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U-2s and Spy vs Spy

U-2s and Spy vs Spy. The Khrushchev Era. The Soviet Premier’s visit to the US in 1959 included Hollywood, an Iowa farm, raised hopes that US/Soviet relations were finally warming This false sense of security did not consider that the USSR was furiously working to build nuclear ICBMs.

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U-2s and Spy vs Spy

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  1. U-2s and Spy vs Spy

  2. The Khrushchev Era • The Soviet Premier’s visit to the US in 1959 included Hollywood, an Iowa farm, raised hopes that US/Soviet relations were finally warming • This false sense of security did not consider that the USSR was furiously working to build nuclear ICBMs

  3. While the Soviets had an extensive underground spy network providing a continuous stream of intelligence to the USSR • The Americans relied more on technology for intelligence gathering: balloons, manned aircraft, satellites to probe the iron curtain Henry Kissinger once described the Cold War behavior of the United States and the Soviet Union as being "like two heavily armed men feeling their way around a dark room, each believing himself in mortal peril from the other, whom he assumes to have perfect vision.

  4. The 1950’s • After the shock of First Lightning and other Soviet nuclear weapons developments, Eisenhower felt compelled to develop two vital intelligence functions which didn’t exist: • Warn against surprise attack by Soviet Union • Provide intelligence on Soviet weapons developments which the President needed to make good national security decisions • Eisenhower commissioned CIA director Allen Dulles to develop a photographic reconnaissance aircraft that could overfly the Soviet Union higher than any aircraft known to exist, obtain high resolution photos and deliver them to photo interpretation centers. CIA pulled together the best of the industry and academia: Lockheed’s Kelly Johnson, Polaroid’s Edwin Land and experts from MIT, Harvard and the Asst Secy of Air Force

  5. The end result: U-2 • In 88 days, the “Skunk Works” rolled out the prototype U-2 on August 1, 1955. • The design married glider wings with a modified F-104 Starfighter fuselage and could achieve altitudes in excess of 70,000 feet. The aircraft was difficult to fly.

  6. U-2 Over-Flights of Soviet Union • U-2 s began flights into Soviet airspace on June 20, 1956. Although the flights were detected & tracked by Soviet air defense radars, Soviet interceptors (MiG-19s and Su-9s) were not able to reach the intruders. • In 1958, President Eisenhower questioned whether the risk of exacerbating an international incident was worth the benefit of intelligence received from U-2 flights stating that detection of surprise attack was the most important objective • Advisors conceded that while the U-2 does not solve this objective, the intelligence gained was very valuable; the flights continued….

  7. Ten-Ten • In order to facilitate over flights into Central Asia (esp the Tyuratam missile launch facility), President Eisenhower secured permission from Pakistani President Suhrawardy to establish U-2 bases at Peshawar Airbase in July 1957. The flights would land at bases in Iran (Imperial), Norway and Turkey. • The U-2s were assigned to the 10-10 detachment at Incirlik, Turkey as part of TUSLOG (Turkey-US logistics group)

  8. U-2Flight Track

  9. U-2 Over-Flights of Soviet Union • In Dec 1958, the USAF secretly tested the ability of the F-104 and F-102 to intercept the U-2: • Although F-104 could not fly above 60,000 ft, it could by sheer momentum, punch up to co-altitude with U-2 for 30 seconds; not enough time to achieve intercept. • The F-102 was able to acquire and achieve a fire control solution on the U-2, but it is not believed that Soviets possessed air-to-air missiles capable of achieving this interception. • It was concluded that “successful intercept of the U-2 by Soviet defensive fighters for the next few months is unlikely.” • By April 1959, it was recognized that the major threat to U-2 was the Soviet SAM. The President was growing uneasy with the over-flights and suspended U-2 operations from September 1959 through April 1960.

  10. Missile Gap Disproved • In April 1959, it was recognized that the major threat to the US was Soviet ICBMs but despite Khrushchev’s claims of serial production and popular impression of Soviets having 1500 missiles to attack the US, the U-2 flights showed no evidence to support such claims. • This important information allowed the President to resist pressure to build more ICBMs “to catch up with Soviets” and closed the so-called “missile gap”

  11. Powers Goes Down! • Two weeks before the Four-Power Summit Conference in Paris, Eisenhower took a risk in continuing U-2 over flights. One flight on April 9, 1960 was successful despite Soviet attempts to intercept the plane. The next flight… • On May 1, 1960, former USAF pilot Francis Gary Powers took off from Peshawar entered Soviet airspace on most ambitious track to date (Grand Slam) to photograph ICBM sites around Sverdlovsk and Plesetsk, Ural railroad yards, ICBM sites in Siberia, shipyards in Northern Russia then escape into Arctic Circle and land at Bodø, Norway. • Soviet air defenses were on red alert.MiG-19s and Su-9s were ordered by Khrushchev to attack and ram if necessary the intruder but were unable to reach the high-flying U-2. • When mission was 70 miles west of Sverdlovsk, Powers was shot down. What exactly happened depends on which Soviet officer tells the story:

