Bridging research and policy in a supply and demand framework

1. Bridging research and policy in a supply and demand framework role of external agencies/donors

2. Analytical framework • Basis – GDN Bridging project (global), ODI RAPID program (developing countries) • Demand <=> factors of political context: • Routine processes (transparent or not, open or not, specific entry points) • Nature of politics and culture (degree of contestation, participatory or top-down) • “windows of opportunities”: (crisis – revolutions and public protest, new opportunities – EU or regional integration, new government/minister, parliamentary hearings)

3. Analytical framework - 2 • Supply <=> knowledge production • Timeliness, relevance • Quality and trust (are you speaking with authority?) • Packaging and delivery (working paper, policy brief, policy memo, concept of a law, “idea”)

4. Analytical framework - 3 • Linkages: • Intermediary organizations (filtering and amplifying research messages, organizing meetings, outsourcing analytical tasks) – “connectors” between different epistemic communities. CRS as an “ideal type”? • Media • Civil society groups, advocacy coalitions, political parties

5. Analytical framework - 4 • External influences (IFI’s, international donors) • Agenda setting (IMF) • Technical assistance (by-product – capacity building or crowding out local suppliers?) • Capacity building for researchers and policymakers (funding research, training, networking, etc.) • Promoting “Open society” institutions

6. Transition countries - demand • The nature of politics and general characteristics of the policymaking processes are not “great”, but there are many windows of opportunities: • Market reforms (privatization, financial sector, etc.) • Government reforms (also local level) • Social sector and education reforms • Regional (dis)integration processes • Partial funding is available from outside donors (DFID, USAID, etc.) and creditors (WB). Governments are increasingly able and willing to pay for consulting services (Russia, Kazakhstan).

7. Transition countries - demand • Demand is articulated through consulting contracts (examples from Russia): • administrative reform (HSE) • issuance of regional bonds – Economic Expert Group; • municipal-level strategic planning – Leontieff Center (SPb), Urban Institute (Moscow); • Reform of budgeting procedures at the regional level – Fiscal Policy Center, • Reform of public utilities – Fiscal Policy Center, Urban Institute

8. Transition countries - demand • Demand is articulated through government-affiliated think-tanks (“revolving door”) • Dvorkovich’s Economic Expert Group, Moscow (MinFin) • Gref’s Center for Strategic Planning (MinEconDev&Trade) • Medvedkov’s Center for Trade Policy and Law (MinEconDev&Trade) • Center for Sustainable Development (Astana Akimat) • and creation of in-house research departments, e.g. within central banks

9. Transition countries - supply • Government-related (semi-independent?): new, through revolving door, or former state institutes • Limited research, mostly policy consulting • Independent, western-funded. Different models: CEFIR vs. International Centre for Policy Studies, Kyiv vs. CEP-Tashkent • Academic research and “policy analysis” for western clients, limited policy consulting with western funding

10. Supply side problems • Incentives: production of timely and operational knowledge is not the primary function of independent think-tanks. Among other reasons, because of their “independence” from government funding and dependence on western funding => inclination to produce for western clients and audiences • Non-operational knowledge has “value”, but not local “market value”, because civil society institutions and other “transmission” mechanisms are underdeveloped.

11. Supply side problems - 2 • Independence has a price – no steady source of income (budget transfers, “voluntary contributions” by private sector, tuition?) • Endowments – the US model – are exception, not the rule (International Centre for Policy Studies) • Partnerships with research universities or business schools are rare (IPM, NES/CEFIR, HSE). Tuition could provide a steady source of income + faculty sharing

12. Supply side problems - 3 • Western project funding is short-term and phasing out. EU? • Vicious circle: too many loosely connected and small projects, lack of focus and strategy, low-quality outputs b.c. monitoring is costly • Implications: • Difficult to attract and retain qualified cadre • Investments in quality is delayed • Reputation is damaged beyond repair • “Imagine you had a million dollars”. CEFIR?

13. Role of donors – long-term • Facilitate strategic re-orientation and re-structuring • Facilitate mergers and strategic alliances • Create endowments for “legacy” institutions (help bring private donors on board)

14. Business models for independent think-tanks • Strategic alliances: • With government: CSR, CER. Ensures access to policymaking, but may be difficult to maintain independence. • With business: Public Policy Institute-Bishkek (Aki-Press, Business club). How to maintain independence? • With a business school (IPM): how to make it mutually beneficial beyond “marketing”? Sharing faculty requires extending MBA curriculum beyond business. • With an economics department (CERGE EI, NES/CEFIR): faculty can be shared (cost reduction), but income stream is not guaranteed. Ph.D. and western-style MA are costly, while tuition is low. Requires BA or MBA. • With an “outreach” operation (CEFIR/EERC) – banking on local corporate funding. Requires development of relevant products, beyond research. • SA and mergers often don’t happen until too late 