending a conference to send them malware and establish a foothold in the organization • Send a person a file, that appears to be from a trusted party, that is relevant to job • Requires multiple layers of research

  21. Targeting Vulnerable Individuals • Israeli soldier who posted raid in advance • Finding disgruntled people inside target • Finding groups where people share information • Cross reference it with other sources on the Internet • Establish fake friendships with fake profiles

  22. Robin Sage Issue • Someone set up a fake profile to see how many people would respond to it • Had hundreds of friends in the Intelligence and Defense communities • Started getting friend requests from hostile areas

  23. Fake Profiles and Groups are Easy to Start • Mike Murray tried to fake himself until I mentioned it would be a great attack • Regular celebrity and corporate fakes • There have not been publicly announced espionage profiles, but intelligence operatives would be foolish not to

  24. It Only Takes One • Per Stan, all an adversary needs is one person in your organization and they can get everything • Consider how much data Manning was able to compromise

  25. How I Would Do It • Search an organization • Identify as many people as possible through Google and other sources • Profile their likes, interests, friends, troubles, issues, family, etc • Create fake profiles, join relevant groups • Search for vulnerable people • Solicit as many as possible until you find a vulnerable person

  26. The Key • The people never know who they are really dealing with • Over time, I would manipulate them to give me information, whether they know they are being manipulated or not • Again, it only takes one, and there are thousands of targets • Intelligence agencies and criminals have lots of time to find that “one”

  27. For Your Reading Pleasure

  28. For More Information Ira Winkler, CISSP ira@isag.com +1-410-544-3435 http://www.facebook.com/ira.winkler @irawinkler

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