  12. Powers Goes Down! • Oleg Penkovsky (GRU); a salvo of 14 SA-2 missiles bagged the U-2 • Capt Mentyukov flying an unarmed (so that it could reach the U-2) Su-9 caught the U-2 in slipstream, flipped caused wings to break off • Khrushchev’s son reported that the Su-9 missed, then a single SA-2 missile exploded behind U-2, breaking off wings. Additional 13 SA-2s launched because of uncertainty of the kill and accidently destroyed a pursuing MiG-19 (friendly fire). • Less credible stories involve a preset bomb going off. GRU spies at Bodǿ were tipping off Soviets with flight schedule information

  13. Powers Goes Down! • Powers managed to bail out of the crumbling plane. • But was captured as he parachuted to the ground. Pieces of the wreckage were recovered intact including cameras loaded with condemning pictures • Up until May 7, the US, unaware of the capture, released cover-up story that NASA weather research plane strayed off course from Turkey • On May 7, 1960, Khrushchev confronted US with the evidence: Powers alive and large pieces of wreckage

  14. Eisenhower Admits to Spying • An international political embarrassment for US, the wreckage was put on public display in Gorky Park on May 11, 1960 • President Eisenhower publically acknowledged responsibility for the U-2 flights • Powers was tried in USSR Supreme Court for crimes of espionage and violation of sovereignty of the USSR in August 1960.

  15. Powers Guilty • Roman Rudenko, the Soviets' chief prosecutor in the Francis Gary Powers trial, called our U-2 program "a graphic example of criminal collusion between a big American capitalist company, an espionage center, and the US military." • Soviet Supreme Court found Powers guilty and sentenced him to 10 years confinement • The first three years in prison • Then seven years hard labor • He only served 1 year 9 months and 9 days before being traded for the Soviet spy Colonel Rudolph Ivanovich Abel.

  16. International Law • Chicago Convention (ICAO) on Sovereignty: • “The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.” • The limits of that “airspace” are not defined and certainly do not include space • Attempts by USSR to include space countered by recognition that Sputnik would then be in violation • ICAO entered into force for US and USSR in 1947 when high altitude flight inconceivable • Issues other than “sovereignty” were involved in Powers case: espionage • The espionage agent is “out in the cold” by himself, not protected by his state • Conventional practice is not to charge offending states with espionage crimes but to “counter-attack” in kind • There is no law that spying per se is an international offense • Powers was condemned by Soviet law although UN charter was evoked: • UN Charter Article 2(4): All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. • No other nation has used this article to condemn espionage

  17. Repercussions of the U-2 Incident • Public protests began in Japan and the U-2s were withdrawn from there and all its other overseas detachments as well. No more intentional manned US reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union • Tensions also ran high the following week with Khrushchev threatening retaliation against U-2 bases on May 15 and walking out of the Paris summit, effectively collapsing the peace talks on May 16. • The hoped for nuclear weapons test ban treaty would not be realized during Eisenhower’s administration • Soviet relations with Pakistan, Turkey, Iran and Norway were irrevocably damaged • Pakistani General states "Pakistan felt deceived because the US had kept her in the dark about such clandestine spy operations launched from Pakistan’s territory."

  18. United Nations • May 23, 1960, Khrushchev openly charged the US with espionage, calling for condemnation by the Security Council of the aggressive acts of the United States • In unprecedented admission of responsibility, President Eisenhower justified the action • “to obtain information now concealed behind the iron curtain in order to lessen the danger of surprise attack on the free world” • US offered an "open skies" counter proposal to the USSR allowing reciprocal flights over one another's territory • USSR was overwhelmingly outvoted & its proposed resolution to condemn US defeated

  19. Justification Of U-2 Flights • While Soviet over-flights of the US have never been acknowledged by NORAD, Soviet aircraft have violated airspace of other free world countries to do reconnaissance: Iran, Pakistan, Japan, Turkey, etc. • The information provided by U-2 flights prevented the President from accelerating the arms race when there was political pressure to do so • Espionage is not illegal in itself and the Soviets have used extensive human intelligence in US, UK without receiving international condemnation

  20. Condemnation of U-2 Flights • Over flights may be violation of international law respecting the sovereignty of nations but the limits of this are not defined • The timing of resumption of over-flights was bad when the US • was about to engage the Soviet Union in peace talks • was on the doorstep of a more acceptable means of photographic intelligence i.e. “Corona” satellite • was in a Presidential election year

  21. The Corona Project • Even the most advanced aircraft would eventually become vulnerable • The only logical answer to unhindered photographic reconnaissance was the satellite, known as the Corona Project • As early as 1959, Eisenhower was briefed by Dr Land (Polaroid) concerning the high resolution cameras available for satellites and the only thing missing was an adequate launch vehicle. (Thor rocket was not reliable)

  22. The Corona Project Ironically, on the day Powers was sentenced—August 19, 1960—the U.S. launched the first Corona satellite, recovering a film package from it by an awaiting aircraft over the Pacific Ocean. • The Corona's pictures showed more of the Soviet Union (albeit at lower resolution) than all reconnaissance missions made up to that time by the U-2 and high-altitude balloons. • From that day forward satellites, not airplanes, would provide photo intelligence of Soviet activity—and would do so without political risk.

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