Constitutional Framework for the Modern Juvenile Court

Constitutional Framework for the Modern Juvenile Court Class 17

Case of the Day • In the Interest of D.A.S., Appellate Docket 688 MDA 2005 (PA), Court of Common Pleas 17th Judicial District, No. 40JV04 (March 2005). • Facts • D.S. is 11 year old boy with Asperger’s Syndrome, a form of autism spectrum disorder • He committed a series of offenses in his 5th grade special education classroom over two dates, police were called both times to remove him from classroom. This was D.S.’ first contact with police • Prosecutor filed delinquency petition • Family filed for special hearing with school district to get stronger services in school for D.S.

At adjudication hearing, Juvenile Court excluded testimony of Dr. Powell, a neuropsychologist who had examined D.S. as to his culpability • But Juvenile Court allowed Dr. Powell to testify at disposition hearing • Meanwhile, Special Ed Hearing found in favor of D.S. and his family, citing inadequate behavioral and therapeutic supports in the school’s special ed program (upheld on appeal) • D.S. was found delinquent on several (but not all) of the charges and was placed on indefinite probation with both treatment and reporting requirements • D.S. appealed delinquency petition, citing diminished responsibility due to his disability. Trial court and Court of Common Pleas rejected the appeals.

Issues • Is evidence of school failure to provide adequate services probative of D.S.’ culpability? • Would greater therapeutic integrity in the classroom have mitigated D.S.’ behavior? Is this contextual information relevant in fact finding proceeding? • 20 USC 1415(k)(9)(B) re special ed laws when a crime is alleged • In re C.M.T. (PA case) re special ed services and dependency proceedings • But see Osby v Texas, as example of ‘environmental’ defense • Does due process requirement hold in D.S.’ claim that exculpatory evidence in testimony from Dr. Powell should have been admitted? • Relevance of Winship? • Does neuropsychological condition compromise mens rea? (see In re G.T., PA case setting a mens rea standard in juvenile court) • Did D.S. act ‘voluntarily’? Implication of limbic system in behavior … heightened arousal in the face of threat…but how does his otherwise controlled behavior undermine his neuropsych claim? • D.S. acted in self-defense…but does Asperger’s skew the calculus of self-defense? “Reasonable belief”? (again, see Osby)

The First 50 Years:Jurisprudential Stability • During the early years of the juvenile court, issues arising from juvenile delinquency proceedings rarely came before the U.S. Supreme Court • Haley v. Ohio (1948) • “Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy of any race. He cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity….This is the period of great instability which the crisis of adolescence produces." • Gallegos v. Colorado (1962) • “A fourteen-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated,…is not equal to the police in knowledge and understanding…and is unable to know how to protect his own interests or how to get the benefit of his constitutional rights…” • By any standard, the juvenile court was a spectacular institutional success • By mid-century, both interventionist and diversionary philosophies were unchallenged in the U.S. and imitated around the world • Broad acceptance of stigma avoidance prong of juvenile court • Preference for informality and broad but benign power • Institutionalized culturally and jurisprudentially

Diverging Trends • Philosophy of state intervention in the lives of children who commit crimes crumbled in the 1960s • ‘Naïve arrogance’ of rehabilitative ideal was exposed in the underlying twin realities of punitiveness and weak interventions • Social movements for rights washed over juvenile court and transformed it • But the juvenile court survives, especially its diversionary (stigma) prong • Perhaps this was the stronger philosophy, and justifies a separate legal institution even as proportionality and public safety dominate the discourse at the court’s borders • The modern struggle is to reconcile due process rules with this diversionary philosophy – the juvenile-court-as-triage

Transfer To Criminal Court • Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541 (1966) • Facts: • Sixteen-year-old Morris Kent charged with rape and robbery while on probation for another offense. • Upon being apprehended, Kent was interrogated by police officers and admitted his involvement; his mother was unaware he was taken into custody and no attorney was present • Mother retained counsel who filed a motion requesting a hearing on jurisdiction • Juvenile court judge does not rule on the motion, but waives jurisdiction after making a “full investigation”

Ruling: Procedural Formality in Waiver Decisions • The Court referred to evidence that juveniles may receive the “worst of both worlds”— “neither the protection accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.” • Juveniles who were waived to the adult court had rights due process protections right to counsel, notice of charges, access to records, and notice or reasons for waiver • Kent ruled that waiver could not be made based solely on the discretion of the judge, and that the court should promote standards to guide the transfer decision and make it fair and consistent.

