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Marc Laroche Manager, Product Evaluation marc.laroche@entrust (613) 247-3446

The Trusted PKI. Marc Laroche Manager, Product Evaluation marc.laroche@entrust.com (613) 247-3446. Agenda. The Entrust PKI, an overview Evaluation approach Common Criteria Certification: Functionality and assurance covered What is next? Entrust/PKI v5.0 evaluation Summary. CRL.

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Marc Laroche Manager, Product Evaluation marc.laroche@entrust (613) 247-3446

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  1. The Trusted PKI Marc Laroche Manager, Product Evaluation marc.laroche@entrust.com (613) 247-3446

  2. Agenda • The Entrust PKI, an overview • Evaluation approach • Common Criteria Certification: Functionality and assurance covered • What is next? Entrust/PKI v5.0 evaluation • Summary

  3. CRL Entrust/PKI The main components OS Entrust/Authority Database CM LDAP OS X.500 Directory

  4. CRL Entrust/PKI The main components OS Entrust/Authority Entrust/RA Admin API Database CM CM PKIX-CMP OS LDAP OS X.500 Directory

  5. CRL Entrust/PKI The main components OS Entrust/Authority Entrust/RA Admin API Database CM CM PKIX-CMP OS LDAP OS Entrust-Ready Applications Other CAs OS CM OS X.500 Directory Other Applications

  6. CM CM CRL Evaluation Scope Database Entrust/Authority Entrust/RA ADM API PKIX-CMP Other Applications CM X.500 Directory Entrust-Ready Applications

  7. CM CM CRL Evaluation Scope Database Entrust/Authority Entrust/RA ADM API PKIX-CMP Non Entrust-Ready Applications CM X.500 Directory Entrust-Ready Applications

  8. CM CM CRL Evaluation Scope Database Entrust/Authority Entrust/RA ADM API PKIX-CMP Non Entrust-Ready Applications CM X.500 Directory Entrust-Ready Applications

  9. CM CM CRL Evaluation Scope Database Entrust/Authority Entrust/RA ADM API PKIX-CMP Non Entrust-Ready Applications CM X.500 Directory Entrust-Ready Applications

  10. CM CM Entrust/PKI 4.0a Certification:Evaluated Functionality • User identification and authentication Entrust/Authority Entrust/RA ADM API PKIX-CMP Other CAs End-Entities

  11. User identification and authentication • User I&A before any action (FIA_UID.2 and FIA_UIA.2) • Password rules (FIA_SOS.1) • Single use authentication for user initialization, key recovery and enabling of CA cross-certification (FIA_UAU.4) • Enforced re-authentication to complete sensitive operations and after session time-out has occurred (FIA_UAU.6) • Protected authentication feedback (FIA_UAU.7) • Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1)

  12. CM CM Functions • User Id • Role • Privileges • Access Control Entrust/Authority Entrust/RA ADM API Data PKIX-CMP Access Control Mediation Other CAs End-Entities

  13. Access Control • Complete access control on CA data objects (e.g. CA signing key, user privilege vector, policy, etc) and functions (FDP_ACC.2) • Security attribute based access control (i.e. user id, role and permissions) (FDP_ACF.1) • Secure management of security attributes, including access control and enforcement of secure values (FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.2, FMT_MSA.3, FIA_ATD.1) • Secure management of security enforcing data objects (e.g. integrity check rate, database encryption algorithm, CA signing algorithm, etc.), including access control and enforcement of secure values (FMT_MTD.1 and FMT_MTD.3)

  14. CM CM • Separation of duties Security Officer Entrust/Authority Entrust/RA Administrator ADM API Master User PKIX-CMP Auditor Directory Administrator End User Others (Custom-defined)

  15. Separation of duties • Maintenance of roles and associations between users and roles (FMT_SMR.2) • Management of security functions behavior restricted to distinct roles (FMT_MOF.1 and FMT_SAE.1)

  16. CM CM CRL • Key Management Database Entrust/Authority Entrust/RA X.509v3 PKCS#1,3 FIPS 140-1 FIPS 186-1 PKIX-CMP ADM API CM X.500 Directory End User

  17. Key Management • Certificate-based key management that meets the following standards: X.509v3, PKCS#1 and 3, FIPS 140-1 and 186-1, LDAP, PKIX-CMP (FCS_CKM.2) • User initialization, key update, key recovery and encryption key back-up IAW PKIX-CMP and FIPS 140-1 (FCS_CKM.3) • Use of secrets generated by a FIPS 140-1 cryptographic module is enforced (FIA_SOS.2)