Waiver Standards Under Kent • The Supreme Court declined to state what standards should apply, deferring to the individual states. The Kent Court referred to a 1959 policy memorandum from the U.S. District court suggesting principles to guide judges in making transfer decisions. • However, in an Appendix to the decision, they endorsed guidelines that had been adopted by the D.C. Circuit Court, and “suggested” that these factors be considered by judges when making waiver decisions:

Constitutional Domestication of the Juvenile Court • In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) • Facts: • Fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault taken into custody for allegedly making an obscene phone call • Gault had previously been placed on probation. • Police did not leave notice with his parents, who were at work, that their son had been arrested • Formal petition filed on the hearing day; made no reference to any factual basis for judicial action • No one was sworn in at the hearing; no transcript or recording was made • Gault committed to the State Industrial School until he reached the age of 21 • No appeal permitted in juvenile cases under Arizona law

Ruling • The Court found that Gault was being punished rather than helped by the juvenile court. The Court explicitly rejected the doctrine of parens patriae as the founding principle of juvenile justice, describing the concept as murky and of dubious historical relevance. The Court concluded that the handling of Gault's case violated the due process clause of the 14th amendment: • "Juvenile court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure."

Procedural Requirements • Notice of Charges • Due process of law requires notice that would be adequate in a criminal or civil proceeding • Must provide timely notice, in advance of the hearing, of specific issues • Right to Counsel • Must be notified of right to counsel, or if they are unable to afford representation, that counsel will be appointed. • “The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it. The child ‘requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.’”

Procedural Requirements • Confrontation, Self-Incrimination, & Cross Examination • The juvenile has the right to confront the witnesses against him or her in the hearing on guilt or innocence and to cross-examine those witnesses. • The privilege against self-incrimination applies to juvenile proceedings and the child must be informed of that right as well. • Appellate Review and Transcript of Proceedings • Court must maintain a written record or its equivalent adequate to permit effective review on appeal.

Fortas’ Justification • “While due process requirements will….introduce a degree of order and regularity … and in contested cases will introduce some elements of the adversary system, nothing will require that the conception of the kindly juvenile court judge be replaced by its opposite.” • Due process, then, will not hinder identification of the child’s needs – TRUE? • But due process in the juvenile court can preserve separate jurisdiction, which serves the diversionary and stigma avoidance rationales

“Hindering the Juvenile Court” • Justice Harlan’s dissent • Formality “…would create the atmosphere of an ordinary criminal trial” and jeopardize the court’s substantive mission • Only notice of charges, right to counsel, appellate review, and transcript of proceedings should be required by juvenile courts • The self-incrimination, confrontation, and cross-examination requirements radically alter the character of juvenile court proceedings • Court should impose no more procedural restrictions than are necessary to ensure fundamental fairness • States should be given the opportunity to develop their juvenile court systems without unnecessary hindrance

Fundamental Distinction Between Juvenile & Criminal Proceedings • Justice Stewart’s dissent • Court’s decision is constitutionally unsound and amounts to bad judicial policy • Juvenile proceedings are not adversary proceedings; its mission is antithetical to a prosecution in criminal court • “The inflexible restrictions that the Constitution so wisely made applicable to adversary criminal trials have no inevitable place in the proceedings of those public social agencies known as juvenile or family courts…and invite a step backwards into…an era [when] there were no juvenile proceedings, and a child was tried in a conventional criminal court with all the trappings of a conventional criminal trial.”

Standard of Proof • In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) • Facts: • Twelve-year-old boy steals $112 from a woman’s pocketbook • Judge acknowledges that proof might not survive reasonable doubt standard, but rejects Winship’s argument that such proof is required by the Fourteenth Amendment • Issue: Is proof beyond a reasonable doubt among the ‘essentials of due process and fair treatment’ required during the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is charged with an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult?