  18. CM CM CRL • Audit • Audit records are generated for a defined list of events; each record includes: log number, event description, severity level, user id, user type and state (FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_GEN.2) • Any modification to audit records is detected (FAU_STG.2) • Privileged users are provided with the capability to read audit records and look for specific information based on user-defined search criteria (FAU_SAR.1 and FAU_SAR.3) Database Entrust/Authority Entrust/RA ADM API X.500 Directory PKIX-CMP End Users Other CAs

  19. CM CM CRL • Trusted Path and Data Protection Database Entrust/Authority Entrust/RA ADM API PKIX-CMP CM End Users X.500 Directory Other CAs

  20. Trusted Path and Data Protection • Communications with remote administrative users, end users and external CAs are authenticated and protected from modification and disclosure (FTP_TRP.1) • Communications involved with automatic key management operations (e.g. key update) are protected from modification and disclosure (FTP_ITC.1) • The access control policy is enforced when data is transmitted and received, and modification, deletion, insertion or replay is detected (FPT_ITI.1) • Exchanged data is consistently interpreted (FPT_TDC.1) • Generation of evidence of origin for CA certificates, user certificates, CRLs and ARLs is enforced, and the capability to verify the evidence of origin is provided (FCO_NRO.2)

  21. Trusted Path and Data Protection (continued) • Generation of evidence that can be used as a guarantee of the validity of CA certificates, user certificates, CRLs and ARLs is enforced, and the capability to verify evidence of the validity is provided (FDP_DAU.1) • Data stored in the local database is monitored for integrity errors (FDP_SDI.1)

  22. Non-bypassability • Security enforcing functions are invoked and succeed before each function within the CA allowed to proceed (FPT_RVM.1)

  23. CM CM CRL • Cryptographic services (Environmental) Database Entrust/Authority Entrust/RA ADM API PKIX-CMP CM End-Users X.500 Directory

  24. Cryptographic services • Key and secret generation is performed by a FIPS 140-1 validated module (FCS_CKM.1 and FIA_SOS.2.1) • All plaintext keys are zeroized by a FIPS 140-1 validated cryptographic module (FCS_CKM.4) • All cryptographic operations, including pseudo-random number generation, short term key storage, encryption/decryption, signature generation and verification, hashing and MAC generation and verification are performed by a FIPS 140-1 validated cryptographic module (FCS_COP.1)

  25. CM CM • Abstract Machine Services (Environmental) • Reliable time stamps are provided for own use (FPT_STM.1) • Audit records are protected against unauthorized deletion (FAU_STG.2.1) • A security domain for own execution is maintained, which provides protection against interference and tampering by untrusted applications (FPT_SEP.1) OS OS Entrust/Authority Entrust/RA Audit ADM API PKIX-CMP Time Time

  26. And what EAL3+ means … • Internal development processes and systems were documented and reviewed. • Configuration management (source code, documentation, test plans); evidence that CM is actually used; measures that allow only authorized changes to configuration items. • Security measures (physical, procedural, personnel and other used to protect the development environment). • Flaw reporting procedures + • Problem tracking + • Product delivery • Design was documented and reviewed for conformance with claimed functionality. • Informal functional specification • High-level design (description of security functions in terms of subsystems and relates subsystems to the functions that they provide; description of the interfaces between these subsystems).

  27. Continued ... • User documentation was reviewed: • Installation guidance • Administrative guidance • Informal correspondence demonstration was reviewed: • More abstract representation (claimed functionality) is correctly and completely refined in the less abstract representation (FS and HLS). • Test plans, test procedures, expected test results and actual test results were submitted and reviewed: • Demonstrate that each security function was tested against the functional specification in a systematic manner. • Demonstrate that the tests are sufficient to confirm that the security functions operate IAW the High-Level Design; demonstrate that the internal interfaces are exercised. • Vulnerability analysis was submitted and reviewed. • Categorization report was submitted and reviewed.+ • subcomponents are described as security enforcing or not.

  28. Entrust/PKI 5.0 evaluation:Augmented from 4.0a • Functionality • Enforced proof of receipt - keys and certificate (FCO_NRR.2) • Residual information protection (FDP_RIP.1) • Automated recovery of services (FPT_RCV.2) • Replay detection - certificate request (FPT_RPL.1) • Session locking (FTA_SSL.1 and FTA_SSL.2) • Assurance - EAL-CS2 • ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model • AVA_MSU.2 Validation of analysis

  29. In summary • The Entrust/PKI evaluations cover: • cryptographic services • essential public key management functionality • supportive security critical functionality • The Common Criteria certification serves as a fundamental extension to the FIPS 140-1 process. • The selected CC assurance components (EAL3+) provide a maximum amount of confidence consistent with existing best practices for COTS development.

  30. Questions? For more information: http://www.entrust.com/entrust/validation.htm E-mail: marc.laroche@entrust.com Tel: (613)247-3446

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