Reasonable Doubt v. Preponderance • N.Y. Court of Appeals • Delinquency adjudication is not a ‘conviction’ and therefore affects no right or privilege • No deprivation of due process in statutory provision because delinquency status is not made a crime and the proceedings are not criminal • Preponderance standard justified because juvenile proceedings are designed ‘not to punish, but to save the child’ • ‘Tenuous difference’ between reasonable doubt and preponderance standards

Reasonable Doubt v. Preponderance • U.S. Supreme Court (Justice Brennan) • No merit in Court of Appeals arguments; decision in Gault rejected those justifications • Reasonable doubt standard is an essential due process safeguard • “…the constitutional safeguard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is as much required during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceedings as are those constitutional safeguards applied in Gault…”

Concurrence • Justice Harlan • Although the consequences are not identical to those in a criminal case, the differences do not support a distinction in the standard of proof • Reasonable doubt standard premised on the belief that it is better to let a guilty man go free than convict an innocent man • Reasonable doubt standard does not: • Interfere with rehabilitation • Further stigmatize youth • Burden juvenile courts

Dissent • Justice Burger & Justice Stewart • Court’s decision further erodes the differences between the juvenile and criminal courts • Juvenile court requires flexibility, not judicial formulism • Justice Black • Literal interpretation of the Constitution • Reasonable doubt standard not implied nor stated • ‘Due process of law’ given an unjustifiably broad interpretation

What Justifies This Standard of Proof in a Juvenile Court? • Avoidance of wrongful conviction and exposure to punishment? • But wouldn’t that be reversed in the juvenile court – “…better to help 10 innocent kids than to let one go free who needs the Court’s help” • Gault and Winship reject that idea…and with it, reject the interventionist prong of juvenile court ideology • Formality and due process are orthogonal to the question of diversion, or avoidance of criminal court harm….the standard of proof is irrelevant if the court shields the kid from the social and psychological harms of adult punishment • And the court’s language is irrelevant, too • So, the modern philosophy of the juvenile court is, in some ways, simply a lesser-of-evils paradigm • And then punitive motives no longer have to be camouflaged as rehabilitative sanctions • After Winship, the tension between the interventionist and diversionary juvenile courts had been resolved, and the diversionary rationale survived and dominated

Trial By Jury • McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) • Facts: • Sixteen year old McKeiver charged with robbery, larceny, and receiving stolen goods • Terry, age 15, charged with assault and battery on police officer • Barrus and 45 other children charged with various misdemeanors in connection with a series of demonstrations • All face possible incarceration (6 to 10 years) • All denied request to trial by jury • Issue: Is there a constitutional right to a jury trial in juvenile court? • Court: Trial by jury in the juvenile court’s adjudicative stage is not a constitutional requirement

Court’s Reasoning in McKeiver • Court has refrained from issuing a flat holding that juveniles are entitled to the same rights as adults accused of a crime • Trial by jury would remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process • A jury is not a necessary part of a fair and equitable criminal process • Trial by jury would not strengthen fact-finding, but would erode the juvenile court’s ability to function in a unique manner. • Right to jury trial would not remedy the system’s defects

Court’s Reasoning in McKeiver • Abuses in juvenile court result from a general lack of resources and dedication, not inherent unfairness • A juvenile court judge can use an advisory jury when necessary • A majority of states by statute deny juveniles a right to jury trial • Jury trial would entail delay, formality, and clamor of the adversary system, and possibly a public trial • Equating the adjudicative phase of the juvenile proceeding with a criminal trial ignores the aspects of fairness, concern, sympathy, and paternal attention inherent in the juvenile system (despite punitiveness? See Marshall’s dissent)

Concurrence/Dissent • Justice Brennan • Due process in juvenile delinquency proceedings are not criminal prosecutions and therefore do not require jury trials on demand so long as some other aspect of the process adequately protects the interests that jury trials are intended to serve • For juveniles, those interests can be met by public trials • PA has no statutory bar to public trials • However, NC law permits or requires exclusion of the general public from juvenile trials

Dissent • Justices Douglas, Black, and Marshall • Conviction of these crimes would subject a person, whether a juvenile or adult, to imprisonment • Fourteenth/Sixth Amendments speak of denial of rights to “any person,” not denial of rights to “any adult person” • Trial by jury would provide youth with a safeguard against being prejudged by a biased judge

Constitutional Framework for the Modern Juvenile Court